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ABSTR.A.CT
U.S. Population Policies and Environm ental Ethics:
Addressing Population Growifa from the 
Biocentric Perspective
by
Phil MacWilliams
Dr. Barbara Brents, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Sociology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
When the environmental movement began to surge in the 1960s, concerns were 
raised over the prospects o f the U.S. population growing to an unsustainable level and 
causing irreparable harm to the environment and our quality o f life. Unfortunately, 
population growth has not been given the priority it deserves not because it is not an 
important issue, but because o f our failure to view population growth, and all 
environmental issues, from a biocentric outlook. It is this paradigm shift towards 
biocentrism that we as moral agents should be making and which will subsequently cause 
us to view population growth in a new way. This argument is made by illuminating the 
inadequacies o f the traditional anthropocentric ways o f defining environmental issues, 
and then presenting and defending the biocentric ethics that we should use to supplement 
our traditional outlook on our place in the environment and how we treat it and its 
nonhuman inhabitants.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The human population continues to grow at an exponential rate across the earth. 
Although substantial efforts to halt this growth have been made in the last few decades 
(and have in many ways enjoyed some success), the global population continues to 
increase at a rate of ten thousand people per hour. The vast majority o f this population 
growth occurs in the Third World (now commonly referred to as "Least Developed 
Countries") and these nations are impacted the most by problems that result from rapid 
population growth. Subsequently, there has been a substantial amount of attention 
directed towards Third World population growth and the problems that seem to inevitably 
come along with it. At the same time, however, many countries in the developed world 
have achieved population stabilization and in some cases are even experiencing a decline 
in population. There is, though, a glaring exception to the norm of First World 
population stabilization: the United States. The U.S. is currently the third most populous 
country in the world behind China and India, respectively. And with an annual rate o f 
growth that is the highest o f any industrialized nation, the current U.S. population of 270 
million may very well reach the 400 million mark by the middle o f the 21st century.'
 ̂ Bouvier, Leon F. and Grant, Lindsay. How Many Americans? Population,
Immigration, and the Environment. (San Fransisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), 62.
1
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This thesis will focus on U.S. population growth and will argue that the United States, 
taking into consideration that no further population growth is needed to ensure our 
survival or our quality o f life, should stabilize its population. Note that the term "should" 
is used instead of "needs to." The reasons for this will become clear as the thesis 
progresses. Also note that the term "population stabilization" is used instead of 
"population control.” Although these terms are unfortunately (and incorrectly) used 
interchangeably, there is quite a difference. Not only is population stabilization a much 
more mild term that population control, they also differ in the purpose that each has and 
subsequently the policies that each result in. This will also be emphasized and expanded 
on throughout the thesis as well.Although this thesis does not attempt to define what the 
"optimum population" for the U.S. would be and for the most part refrains from engaging 
in that sort o f utopian fancy, as a generalization it can said that achieving a total fertility 
rate of 1.5 and an annual immigration level of about 500,000 per year would create 
conditions that allow us to live according to ethical principles that are espoused in this 
thesis.
Having stated the purpose o f  this thesis, there are three questions that immediately 
come to mind, and it is best to address them from the start. First, if  we are worried about 
environmental damage, why should we focus on U.S. population growth instead o f the 
populations in the developing world? After all, this is where the vast majority of 21st 
century population growth will occur and where most of the environmental destruction is 
likely to occur. Second, why focus on population instead of consumption? Many argue 
that we have a consumption problem instead o f a population problem, and in many ways 
there is great tmth to this statement. Third, even if it is agreed that population
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stabilization is something we should attempt to attain in the U.S., what kind of policies 
would such an endeavor require? Any talk o f population growth tends to conjure up 
images o f restrictive population policies o f such nations as India and China, and these are 
legitimate concerns. 1 will address each of these questions in nun.
Why Focus on U.S. Population Growth?
There are three general reasons for writing a thesis that focuses on the U.S. 
population instead of the developing world: the practical, the political, and the ethical. 
Practically speaking, few would argue that the developing world does not have a 
population problem. The many problems that are created by the rapid population growth 
in those areas o f the world, with environmental damage being just one o f them, are well 
documented. By comparison, U.S. population growth- which is quite rapid when 
compared to our industrialized counterparts- has received very little attention yet creates 
many problems that must be addressed. O f course, what we perceive these problems and 
their severity to be is subject to what branch of environmental ethics we subscribe to. 
This is a point that will be made numerous times throughout the thesis. The point is, 
though, that U.S. population growth is a problem that has not received the attention it 
warrants, and this thesis is a vehicle for changing that. Within the circle of 
environmentalism, population growth is seen as a problem that must be addressed, but 
outside o f that circle and within the general public it is not as recognized as certain 
“major” issues such as global warming or rainforest destruction. Furthermore, and 
perhaps more importantly, the attention that it has received is unsatisfactory not just in its 
scope but also in its depth. The arguments that are made for population stabilization are
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often based on individual notions of what a model society should look like, nostalgia, and 
an examination o f environmental damage purportedly linked to population growth that is 
not nearly critical enough. Most of these arguments are good at grabbing one’s attention, 
but are not satisfying when scrutinized as closely as they should be. Not only that, those 
who do argue that population stabilization is a critical element o f environmental 
protection often treat is as an assumption rather than something that needs to be 
thoroughly supported. Therefore, there clearly is a need to take this issue and address it 
in a fresh way and in a more detailed and critical way than is normally done.
Politically, the U.S. must realize that it is a world leader. Perhaps the only true 
world leader at this point in time. This requires us to set the example in everything we 
do, including how we address population growth. The U.S. has been instrumental in 
helping many developing nations to create programs and polices to curb their population 
growth. Although the U.S. growth rate is much slower and our problems of a lesser 
magnitude, it is still hypocritical to tell other nations to stabilize their populations while 
we do little about our own.
Addressing the ethical aspect of why we should stabilize population growth is 
what forms the bulk of this thesis. Taking into consideration the high quality of life in 
the U.S. (at least materially speaking) as well as our relative success in preserving and 
protecting the environment, it would seem as if  population growth is a "Third World" 
problem. In many ways, however, the quality o f life enjoyed in the United States will 
stand to suffer if  the population continues to grow as much as the Census Bureau projects 
it will. One can easily envision the congestion and overcrowding that such growth 
(barring any drastic change in our lifestyles, o f course) may cause. In the past, "surplus"
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populations could emigrate to newly discovered continents or venture out towards the 
frontier. More recently, aided by the affordability of the automobile, Americans have 
been able to create a new type o f living area called the suburbs and thus escape the 
increasingly crowded urban areas. But it seems as if we are approaching the end o f  the 
line when it comes to finding new outlets for a growing population. There are fewer 
places left that have not become subdued, altered, and inhabited by humans, and there is a 
strong and growing desire among many Americans to allow those areas that have not to 
remain as nature made them. Therefore, it seems as if the next 100 million-plus 
Americans will be forced to share the same cramped living spaces that we currently have. 
The prospects o f such living conditions has many Americans yearning for a stabilization 
o f the population. In one poll taken, 93% of those polled felt that the U.S. population was 
either currently at its optimal level (meaning further growth is undesirable) or was 
already too big. This attitude shared by many Americans is undoubtedly linked to the 
general feeling o f overcrowding, traffic congestion, increased noise pollution, crowded 
and overused recreation areas, and lack of serenity, to name just a few.
The inconveniences that have resulted from population growth are certainly not 
the only problems that population growth causes and are probably not sufficient reasons 
to warrant the creation of population policies aimed at stabilizing our growth. To support 
such an argument there must be evidence that human population growth will cause 
problems o f such magnitude that they will no longer merely be an inconvenience, but will 
breach our ethical duties. There are many serious problems that stem from population 
growth (as either a direct cause o f or an important factor in) that would rise to this level. 
For instance, it has been argued that population growth can hinder a society's ability to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
educate its members sufficiently, that population growth has in some cases resulted in 
extreme poverty, and that population growth can lead to instability because of the friction 
created as neighbors converge and feud over resources. All o f these are serious dilemmas 
that have received attention in a variety o f forums. But the most well-known and 
distressing aspect o f population growth (that also fuels the most debate) is its contribution 
to environmental deterioration, and this is the aspect o f population growth upon which 
this thesis will focus. In this thesis I am making the argument that we have an ethical 
duty to stabilize our population out o f our duties to protect the environment. To be more 
specific 1 am arguing that we should stabilize our population based on the demands 
created by a shift to a more biocentric outlook- a shift that should be made. Although 
population growth is the topic o f this thesis, such a shift in thinking will not just color 
how we view population growth, but how we view all environmental issues.
Why Focus on Population Instead of Consumption?
This thesis does not argue that the U.S. should focus on population in lieu o f its 
efforts to alter consumption habits and develop better technology. Rather, it is arguing 
that the environmental ethics we should adopt require us to address population in addition 
to consumption and technology, whereas the traditional approach has been to forego any 
mention o f population and address only the latter. In fact, the principles set forth in this 
thesis could certainly be used to argue for greater efforts at curbing consumption. It is 
often argued that the environmental problems facing the U.S. are not the result o f a 
population problem but o f a consumption problem, and our efforts should be aimed at 
curbing consumption. In other words, there is a consumption problem, not a population
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problem. There is, of course, truth to this argument. The U.S. does have the highest 
consumption rates in the world, we consume at an unsustainable level, and many of our 
environmental problems are a result of this consumption and could perhaps be addressed 
without having to bring about a stabilized population. So why argue that population 
stabilization is necessary along with addressing consumption and technology instead of 
just focusing on our consumption habits and technological advancement? This question 
goes to the heart o f this thesis, especially when the environment is apparently protected to 
the point where we still have a high quality o f life in the U.S. and the problems we do 
face because o f population growth are not nearly o f the same magnitude o f those faced by 
developing countries. The best way to address this criticism requires us to realize that to 
say that we have a high quality of life in the U.S. and relative success in preserving and 
protecting the environment begs two questions. First, what is our measure o f success? 
Second, through what type o f outlook (anthropocentric or biocentric) has this measure of 
success been created?
The measure o f success is not how well we can prevent harm to the environment 
and all o f the natural habitats and nonhuman species that it encompasses, but how well 
we can prevent it (or contain it) so that humans do not become any worse off. Clearly 
this is a very anthropocentric-oriented measure o f success which comes as no surprise 
since, as it will be explained further in this thesis, the anthropocentric outlook has always 
been and is still to a large extent the dominant outlook. So to say that we have had 
relative success in preserving and protecting the environment means that we have enacted 
measures sufficient at keeping pollution at an acceptable level for humans, in terms of 
both health and aesthetics, and displacing or containing other types o f problems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Moreover, this has been accomplished in the wake of a growing population. If this is the 
right measure to have, then population growth in the U.S. may not need be an issue. 
However, this thesis argues that this is not the right measure o f success, and that if  we are 
to truly protect the environment to the right extent and for the right reasons- one that is 
focused not just on humans but on the protection and preservation o f nonhuman species- 
then population stabilization becomes a necessary factor in environmental protection 
alongside consumption and technology. Stabilizing the population becomes something 
we should do instead of merely something that is convenient in our efforts to protect the 
environment. To make this argument, this thesis will apply biocentric environmental 
ethics to the population issue. (Note: A further explanation o f "biocentric" and 
"anthropocentric" will be given in the next chapter). It will justify the creation of 
comprehensive policy aimed at bringing about the eventual stabilization o f our population 
based on the ethical demands placed on us by biocentric environmental ethics. As this 
thesis will show, the argument for population stabilization requires us to make a 
paradigm shift that will allow us to view our population growth, and ultimately our 
species as a whole, in a whole new way- a way that is quite different from the traditional 
way o f viewing population growth and a way that forces us to frame the population issue 
in a very different maimer.
Concerns Over Population Policies 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a debate on population growth has been the 
negative images that come to mind. This is certainly understandable since we 
immediately think of the restrictive one-child population policy o f China, and the
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intrusive measures used to limit fertility in India. So before this thesis progresses any 
further it is important to clearly state that those types o f initiatives are not what are being 
proposed here. Although the main purpose o f this thesis is to argue that we should 
stabilize our population because of the demands placed on us by biocentric environmental 
ethics, a secondary purpose is to make sure that it is very clear that population 
stabilization can be achieved without restrictive and involuntary policies. It is possible to 
achieve population stabilization while still leaving the intimate decisions of whether to 
have children, when to have them, and how many to have completely unfettered. This 
nation has a long history o f respecting the autonomy o f individuals in this type o f 
decision, and the need to stabilize our population does not mean this has to stop. While it 
is important to realize that we should stabilize our population, we should never lose sight 
that how we go about doing it is equally important.
Roadmap o f the Thesis 
So far I have stated what this thesis is arguing, and why such an argument needs 
to be made. The rest o f this Introduction details exactly how this argument is made, and 
what purpose each chapter serves in the overall framework of the thesis. The next 
chapter elaborates on three vital aspects o f the population issue. First, there is the 
fundamental demographic data that must be understood before any serious argument 
(both for or against) population stabilization can take place. This section of the chapter 
describes the reasons for past population growth (or lack thereof in some cases) and 
future growth. To determine the best way to go about addressing population growth one 
must have a firm grasp on our demographic past. This chapter also offers various
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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population projections for the future since we must understand what the future may hold 
in store when determining if  population is a serious issue. Finally, Chapter 2 explores the 
various fertility determinants in modem societies. Although this thesis is primarily 
concerned with environmental ethics and the policy aspect o f addressing population 
growth, is very important to focus on this demographic material from the beginning. Any 
discussion about population growth requires an understanding o f the fundamentals, and it 
is the information found in this section o f the chapter that is used for laying the 
foundation for creating policies aimed at stabilizing population growth. Furthermore, 
it offers a presentation of the demographic information in a level o f  detail and precision 
that is lacking in most other writings on this topic.
Chapter 3 offers historical insight into past ideas surrounding population growth 
and how this has influenced the American policy process as it pertains to the population 
issue. After giving a very in-depth definition and explanation o f the term "population 
policy," this chapter looks at the dominant views on population and how this has 
influenced the way in which the problem has been framed. In doing so it uncovers a cycle 
that the population debate has always followed and points out that this cycle is based on a 
strict anthropocentric outlook and on a growth ethic that originated in times and 
conditions that are no longer relevant to those in which we find ourselves today. 
Ultimately this chapter culminates with the assertion that population growth would have 
been viewed much differently (and hence dealt with much sooner) if  a different branch of 
environmental ethics had been more pervasive in Western thought. Naturally, then, this 
is followed by the argument that this biocentric branch of environmental ethics- which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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asserts that all life has inherent value and should be protected- should have been followed 
when approaching the population issue instead of the predominant anthropocentric one.
Chapter 4 is the most important chapter. There is a lengthy presentation of the 
traditional and prevailing arguments for population stabilization. In this chapter it is 
conceded that the traditional arguments do not provide a strong response to the claim that 
we have a consumption problem instead of a population problem. This is because the 
most prevalent arguments for population stabilization based on environmental reasons are 
grounded not just in anthropocentric environmental ethics but, more specifically, an 
anthropocentric-based utilitarianism. By critiquing these anthropocentric-based 
utilitarian arguments for population stabilization and by taking a realistic look at the way 
in which we in the United States go about determining whether we are actually being 
harmed by something, this chapter reaches the conclusion that this type o f purely 
anthropocentric argument will continue to fail to bring the population issue to the policy 
agenda. Therefore, a more biocentric approach must be adopted if we as a society will 
ever address population growth. That is not to say that there are no anthropocentric- 
based arguments that could be convincing. As mentioned, there are many areas other than 
environmental protection that population growth affects. But as far as environmental 
protection is concerned, anthropocentric-based utilitarian arguments for population 
stabilization are weak, and this chapter exposes their weakness. It is because of this 
weakness that population growth has not been given more attention, and not because 
population growth is not a serious problem. The approach that I argue should be taken is 
the adoption o f a more biocentric outlook. So the basic schema of this thesis can be 
presented in the following way: 1) Anthropocentric ethics have dominated Western
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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thought, and have therefore shaped how we view population growth and how we wish to 
address it, 2) Anthropocentric-based utilitarianism has not proven to be a strong 
argument for efforts at stabilizing the population in the interest o f environmental 
protection (although other anthropocentric-based arguments may provide a good 
argument for population stabilization for reasons perhaps related to but not solely focused 
on environmental protection), 3) Biocentric ethics, on the other hand, would require us to 
view further population growth in a new way and lead us to the conclusion that a long 
term effort aimed at population stabilization is the right thing to do, 4) And, to keep the 
argument from being circular, the biocentric outlook is what we, as moral agents, should 
adopt. From this schema it is apparent that an argument for population stabilization, once 
anthropocentric-based utilitarian arguments are dismissed, is a two-step process. First, it 
must be demonstrated that a more biocentric outlook is one that we, as moral agents, 
should adopt. It is not enough to merely reject the old approach. The argument for 
biocentric ethics does not gain strength merely from the weakness of anthropocentric 
ethics, so it must be defended based on its own merits. Second, it must be demonstrated 
that the biocentric outlook does in fact require us to stabilize our population once 
population growth is no longer necessary to ensure our survival and quality or life. The 
fact that biocentric environmental ethics require population stabilization at a certain point 
would be irrelevant if  it is an indefensible position. However, a comprehensive defense 
o f the biocentric outlook is a rather ambitious undertaking and numerous books have 
been devoted to doing so. An attempt to do so would be beyond the scope o f  this thesis. 
Therefore, this thesis will only goes as far as giving a historical development o f the 
biocentric outlook and then analyzing and critiquing the prevailing arguments for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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biocentric ethics (as well as their counterarguments) in order to demonstrate that 
biocentric environmental ethics provide viable and defensible ethical theories that are 
worthy o f serious consideration. Since this branch of environmental ethics is something 
that most people have never even considered or been made aware of, this level o f  analysis 
will suffice for the purpose o f this thesis.
Finally, this thesis culminates in Chapter 5 with a brief look at the various ways in 
which our demographic future can be influenced. It is one thing to recognize that we 
should stabilize our population at a much lower number than is projected, it is another to 
devise ways to do it that are in keeping with our many interests and the traditional 
Western values we wish to protect. A realistic look at what it will take for the U.S. 
population to stabilize is a reduction in fertility rates to 1.5 (compared with the 2.1 we 
presently have), and an immigration level holding steady at 500,000 per year. This are by 
all means attainable and fair goals, that do not in any way infringe upon the liberties we 
enjoy and are entitled to. While this chapter does not offer a specific policy proposal that 
is purported to be the definitive answer, it offers recommendations on what the U.S. 
should do over the long term. Interestingly, it does not require that we do anything 
drastically different than what we are already doing. Actions most likely to have an 
impact on fertility rates (as mentioned in Chapter 2) are those that should be taken 
anyway for several other reasons, regardless o f whether population growth is seen as a 
problem. The fact that population growth is a problem only adds to the list o f reasons for 
doing them and making them a higher priority. And just as importantly, tins chapter 
dispels some o f the fear and misconceptions that tend to surround any talk o f addressing 
population growth.
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A Final Note Before Reading 
Before reading this thesis a comment should be made regarding the style and the 
intended audience. A large portion o f this thesis is historical in the sense that it devotes a 
lot o f attention to the historical progression of thought concerning population growth and 
environmental ethics. Also, there is alot o f attention devoted to explaining certain ideas 
ethical theories that are ultimately rejected and substituted with others, especially in 
Chapter 4. The reason for this approach centers around the fact that although addressing 
population growth is certainly not an unheard o f aspect o f environmental protection, the 
approach used in this thesis is relatively novel in so far as it relies on the tenets of 
biocentric environmental ethics to demonstrate the need for population stabilization 
instead of the anthropocentric norms traditionally used. Therefore, it is important to 
firmly establish the historical aspect for two reasons. First, we have a tendency to resist 
making a complete break from traditional ideas unless they are blatantly wrong. Instead 
o f completely throwing out old ideas and replacing them with new ones, we prefer to 
modify and build upon the old ones, and not simply switch to ideas that are radically 
different. The historical overviews show that although a new approach to population 
growth is being used, much of it is in many ways rooted in the traditional thought that we 
are not quite ready to depart from. The second reason, which is actually the opposite side 
o f the same coin, is that some aspects o f this thesis to some degree do advocate a break 
from traditional thought. Before a reader is likely to embrace such a departure, there 
must first be a thorough review o f the old approach before we can feel comfortable that it 
is time for a change. This is especially true in Chapter 3 with the examination o f the
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times from where this “growth ethic” to which we still adhere to today emerged. To put 
forth as thorough of an argument as this issue deserves, it is important to take a very 
critical look at the times and circumstances where the ideas we adhere to today originated 
from. If the circumstances today no longer resemble those where continual population 
growth was deemed necessary, then why should we blindly adhere to this “growth ethic”?
The audience that is likely to be most receptive to the ideas put forth in this thesis 
have two characteristics: those who have had significant contact with the natural world 
and have some affection for it, and those who are politically sophisticated enough to 
realize the inevitable compromise that must accompany any translation of philosophical 
thought to policy initiatives. This thesis is unlikely to be persuasive to those who have 
never immersed themselves in nature and found themselves in awe of the wonder and 
beauty o f the natural world and the variety of species that call it home. This is because 
many o f the ideas presented in this thesis are based on a feeling o f right and wrong that 
can come only through significant interaction with nature, instead of strictly relying on 
logical deduction. It is more likely that the ideas in this thesis will feel right than be 
attained by logical deduction. The reader must also be aware that in the policy arena 
there are always many competing interests to be considered, with some being apparent 
and others a little more subtle. Therefore, even though society has a whole may actually 
embrace an idea and wish to implement policies to achieve those ideals, it must always be 
remembered that just as there is a right thing to do there is a right way to do it, and that 
there are always other values to be protected and other causes of equal or greater 
importance.
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CHAPTER 2
DEMOGRAPHY AND THE CAUSES OF POPULATION GROWTH
The population debate draws from three disciplines: ecology (which is used to
study the effects o f human population growth on the environment), environmental ethics
(from which we can make a moral judgment on such effects), and demography (to explain
the fundamental principles o f population and thus what causes populations to grow and
then stabilize). This chapter will provide an inttoduction to some historical demographic
characteristics. Not only will it provide the necessary historical context for a discussion
on contemporary population growth, it will introduce and define several key concepts and
point to some of the factors that have traditionally caused (or prevented) population
growth. Furthermore, it will explain what has caused the population explosion of the
20th century. Naturally, this section o f the chapter will be centered on the role that health
has played in hindering or enhancing population growth. Health, as it relates to
population growth, is the proverbial "double-edged sword" as this part o f the chapter will
demonstrate. Next the focus will shift to the demographic patterns o f the United States,
the nation with which this thesis is most concerned. The past, present, and projected
future population of the U.S. will be discussed followed by an explanation as to why we
are still growing despite the fact that many o f our counterparts in the developed world
have since ceased to do so. This chapter will demonstrate that we have grown, are
growing, and will continue to grow for quite some time. And finally, the modem
16
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determinants o f fertility for advanced societies will be explored. This will help lay a 
foundation for the chapter on possible policy alternatives.
History of Global Population Growth 
There are three factors o f population growth: fertility, mortality, and migration. 
This is explained by the equation: Population = (Fertility + Immigration)-(Mortality + 
Emigration). In other words, if the fertility rate (the number o f live births per 1000 
females) is higher than the mortality rate (the number o f deaths per 1000 people), and net 
migration is zero, the population will grow. It is with this equation that the rate of 
population growth for a specific nation or region is determined. On the global level, 
migration is not a factor and the population growth is determined only by the difference 
between fertility and mortality. The size o f the global population is projected to surpass 
the 6 billion mark by the end o f 1999. It is virtually certain to grow to at least 8 billion in 
the coming decade. However, the human population has not always been this large and 
has not always grown at such a furious pace. In fact, until 200 years ago the size o f the 
human population had remained fairly stable because the high birth rates were balanced 
with very high death rates.2 To fully understand how much and how quickly we have 
multiplied, Ansley Coale's famous article "The History of the Human Population" is the 
best place to start. It offers insight into, as he put it, "the process by which a few
2 Coale, Ansley. "The History o f the Human Population." Scientific American. 231: pp. 
41.
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thousand wanderers a million years ago became billions o f residents o f cities, towns, and 
villages today.
Accurate census taking is a relatively recent phenomena, so determinations of past 
populations are very difficult to make and are susceptible to error. The complexity of 
doing so is further exacerbated by the fact that there is really no way to determine when 
or how hiunans became distinct fi'om their predecessors and thus no real way of 
determining an accurate number to start with. Nonetheless, based on what 
anthropologists know about the technological and social institutions that prevailed at 
given times, reasonable estimates can be made. For example, before the introduction of 
agriculture the world could have supported a hunting and gathering culture of 
approximately five to ten million people."^ During this period -fi'om the dawn of 
humankind to the initiation o f agriculture and the domestication o f animals (generally 
regarded to be around 8000 B.C.)- the rate of growth was exceptionally slow with an
addition o f only fifteen people per million each year.^ Considering that a rate of growth 
o f only 0.1% per year (with a starting population o f only 100,000) would result in over 
billion people in only 12,000 years, the rate of growth during this period had to have been 
very close to zero.^ This period o f human history was characterized by very slow growth 
and, at times, declines in population.
3 Coale, 14.
4 Coale, 15.
5 Coale, 17.
^ Ehrlich, Paul and Ehrlich Anne. The Population Explosion. (Simon and Schuster. 
New York, NY: 1990), 48.
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Once humans began the gradual move from a hunter-gatherer society to an 
agriculture-based society, the rate of growth increased. It is estimated that by the year 1 
A.D. the 8 million people that existed in 8000 B.C. grew to about 300 million, which
represented an increase in the annual growth rate to about 360 per million.^ The growth 
rate continued to accelerate and between 1 A.D. and 1750 the population increased to
somewhere between 500-800 million.^ But from 1750 onward is where the growth rate 
really accelerated. The annual growth rate from 1 A.D.-1750 A.D. is estimated to be at 
.56/1000, but from 1750 to 1800 it increased to 4.4/1000.^ This growth rate resulted in a
global population of 1 billion in 1800, 1.3 billion in 1850, and 1.7 billion by 1900.^^ 
During the first half of the 20th century the rate o f growth significantly increased once
again to about 7.9/1000 causing a world population o f 2.5 billion by 1950.11 w hat is 
even more astounding is that from 1950 to 1974 the growth rate jumped to 17.1/1000 
with a subsequent global population o f 3.9 billion. 1^ From there, as previously stated, the 
population has since grown to its present day level o f 6 billion.
Although the population has increased greatly since the beginning o f humankind, 
it did not necessarily do so in a linear fashion. There were times when entire civilizations 
flourished and then vanished, leaving no discernible clues as to why. Other events caused 
fluctuations in the population, with perhaps the most well-known being the Bubonic
^ Coale, 17.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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Plague that decimated Europe in the 14th Century. Nevertheless, as Coale explains, the 
history o f the human population can be divided into two periods: a very long era o f slow 
growth and a very brief period of rapid growth. 1^ But why did growth occur in this 
manner? What factors caused the population to virtually remain static for so long and 
then triple within a period o f 150 years? The answer to this question can be found in the 
advances made in human health. But before this can be fully understood and used to 
explain population growth, the concept o f "epidemiological transition" must be defined 
since it systematically describes the avenues for growth.
The epidemiological transition consists o f four stages and "provides a general 
picture o f the major determinants o f death that prevailed during several distinct periods in
our epidemiological history". The first stage of the transition is referred to as the "Age 
o f Pestilence and Famine" and often coincides with the first phase of the Demographic 
Transition Theory. Although a separate concept than the epidemiological transition, the 
Demographic Transition Theory, which will be explored in more detail later, consists o f 
three phases: 1) high birth rates and high death rates, 2) the death rate begins to drop 
sharply with birth rates that ultimately fall too but only after a lag time o f about 50 years, 
and 3) low fertility and low death r a t e s . T h i s  first stage of the epidemiological
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
1^ Olshansky, S. Jay and Ault, A. Brian. "The Fourth Stage o f the Epidemiologic
Transition: The Age of Delayed Degenerative Diseases." The Milbank Quarterly. 
Vol 64, No 3, 1986: pp. 356.
15 Overbeek, Johannes. History o f  Population Theories. (Rotterdam, Netherlands: 
University o f  Rotterdam Press, 1974), 15.
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transition is characterized by very high mortality rates (especially infant mortality) and 
very high fertility rates. People, especially the very young, were at the mercy o f 
epidemics and infectious diseases. Since death struck at such young ages, this stage saw
a life-expectancy that hovered between twenty and forty y ea rs. 15 The second stage o f the 
epidemiological transition is the "Age of Receding Pandemics." During this stage, 
mortality rates decreased (especially among infants), thus causing the life-expectancy to 
increase dramatically (as does the median age o f the population). The population, if  not 
met with a corresponding decrease in fertility rates, will see a rapid increase in population 
during this stage. The reason for this shift is largely due to the increased knowledge o f 
infectious-disease prevention. Historically, societies that progressed to this stage were 
able to do so through several public health initiatives such as public and private sanitation 
improvements and the use o f antibiotics and inoculations.
The third stage o f the epidemiological transition, the "Age o f Degenerative and 
Man-Made Diseases" is also characterized by an equilibrium in mortality, but at a level 
much lower than at the first stage. ̂  ̂  The major causes of death are no longer infections 
and epidemics but chronic degenerative diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and 
strokes. Since these are diseases that kill rather close to what is perceived to be the end o f 
natural life (the human lifespan) then, once again, mortality occurs at an even older age. 
In other words, people live much longer and an increase in population ensues since the 
effects o f mortality on population are, at least temporarily, mitigated. The main reason
^5 Olshansky and Ault, 357. 
17 Ibid, 358.
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why this is conducive to population growth is no so much that people are living longer 
lives, but that the vast majority are at least living to childbearing age.
And briefly, the fourth stage o f the epidemiological transition, o f  which we may 
be on the verge of moving into (at least for certain segments o f the population), occurs 
when people are no longer susceptible to infection or chronic diseases and die only fi'om 
a "natural death" that is inevitable when a living being reaches the end of its biological 
lifespan. This will have much the same effect on population as the third stage.
It is important to keep in mind that the epidemiological transition does not apply 
uniformly to the entire human population at the same time. Because of a host of complex 
variables, different societies experience transitions at different times and at different rates. 
For almost the entire history o f the human population we have been in the first stage o f 
the epidemiological transition. For most o f history there were high birth rates (relative to 
contemporary norms) but very little population growth because o f the balancing effect o f 
high death rates. This is because o f the precarious circumstances under which humans 
lived, especially in prehistoric times when humans were not only subject to infectious 
diseases but accidents and predation as well. But for the most part it was poor health 
practices and little knowledge o f health to which high mortality was attributable. And 
with such high mortality, high fertility was necessary to merely maintain the meager 
growth rates and prevent the population from disappearing. Often when natural fertility 
was the norm, such high fertility rates were only enough to merely repopulate. Natural 
fertility is defined as the number o f births a female would have when there are no
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deliberate attempts to limit fertility (i.e., through the use of birth control devices). 
Cultural constraints, such as proper age at which marriage and childbearing is deemed 
acceptable, and health-related constraints, such as the female not having a sufficient diet 
to support fecundity or having to breast feed the baby due to lack o f alternative food 
supplies, are what dictate the natural fertility. Taking this into consideration it becomes 
apparent why natural fertility is virtually always lower than the human biological 
maximum. Thus, early living conditions that seriously limited natural fertility combined 
with high mortality rates (which resulted in many women not living to their reproductive 
years) resulted in a very slow population growth. Factor in the occasional epidemic and it 
is a wonder that humans survived at all. Although it is quite rare, even today some o f the 
most remote and undeveloped societies in the world still find themselves in this first stage 
o f epidemiological transition.
It is hard to pinpoint exactly when the second stage o f the epidemiological 
transition was first experienced but many believe that it began to emerge as agricultural 
knowledge allowed people to live as collective societies. At times this may have actually 
posed a public health threat via the easier transmission of communicable diseases- and 
subsequently caused a temporary reduction in population- but for the most part it allowed 
for more security and more abundant food supplies (which aided fertility). Living in a 
collective society also allowed an exchange of ideas that lead to new technological 
endeavors such as the building o f roads, new tools, channeling of water supplies, and
Cochrane, Susan Hill. Fertility and Education: What Do We Really Know? 
(BaltimorezThe Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 54.
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eventually even ways to maintain adequate health. In turn, mortality rates fell and the 
setting for the emergence o f the third stage of the epidemiological transition was set.
It is evident that over a significant period o f time humans were able to lower 
mortality through "death control" measures; otherwise the population would not have 
grown to its present size. But the mediums through which we did so are a matter o f 
debate. There are several models demographers use to explain why mortality rates were 
able to be brought imder control with the two most relevant to this topic being the 
medical model and the standard of living model. The medical model holds that mortality
declined with and because o f the advances o f modem medicine and related t e c h n o l o g y .  ^9 
The standard of living model, on the other hand, holds that health improved because o f an 
increase in public health. This includes an increased food supply, nutrition, and public
sanitation, as well as personal health and hygiene.20 Whether one subscribes to a 
particular model or some hybrid o f each, the important thing to bear in mind is that for 
most o f human history population growth was mostly affected by mortality rates. But 
once the transition occurs and death is much more under control, fertility rates become 
the dominant factor in the rate at which a population grows (or declines). If "death 
control" is not met with "birth control" then rapid population growth ensues. This 
explains the rapid growth since WWII, especially in much of the developing world that 
was able to benefit from imported Western medicine and health practices. In other words.
19 Easterlin, R. "Industrial Revolution and Mortality Revolution: Two o f a Kind?"
Journal o f  Evolutionary Economics. Vol 5: 393-408.
20 McKinlay J. and McKinlay S. "Medical Measures and the Decline in Mortality." The
Sociology o f  Health and Illness. Conrad P. and Kem R. (eds). St Martin's Press. 
New York, NY: 1990.
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a move to the second and third phase of the demographic transition must occur for 
population stabilization (or very slow population growth) to become the norm again.
U.S. Population Growth 
Thus far this chapter has focused on some of the fundamental concepts and 
principals o f population including the three components o f population growth, the 
epidemiological transition, and the natural limitations on population growth that apply to 
the population as a whole at any given time and place. A brief history of human 
population growth was laid out with a specific emphasis placed on the role played by 
health. This was done to provide the necessary foundation from which to work when 
studying the population growth of a specific country or region and the determinants o f the 
fertility within that population. This chapter will now shift from focusing on population 
in the abstract to the U.S. population in particular. In this section there is a brief history of 
U.S. population growth (which will illustrate its rate o f growth), its population at various 
points in history, as well as demographic projections o f how large its population may 
become in the foreseeable future.
With a population of about 270 million the U.S. is currently the third most
populous nation in the world, and it is expected to remain so until the year 2020.21 it 
only ranks behind China and India, respectively. And although its population size will 
consist o f a decreasing share o f the world population, the U.S. is still expected to grow
21 Murdock, Steven H. An America Challenged: Population and the Future o f  the 
United States. (Boulder: Westview Press: 1995), 11.
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substantially well into the 21st century (unlike our counterparts in the developed world), 
thus continuing its tradition o f rapid population growth. O f course the U.S. population 
did not begin with such a large population. The first census in the U.S., taken in 1 7 9 0 , 
counted about 4 million Americans (although it should be noted that Native Americans 
were not counted, African Americans were only counted as 1 /3 , and the methods used
were probably less reliable than those used to d a y ) .22 Since then the U.S. population has 
grown at an average o f two percent per year which is the highest rate o f growth ever 
maintained by an industrialized nation for so lo n g .2 3  in recent history (since 1 9 5 0 )  the 
annual rate o f growth has fallen to 1.3 percent per year, but that is still the highest rate of 
growth for any industrialized nation. These numbers may not seem as if there is a high 
rate o f growth, and compared to the growth rate of many developing nations such a 
growth rate is relatively low, but that should not deceive one into thinking that a growth 
rate o f one to two percent per year does not result in high population growth. Because 
population grows exponentially, if it is growing at 1.3 percent per year, each year that 
will be 1.3  percent o f an ever increasing number. Exponential growth also explains why 
a population can see a decrease in immigration and fertility rates, but will still see an 
increase from year to year in sheer numbers o f people. As mentioned earlier, the 
estimated population in 1 7 9 0  was 4 million. By 1 8 9 0 , one hundred years later, the 
population reached 5 0  million and just a decade later in 1 9 0 0  it grew to 7 0  million.
22 Bouvier, Leon F. and Grant, Lindsay. How Many Americans? Population,
Immigration, and the Environment. (San Fransisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994), 62.
23 Ibid, 63.
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What has happened since the turn of the 20th century is truly remarkable. From 
1900 to the present, the U.S. population has managed to grow by almost 200 million 
people. What has caused such a population boom? It was previously mentioned that 
population increase is caused by two factors; natural increase (when the number o f births 
exceeds the number o f deaths) and net migration increase (when the number of 
immigrants exceeds the number o f emigrants). It is well known that this second factor 
(immigration) has certainly played a major role in U.S. population growth. In fact for 
many Americans it instills a great sense of pride. It is estimated that since 1900 almost
43 million people have immigrated to the U.S.24 Furthermore, immigration contributes 
to population growth in a secondary way. Once here, immigrants will have children and 
therefore add to the population's natural increase. When viewed this way, over ninety 
percent o f today's population can be considered descendants o f immigrants who arrived 
here after 1776.25
There can be no doubt that the U.S. population would be much smaller without 
immigration. However, those who wish to blame U.S. population growth solely on 
immigration should take note that natural increase (i.e., high fertility rates) is responsible 
for the vast majority o f growth. In fact, with the exception o f the decade o f 1900-1910 
(in which immigration contributed to about fifty percent o f U.S. population growth), the 
proportion o f population growth caused by immigration is much smaller in the 20th
24 Murdock, 12.
25 Gibson, Campbell. "The Contribution of Immigration to the Growth and Ethnic
Diversity o f the American Population." Paper presented to biannual American 
Philosophical Society, 7 Nov 1991.
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century than it was in the nineteenth. In the decades 1 9 3 0 -4 0 , 1 9 4 0 -5 0 , 1 9 5 0 -6 0 , 1 9 6 0 -  
7 0 , and 1 9 7 0 -8 0 , the percentage of U .S . population change attributable to immigration
was 7 .4  percent, 4 .6  percent, 8 .9  percent, 13 .5  percent and 1 8 .8  percent, r e s p e c t iv e ly .2 5  
The rest o f the population growth during these decades came from natural increase. This 
leads to a very important question: What caused such a large natural increase? The first 
reason is the high fertility rates that have persisted throughout most of the 20th century. 
Although they were lower than those of the previous century (and became even lower 
once the U.S. completed its transition from an agriculturally-based rural society to an 
industrial-based urban society), U.S. fertility rates are far higher than its European 
coimterparts and they have almost always been well above the replacement level fertility 
o f 2 .1 .  Similar to immigration, fertility rates do not remain constant. When viewed in 
ten-year increments (after an all-time low during the Great Depression) fertility rates have 
fluctuated from 2 .3  in 1 9 4 0 , 3 .1  in 1 9 5 0 , 3 .7  in 1 9 6 0 , 2 .5  in 1 9 7 0 , 1 .8  in 1 9 8 0 , and 2 .1  by 
1 9 9 0 .2 7
Furthermore, when studying the effects o f fertility on population growth, 
population momentum must be considered. Population momentum causes the population 
to grow for several decades even though the total fertility rate (TFR) is at replacement 
level. This is a result o f high fertility in the past. The women now at childbearing age 
may be choosing to have less children than past generations, but the former high fertility 
rates ensured that there is an ever increasing number of women in their childbearing
25 Murdock, 12. 
27 Ibid, 16.
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years. Therefore, the sheer increase in size o f this portion of the population base more 
than makes up for the decrease in fertility rates. Population momentum is now underway 
in the United States because o f the post-World War II "baby boom." Even if  all 
immigration were to cease and the total fertility rate (TFR) remained at 2.1 (replacement 
level fertility), the U.S. population would still soar to well over 300 million before it 
stabilized. In the next several decades to come much of what is now considered the 
developing world will find themselves in a similar situation, although perhaps on a much 
larger scale. Because of their current high fertility rates (which in some countries exceeds 
six live births per woman), their populations will continue to increase once replacement 
level fertility is achieved.
Both past and present fertility rates will continue to influence the demographic 
characteristics o f the U.S. well into the 21st century, but what has perhaps played a more 
important part o f the 20th century population growth than immigration and fertility is the 
great decline in mortality that this century has witnessed. Life expectancy at birth in the
U.S. has increased from 47.3 years in 1900 to 75.7 years in 1994.28 Furthermore, the 
certainty o f life has increased as well. Ninety-five percent of all women can expect to 
live to age fifty (i.e., the full span of childbearing years) whereas in 1900 fewer than sixty 
percent reached that a g e .2 9  Much of this increase in life expectancy is attributable to a 
dramatic decrease in infant mortality. In 1940 the infant mortality rate was at 54.9/1000. 
In the decades to follow the infant mortality rate became progressively lower from
28 White, Kevin M. and Preston, Samuel H. "How Many Americans Are Alive Because 
o f Twentieth Century Improvements in MoxidMtyTPopulation and Development 
Review 22(3). Sept 96:pp. 415.
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33/1000 in 1950, to 27/1000 in 1960, to 21.4/1000 in 1970, to 12.9/1000 in 1980, and 
finally to 9.2/1000 in 1990.30 Simply put, the certainty o f life and the age to which one 
can expect to live have greatly increased. What we have witnessed is the epidemiological 
transition as it applies to the U.S. In early U.S. history, very high birth rates were met 
with very high mortality rates that struck very early in age. As the society modernized 
and progress was made in the medical field and, more importantly, the public health field, 
people lived healthier lives and death came much later in life. This is especially true of 
the post-World War II generations that benefited from mass immunizations.
This rise in life expectancy that stemmed from advances in health is probaby the 
greatest human achievement to date, but it obviously has not come without demographic 
implications. In addition to making the U.S. a much older society (as demonstrated by 
the rise in median age as well as the proportion of the age structure comprised by the 
elderly), there are many more people alive today than there would have been had life 
expectancy not made such a dramatic increase. In fact, it is estimated that if mortality 
had remained at 1900 levels throughout the century (and holding all other factors 
constant) the population in the year 2000 would be only 139 million,31 which is only half 
o f what it actually is. Similar to immigration, there is a primary and a secondary affect 
on population: direct deaths avoided through mortality decline, and births from those 
people who may otherwise have not survived to childbearing age. It is also interesting to
29 Ibid.
30 Murdock, 16.
31 White and Preston, 420.
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note that the population growth produced by mortality decline during this century is 
double that produced by 20th century immigrants and their d e s c e n d a n ts .3 2
U.S. Population Projections 
During the 20th century the U.S. witnessed its transition into the third phase o f 
demographic transition (from high births and high deaths to low births and low deaths) as 
well as the third (and possibly even fourth) stage of the epidemiological transition. 
Taking this into consideration, future U.S. populations can be projected. But this shift o f 
focus from past population to future population should be preceded with a note o f 
caution: there are limitations that yield population projections imprecise and sometimes 
flawed. This is because projections are only as good as the assumptions that go into
th e m .3 3  When it comes to fertility, mortality, and immigration it is easy to take present 
numbers and use them to predict the future, but there is no guarantee that the conditions 
that created the present numbers will persist in the future. A good example of this is the 
low birth rates during the Great Depression. This caused many to believe that population 
stabilization, and even a possible decline in population, would occur in the very near 
future. But the baby boom occurred and caused a population increase far beyond what 
anyone had expected. Nonetheless, population projections remain a vital tool for policy 
makers and although they should always be viewed with some skepticism, they offer 
good insight into the demographic future.
32 Ibid, 422.
33 Fosler, Scott et al. Demographic Change and the American Future. (Pittsburgh:
Universityof Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 37.
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Demographic projections are made based on high, middle, and low assumptions 
o f fertility, mortality, and immigration. Usually the source o f these projections is the 
U.S. Census Bureau and since 1940 they have made such projections every few years 
based on demographic trends. For the purposes o f population projections, the fertility 
rates are currently defined in the following way: low is 1.6, middle is 1.8, and high is 2.2. 
Mortality rates are defined as high being 77.4, middle 81, and low 85.9. And for 
immigration, high is 750,000 per year, 450,000 per year is middle, and low is 250,000. 
Using these assumptions, the Census Bureau created over thirty different projections 
ranging from a low population projection (for the year 2050) o f 276 million to a high 
population projection o f 507 m ill io n .3 4  Using the middle projection, which is often 
deemed to be the most likely, there is a projected population o f 383 million by the year 
2050. O f course, it is difficult to say which scenario is the most likely and the further 
into the future the population is projected the more tenuous the outcome. Given current 
demographic trends, the U.S. population will reach 300 million by the year 2012, 350 
million by 2025, and 397 million by 2050.35 Regardless o f which projection will occur, 
they all point toward one very interesting aspect o f population growth: the U.S. 
population will be growing at its all time slowest rate (probably about 0.8%) but in terms 
o f sheer numbers it will see is largest increases ever.
34 Murdock, 51.
35 U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Population o f the United States, by
Age, Sex and Race: 1988 to 20S0."Current Population Reports, P-25-1018. 
Washington, DC. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
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Modem Determinants o f Fertility in Advanced Societies 
There are several theories that explain why a society shifts from high fertility to 
low fertility as well as what factors people consider when determining family size. This 
section will serve as an overview of the prevailing theories of fertility determinants in 
advanced societies. In doing so it will establish the basis o f knowledge from which 
policy alternatives could be created. Such policy initiatives could range from those that 
directly influence demographic behavior to those oriented toward trying to change social 
behavior and institutions which will then indirectly have an impact on population 
processes.
Fertility determinants are a complex intermingling of social, cultural, and 
economic factors that influence choice-making as it pertains to reproduction. But before 
it can truly be a choice, there are two necessary preconditions: maternal and child health, 
and adequate family planning s e r v ic e s .36 Unless all people have access to family 
plaiming services that are reliable, affordable, and convenient to use, fertility rates will 
more closely resemble those o f the society's natural fertility than its desired fertility. 
With regards to health, the other side to the "double-edge word" mentioned earlier 
becomes evident. It was previously stated that once there are sufficient health conditions 
for women to survive to childbearing age (and for virtually all children to survive to 
adulthood) population will initially grow. But it has been firmly established that 
adequate health will eventually result in lower fertility rates. Conventional wisdom holds
36 Weeks, John R. "How To Influence Fertility: The Experience So Far." Elephants in 
the Volkswagen. Grant, Lindsay (ed.). (New York: Freeman and Co., 1992), 15.
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that if  the survival o f  a child to adulthood is virtually certain, parents become inclined to 
have less.
So once fertility is decided by rational choice, what are the factors that influence 
that choice? Perhaps the most widely used theory of fertility is the Demographic 
Transition Theory, the three phases o f which were described earlier. According to this 
theory, in traditional rural agricultural societies, high fertility was necessary in order to 
offset high mortality and was advantageous since children were more o f an economic 
asset. As a society modernizes, there are several economic and social changes that lead to
children being viewed as a liability instead of an a s s e t .37 The rising cost o f children in a 
modem urban setting coupled with their loss o f economic value (and with the increased 
certainty o f child survival) weakened the motivation to have large families. In other 
words, there is an intergenerational wealth f lo w .38 Instead of wealth flowing from the 
children up to the parents, the reverse occurs. Hence the old adage "development is the 
best contraceptive."
However, as many demographers now assert, development itself is not necessarily 
a cause o f fertility decline. Instead, there are more proximate determinants o f fertility 
that ensue once a society develops, and it is these proximate causes that are responsible 
for fertility decline than development. Economic considerations are one o f them. Once 
the demographic transition has taken place, economics becomes a large consideration for
37 Bongaarts, John and Watkins, Susan Cotts. "Social Interactions and Contemporary
Fertility Transitions." Population and Development Review 22(4). Dec 96, pp. 
639.
38 Caldwell, JC. "Toward A Restatement o f Demographic Transition
Theory."Popn/ation and Development Review 2:321-66, 1976.
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parents. In general, economic theories o f fertility hold two assumptions.39 First, couples 
behave in rational ways when they decide on the number o f children they want to have. 
Second, children are basically viewed by couples as consumptive goods. One example of 
a purely economic fertility theory was created by Leibenstein (in 1974). His theory 
described the development over time o f different benefits and costs o f children in order to 
explain the relation between changes o f fertility and economic development. He 
distinguished three types o f utility for which a child is wanted: 1) consumption utility- the 
child is a source o f personal pleasure, 2) work or income utility- the benefits from the fact 
that the child will sooner or later enter the labor force and add income to the household, 
and 3) security utility- derived from the fact that the child will be a potential source of 
security and help for parents in their old age. Also, there are two types o f disutilities that 
parents must consider: 1) the direct cost o f children, such as feeding, clothing, housing, 
and education, and 2) the indirect costs o f children, such as the earnings income lost (as 
well as other opportunities forgone by the parents) because o f the time and effort
necessary to raise and educate a child.40 It is these utilities and disutilities that people 
consider, and as a society modernizes it becomes clear how the utilities are diminished 
while the disutilities are enhanced. Because of child labor laws and compulsory 
education laws, parents will not receive any income utility, at least not for a very long 
time. Laws such as these, which are rarely absent in a modem society, substantially 
increase the financial burden that children place on parents. Furthermore, as societies
39 Andorka, Rudolf. Determinants ofFertlity in Advanced Societies.(Fiev/ York: 
MacMillan Publishing Co., 1978), 27.
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advance and become more modernized, there tends to be more socialized policies such as 
Medicare and Social Security. These policies allow for greater independence o f the 
elderly and it creates a situation in which they are no longer completely dependent on 
children (thus eliminating old age security as a reason for child bearing).
Certainly economic costs are a major consideration for parents in an advanced 
society, but it obviously is not the only explanation. If it were there would be no way of 
explaining why Americans would want children at all. Furthermore, it cannot explain the 
fertility differentials between the rich and poor. According to this theory alone, it would 
seem reasonable to expect the rich to have higher fertility than the poor, but the exact 
opposite is true. A more comprehensive theory would incorporate economic 
considerations as one factor instead of the only factor. One way o f avoiding this mistake 
is to recognize that there are three basic determinants o f fertility: demand, supply, and the 
cost o f fertility regulation.41 Demand factors include the standard socioeconomic 
determinants o f fertility, and it is here that economic considerations play a role. Supply is 
determined by environmental and cultural factors that constrain or promote fe r til ity .4 2  
And the cost o f fertility regulation includes monetary, time, and psychological factors 
associated with the use o f contraceptives. Essentially this theory emphasizes that only 
applying economics to fertility is an oversimplification. It was stated earlier that access 
to family planning services is a necessary precondition for all other restraints on fertility 
to take place, and this theory's emphasis on the cost o f fertility regulation is an extension
4 0  Ib id , 3 2 .
41 Hirschman, Charles. "Why Fertility Changes." Annual Review o f  Sociology. 1994,
No. 20: pp 215.
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of that. More importantly, it is claiming that there are social and cultural factors that can 
influence the demand and the supply aspects of fertility.
One o f the most important influences of fertility stems from the level o f education 
on both the individual and societal level. The relation between education and fertility is 
assumed to be universally inverse and stable, but what causes this interaction? In other 
words, what are the channels through which education affects fertility? This question can 
be answered by applying education to the three determinants of fertility. As education 
increases, the demand for children tends to decrease. There are several reasons for this, 
many o f which are related to the economic considerations with the most significant being 
that education can alter the preferences o f people, thus changing the perceived costs and 
benefits o f ch ild r e n .4 3  fr is proposed that as people become more educated and their 
world view expands, not only are they more able to grasp the difficulties and sacrifices 
inherent to child rearing ( in terms of finances as well as opportunity), they also tend to 
strive for goals in life other than simply marrying early and starting a family. The "price" 
affixed to children moves beyond mere financial. Furthermore, as people become more 
educated and have the confidence that they will fare well enough for themselves, the 
perceived need for children as safety net (or anyone else for that matter) diminishes.
Education also serves to reduce the supply of children. There are three reasons for 
this. First, the infant mortality rates are largely dependent upon the education of the 
parents, especially the mother. And as already stated, low infant mortality rates are a 
necessary precursor for low fertility rates. Secondly, education often determines the age
4 2  Ib id .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
o f marriage. The more educated someone is, the later the age at which they decide to 
marry and raise children. This is because most people choose to delay marriage and child 
rearing until their education is complete, and often until they are well established in their 
subsequent careers. As studies of many European nations indicate, there is an inverse 
relationship between marriage and fertility r a t e s . 44 Although there may be plenty of time 
to make up for these delays (since human reproductive spans last for so long), that does 
not occur. And third, the number of women who opt to never marry is influenced by the 
level o f education o f both them and the society. Again, this is a result o f the affects that 
education has on changing ones aspirations as well as the social norms.
The third determinant of fertility, the cost of fertility regulation, is influenced by 
education is so far as it not only greatly reduces the financial burden of securing birth 
control, but also by the way in which it influences attitudes toward fertility regulation, 
knowledge o f birth control methods, access to the various means of fertility regulation ,
and communication between husband and wife about family size g o a ls .4 5  Through 
education, people are less likely to avoid using contraception based on false information . 
This works on two levels. First, individuals will be more likely to take advantage of 
family planning services and, secondly, on the community level people will be more 
likely to incorporate and promote the use o f such services.
Thus far the economic and educational constraints on fertility have been 
examined, but there is another constraint on fertility that may be even more important: the
43 Cochrane, 114.
44 Golini, Antonio. "How Low Can Fertility Be? An Empirical Exploration." Population
and Development Review  24(1), March 98: pp. 61.
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status o f  women. The status o f women is a cultural characteristic instead o f an economic 
one, and once again it demonstrates the incompleteness of theories that focus solely on 
economic development or financial costs. The role that women play in a given society 
largely dictates what they will do, when they will marry, and ultimately how many 
children they will bear. It also dictates whether there will be a son-preference among 
married couples. If there a strong preference for sons, then families are likely to keep 
having children until a son is bom, thus increasing the fertility r a t e . 4 6  in societies such 
as India where women do not enjoy very much autonomy and their cultural norms dictate 
that they marry early and reproduce often, fertility rates will inevitably be very high. 
Women status is defined by three characteristics: 1) the extent of exposure to the outside 
world, 2) the extent of interaction with the outside world, and in particular, the extent of 
economic interaction, and 3) the level of autonomy in decision-making within and outside 
the h o u s e h o ld .4 7  Similar to the benefits of education, exposure to the outside world 
increases a woman's receptiveness to new ideas (especially as they relate to new 
contraceptive technologies) can change preferences, and perhaps their own idea as to 
what the role of women should be. Also, as long as women hold some autonomy in the 
decision-making process, they will not necessarily have to maintain fertility levels 
dictated to them by their husbands, parents, or societal norms.
45 Cochrane, 116.
46 Mason, Karen Oppenheim. "The Impact o f Women's Social Position on Fertility in
Developing Countries." Sociological Forum, 1987: pp 718-745.
47 Basu, Alaka Malwade. Culture, the Status o f  Women, and Demographic Behaviour.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 53.
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The extent o f a woman's economic interaction seems to be the most important 
aspect o f  women's status as it relates to fertility rates, and possibly the most important 
fertility determinant overall. As improved economic opportunities for men may lead to 
faster family formation and higher fertility, improved opportunities for women engender
the opposite e f fe c t .4 8  When women fill roles other than wife and mother, fertility rates 
decline because of the impact on both the supply and the demand for children. If women 
engage in premarital employment, the age at which they marry goes up thus reducing the 
s u p p ly .4 9  Also, as women have more economic involvement, the opportunities lost 
because o f high fertility become great whereas before the opposite would be true. 
Furthermore, demand is also reduced by the fact that women who have income o f their 
own no longer have to worry about old-age security. If they were strictly a wife and 
mother, then perhaps there would be the need to bear several children in case she was 
widowed. But it is important to note that it is not just the economic involvement o f 
women that aids in lowering fertility. What is more important is type of economic 
involvement. If  women plan on only being employed until the opportunity arises to 
marry and raise a family, then fertility will not be affected as much. Similarly, if  it is the 
type o f employment which is not impeded by high fertility then once again the affect on 
fertility is diminished. Therefore, it is not the current employment status of the woman 
that determines her future (or past) fertility, but the lifelong plans and experiences o f 
employment. A woman who intends to be employed as continuously as possible and
48 Lesthaeghe, Ron and Surkyn, Johan. "Theories o f  Fertility Change." Population and
Development Review 14, N o.l, Mar 1988: pp. 31.
49 Mason, 722.
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wants to avoid (or cannot afford) interruptions o f her occupational career when her 
children are small and require constant care will be less liable to have a larger family than
another who intends to remain at home. 50
In addition to women's status, another important cultural characteristic that can 
have an influence on fertility rates is that particular culture's notion o f what is an 
acceptable family size. Many societies view large families as a sign o f the males virility 
and thus high fertility rates ensue. But just as cultural norms can create high fertility rates, 
they can also work to ensure low fertility rates. In most advanced societies, especially the 
United States, the number of children a couple decides to have is viewed to be a private 
decision. However, as it becomes evident that population growth is at least partly 
responsible for environment deterioration, it is a private decision that has public 
implications. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that if society were to adopt a general 
view that a family with more than two children has become less socially acceptable 
because o f the way in which it can now adversely affect everyone else (instead o f only 
the parents or siblings), people would become less inclined to have large families. This is 
an approach that Vietnam has taken with its one-or-two child public campaign.51
In developed nations like the U.S. where: 1) the transition from a rural agricultural 
society to a modem urban society has been made and 2) where there is a strong grasp on 
health, it follows that fertility rates are determined largely by choice instead of as a matter
50 Andorcka, 380.
51 Goodkind, Daniel M. "Vietnam's One-or-Two-Child Policy in Action." Population
and Development Review 1 \, No.l: March 1995, pp. 85-109.
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o f survival or natural fertility. It has long been thought that development is what lowers 
fertility, however in the last few decades demographers have placed less emphasis on 
development per se and more emphasis on some o f other more proximate causes o f 
fertility decline (which may very well have come about through development, but not 
necessarily so). The decision a couple makes on how many children it will have is based 
on a complex interaction of economic, social, and cultural variables with some being 
more important than others based on the individual. Among some o f the most important 
determinants were the perceived economic utilities and disutilities o f children, the level 
o f education of both the individual and society at large, and perhaps most importantly the 
status o f women in that particular society as measured not necessarily by their level o f 
employment but also by their type o f employment. Furthermore, there are other cultural 
factors that influence fertility rates, such as how that particular culture envisions the ideal 
family size. This, o f course, plays more o f a role in societies that place more emphasis on 
the good o f the whole (like China) instead of those where individual interests are 
paramount (like the U.S.). An additional purpose o f this section, through explaining the 
various fertility determinants in advanced societies, was to demonstrate that efforts to 
lower fertility do not necessarily have to involve coercion. Fertility rates can be changed 
by altering some o f the social and cultural institutions that may facilitate higher fertility. 
While such efforts may take a little longer to come to fruition than do immediate and 
restrictive one-child laws, they would be much more permanent and there would be no 
fear o f a "fertility backlash" as some are anticipating in China.
To summarize, this chapter has served three main purposes. First, it gave a general 
overview o f the history o f population growth on the global scale as well as that o f the
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United States. For most of the history o f the world, the human population was growing at 
a very slow rate and at times not growing at all. It was not until modem history, and the 
20th century in particular, that the population started to grow at an accelerated pace. The 
focus on the U.S. population showed that it too followed a similar pattern, albeit on a 
smaller scale and in a shorter time frame.
Secondly, this chapter used the concept o f health to explain the traditional 
impediments to population growth as well as the dominant factors behind the modem 
surge in population. The concept of the epidemiological transition was applied to the 
history o f the human population. While in the first stage, people were at the mercy of 
disease, infection, and epidemics. As a result, death struck very early in life which 
greatly reduced the human life expectancy. Such high mortality rates had to be balanced 
with very high fertility rates, but poor health in the form of inadequate nutrition impeded 
the natural fertility. As improvements in health were made in the medical field and 
public health field, the transitions to the second and third stage were made and mortality 
rates dropped dramatically. With death now coming much closer to the end of the 
biological lifespan, mortality began to play less of a role in limiting population growth. 
At this point, fertility levels became the main stimulant (or impediment) o f growth. 
Working simultaneously with the epidemiological transition is the demographic 
transition. The demographic transition follows three phases: high mortality rates and 
high fertility rates, low mortality rates and then a lag time of several years (or decades) 
until low fertility rates come about, and finally low mortality rates with low fertility rates 
that result in very slow population growth or even none at all. It is in this third phase that 
most o f the nations o f the developed world are experiencing.
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POPULATION GROWTH .AND THE .AMERIC.AN POLICY PROCESS
As the population in the U.S. continues to surge, so does the debate over whether
there is a "population problem" and, if so, what to do about it. Since the 1960s,
population growth on both the global and .American level has received quite a bit of
attention. As a result, there are many people who are convinced that population growth is
one o f the most pressing concerns found today in the U.S. and the government needs to
enact some form of population policy to address the problem. This chapter will offer
insight into the American policy process as it pertains to U.S. population growth. First.
this chapter will define and explain the term "population policy." This is important since
it is a term that has caused some confusion since it is not as distinct of a policy typology
as economic policy or national defense policy. This is especially true for the U.S.
because we have yet to adopt an explicit population policy as have some other countries.
Second, it will provide a historical context for the population debate. This is useful
because it illustrates how past debates on population have influenced and formed the
contemporary population debate. And third, this chapter will examine the modem
population debate as it has taken form in the U.S. This will demonstrate how historical
perspectives on population growth permeate our thinking today, and has influenced the
amount and type o f attention it has received. Included in this part o f the chapter is a
litany o f environmental damage that many claim is caused by population growth (or at
44
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least cannot be solved if  the population continues to grow) and use to bolster their 
argument for population stabilization. The point o f this section of the chapter is to 
introduce the predominant environmental arguments made for population stabilization, 
not to make a judgement on the strength or validity o f these arguments. That will be 
saved for the next chapter which focuses on ethics.
Defining "Population Policy"
Population policy is the "direct and indirect result of legislative, judicial, 
executive, and administrative actions directly and indirectly affecting many demographic 
c o m p o n e n t s . "^2 These policy initiatives could range from those that directly influence 
demographic behavior to those indirectly affecting population via changes in social 
behavior and institutions. There are five demographic components: 1) the size o f the 
population, 2) the rate o f increase or decrease o f either birth, death, or growth rates, 3) the 
total migration, 4) the age and racial composition o f a population, and 5) the qualitative 
composition o f a population in terms of education, per capita consumption, and per capita 
income. Usually these demographic components are closely related and a policy that is 
aimed at one will usually affect the others to some extent. Contemporary population 
debates mainly focus on the size o f the population which is largely dictated by the rate o f 
increase or decrease o f either birth, death or growth rates, and migration. Population
52 Cook, Rebecca J. "Formulating Population Policy: A Case Study o f the United 
States." in Population Policymaking in the American States: Issues and 
Processes. Elihu Bergman, etal, eds. (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1974), 15.
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policies can be categorized into four models^^; i) the Family Planning Model, 2) the 
Motivation Model, 3) the Population Distribution Model, and 4) the Per Capita 
Consumption Model.
The Per Capita Consumption Model is only a population policy in the loosest 
sense. It takes into consideration the consumption habits o f a particular population center 
and then considers ways to either curb that consumption or meet those demands. For 
example, a policy in this particular model would project the population o f a certain area at 
a certain date and then plan on ways to accommodate the needs o f that larger (or smaller) 
population.
The most obvious policies that belong to the Population Distribution Model are 
U.S. immigration policies. By only allowing a specified number o f immigrants and 
refugees to enter the U.S. each year, these direct policies affect the geographic 
concentration o f people since the majority o f immigrants tends to cluster in only a few 
regions. Another example of a population policy (albeit an indirect one) that fits under 
the Population Distribution Model is the building o f the interstate-highway system. This 
allowed people to move away fi-om the traditional urban centers and subsequently had a 
substantial affect on the geographic dispersion of people. O f course at its inception few 
people probably thought o f this as a population policy. The fact that this policy initiative 
would more likely be considered part of the transportation policy typology demonstrates 
how ambiguous the population policy typology can be and how the lines separating these 
typologies can be obscmed.
53 Ibid.
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The two most well known models are the Family Planning Model and the 
Motivation Model. These are the two models that most people think of when they hear 
the term "population policy." The Family Planning Model assumes that contraceptive 
information and services should be available to everyone on a volimtary basis, and this is 
by far the most utilized model worldwide. This model purports that such services will 
reduce unwanted births and therefore reduce the overall birthrate. Since there are 
numerous U.S. policies that are part o f this model, it can be said that the U.S. already has 
some semblance of a population policy. The most well known example of a direct 
population policy is the Family Planning and Population Research Act o f 1970. Created 
under the Nixon administration, the intention of this legislation was to ensure that all 
individuals who wanted to take advantage of birth control methods had the proper means 
and access to do so. An example o f an indirect population policy that probably had a 
substantial affect on population growth (although this law was not made with the explicit 
purpose o f increasing or decreasing the population) was the Comstock Act o f 1873. This 
legislation prohibited the advertisements of prescriptions for contraceptives, and made it a 
crime to "sell, lend or give away any article whatever for the prevention of
c o n c e p t io n ." 54 By creating a block to contraceptive information and services, the 
inevitable outcome was higher fertility rates and thus more population growth. Another 
example o f a population policy (which could perhaps be defined as either direct or 
indirect) is the legalization of abortion pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe
54 Hardaway, Robert. Population, Law, and the Environment. (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishing, 1994), 92.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
vs. Wade. Since this decision was made, millions o f legal abortions have been performed 
which has undoubtedly had a substantial demographic impact. Again, even though the 
explicit intention o f this policy was not to increase or decrease the size o f the population, 
it undoubtedly had a substantial influence.
The Motivation Model, on the other hand, holds that it is not logical to believe 
that merely giving people the ability to decide the number and spacing of births will 
reduce population growth. Because there are so many factors that influence fertility rates, 
the private desire to limit fertility may be non-existent, therefore society must enact 
measures (directly or indirectly) to bring about a lower birth rate. According to this view, 
the Family Planning Model is still essential since it complements the Motivation Model, 
but it will not be sufficient when left to stand on its own. Therefore, people must 
somehow be motivated to use these family planning services. Policies in the Motivation 
Model fall under three categories that each represent a point along the spectrum of 
v o lu n ta r in e ss^ ^ :  i )  the removal o f pro-natalist policies, 2 )  the creation o f incentives for 
lower fertility rates, and 3) the development o f disincentives or the implementation o f 
anti-natalist policies. An example o f a possible population policy that would fall under 
the first category is the removal o f certain tax deductions for children. While leaving the 
option o f having a large family completely open, it would indirectly impose financial 
penalties upon doing so. Another example would be laws that require insurance 
companies to cover all sorts o f birth control methods, including sterilizations. The 
second category o f policies could include such measures as offering tax deductions for
55 Cook, pp.21-23.
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smaller families, payments for voluntary sterilization, and preferential treatment for 
services among those who opt for two children or l e s s .56 These type o f policies take a 
firmer stance in that they are openly and directly trying to influence people, but it does so 
by using positive incentives instead o f negative ones. And the third category is the most 
intrusive and is often associated with the stringent population policies o f China. These 
are the ones that cross the threshold from positive to negative coercion and can be labeled 
as "involuntary." Policies o f this nature could include the loss o f benefits for those who 
have large families, higher taxes for those with larger families, or, in the case o f India, 
involuntary sterlizations. Although these types of policies do not necessarily have to be 
part o f an effort to stabilize the population (and in fact are rarely used) and are certainly 
not warranted in the United States, it is the fear o f implementation o f these types o f 
polices that often deters people (especially elected officials) from even discussing the 
population issue. And concerning all three categories o f the Motivation Model, the 
examples given of policies are by no means an exhuastive list. They are just a few 
examples to aid in defining each category.
Historical Perspectives o f Population Growth 
Although population growth has generally been heralded as a key ingredient in the 
making of a strong and prosperous nation, Plato and Aristotle thought otherwise. Plato 
(427-347 B.C.) was a strong advocate o f controlling both the qualitative and quantitative
55 Weeks, John R. "How To Influence Fertility: The Experience So Far." Elephants in 
the Volkswagen. Lindsey Grant, ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman & Co., 
1992X181.
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aspects o f population. This was made evident in The Republic. In this book, Plato 
advocated that the population be broken down into three distinct classes with only the top 
two (the warriors and the philosophers) being allowed to procreate. Such a practice, 
which is now commonly referred to as eugenics, was thought to guarantee that society 
would continue to flourish and progress since each successive generation would be better 
than the last. Not only did Plato advocate dictating who could reproduce, but also the 
total number o f households to which a city-state should be limited. He claimed that the
number o f households should never exceed 5,400.52 Although Plato recognized that a 
minimum amount o f citizens were necessary in order to take advantage of the division of 
labor that he regarded as the very basis o f a city-state, he also believed that unregulated 
population growth would introduce a disturbing variable in his well-ordered and
harmonious c ity - s ta te .58 Plato continued his writings on population in The Laws, which 
was written towards the end of his life. Although written many years after The Republic,
he still advocated limiting the city-state to 5 ,4 0 0  h o u s e h o ld s .5 9  Furthermore, he 
entertained the idea of immigration and colonization to keep the population at a stable 
level, as well as implementing an array o f family laws and inheritance laws that would 
enable the total number o f households to remain static.
Aristotle similarly believed that a population should be static and moderate in 
size, and he gave this topic some attention in The Politics. Aristotle stated that, "To the
52 Plato. The Republic. Chapter 6.
58 Overbeek, Johannes. History o f  Population Theories. (Rotterdam, Netherlands:
Rotterdam University Press, 1974), 24.
59 Plato. The Laws. Book Five.
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size o f a state there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for 
none o f these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they
either wholly lose their natime, or are spoiled ."60 Furthermore, Aristotle felt history 
demonstrated that "A great city is not the same as a populous one... Moreover, experience 
shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well-governed; since all cities
which have a reputation for good government have a limit on population."6l Like Plato, 
Aristotle acknowledged that a very small city-state is not viable from either an economic 
or a military point o f view. But consistent with his concept o f the mean that he 
introduced to us in The Nichomachean Ethics, there is a balance that must be struck. 
There were three basic reasons for this. First, if the population grew too large, then a 
revolution was sure to follow. This would occur because the number o f people would 
exceed the amount that the property would support. Secondly, Aristotle feared that if the 
city-state grew beyond a certain number of inhabitants then the system o f direct 
government would break down since rulers and citizens would no longer be acquainted
with each o th e r .6 2  This concern stems from the Greek's concept o f liberty, which is 
referred to as "ancient liberty." Unlike the modem view o f liberty that places great 
emphasis on the importance o f the individual and individual happiness, the Greeks 
defined liberty as the right o f individuals to participate in the deliberations of
60 Aristotle. The Politics. Stephen Everson, ed. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 172.
61 Ibid, pp. 172-73.
62 Overbeek, pp. 25.
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g o v e r n m e n t . 63 And a possible third reason is that too large o f a population hindered the 
ability of a society to educate its young and ensure their proper ethical development. 
Attaining the "good life", according to Aristotle, requires leading a virtuous life. 
However, adopting the virtues listed by Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics requires a 
great deal o f practice and attention toward the young from a very early age. If  population 
exceeds the maximum level that can be sustained, then the individual becomes consumed 
with the pursuit for survival instead o f excellence.
Plato and Aristotle's recognition of limits to population growth stemmed from 
two basic circumstances. First, with respect to geographic size, there were physical limits 
to growth. This is especially applicable to the Greek city-states which were limited in size 
and were largely forced to be self-sufficient. And secondly, once too large o f a 
population was reached, the harmony of the city-state would be lost and the quality o f life 
for its citizens would suffer. These views on population, like much o f the teachings o f 
the ancient Greeks, were largely ignored throughout much o f European thought. This is 
evident during the post-Plague and post-100 Years War period of Europe that was 
dominated by mercantilism. Mercantilist thought has many characteristics that made it 
look favorably upon population growth. First o f all, mercantilism is a system of "power 
economics" as opposed to the "welfare economics" that were championed by earlier
thinkers including the G r e e k s . 6 4  Mercantilists were not interested in the welfare o f the 
individual but in the power o f the state and the wealthy. This included the wealth o f  the 
kings, who were attempting to consolidate their power, and the merchant class. Guided by
63Gray, John. Liberalism. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1986),1.
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some of the same economic principles that are still popular today, mercantilism's 
emphasis on increasing the wealth o f the elite created the need for a large supply of cheap 
labor and an ever-expanding market. Thus, population growth was a necessity.
Secondly, mercantilism is associated with "power politics."^^ This period of history was 
marked by a strong sense of nationalism among monarchs, which in many ways 
continued until World War I. Each nation was continuously attempting to dominate its 
rival neighbors through trade and warfare. With this constant strife, it was deemed 
absolutely essential to have a large population base from which to field an army. Any 
population growth within a rival nation was seen as a threat, and was met with population 
policies aimed at boosting one's own population. A third characteristic, not necessarily 
o f mercantilism but o f the era in which it took place, was the religious climate. The 
beginning o f mercantilism coincided with the Reformation, which was marked by a 
rediscovery o f the high fertility ethos of the Old T e s t a m e n t . 6 6  The "be finitful and 
multiply" mentality once again became prevalent. Religion played a further role in so far 
as it caused many to ignore any possible physical limitations o f the land caused by such 
factors as its geographic location. The dominant mentality was that God would always 
provide for His children and claiming otherwise was borderline blasphemy.
Mercantilist theorizing was designed to increase the might and eminence o f the 
absolute monarch as well as the prosperity o f the merchants and f i n a n c i e r s . 6 2  This
64 Overbeek, 28.
65 Ibid, 29.
66 Ibid, pp. 30.
67 Ibid, 32.
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system, with its emphasis on the improvements on the elite, saw a neglect of agriculture 
(and those who were engaged in it), incessant wars, and the shameful employment of 
child labor. As a result, mercantilist theory began to be criticized by thinkers who 
emphasized such concepts as personal freedom and individual welfare. Many thinkers 
began to look at population growth with more scrutiny. By using the possibility of large 
scale human misery instead o f national power as criteria, population growth was 
considered in a new light. Undoubtedly, the most famous writer on population growth is 
English economist Robert Malthus (1766-1834).
In 1798, Malthus anonymously published the first edition of "An Essay on the 
Principles o f Population." In this essay, Malthus made his famous declaration that "the 
power o f population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to subsist for 
m a n . " 6 8  The reasons for Malthus' concern over population growth becomes clear when 
viewed in the context of the times in which he lived. First o f all, between 1701 and 1801,
the population of England and Wales almost doubled from 5,826,000 to 9,156,000.69 
But from the year 1765 to 1814 (during Malthus' formative years) England had scores of 
poor harvests, unfavorable climate changes, a war with France that made imports
uncertain, and no way of tapping into North America's vast supply of wheat;70 all of 
which causes several food shortages and a vast amount o f human suffering, especially 
among the lower classes and those still in the countryside. As a utilitarian (which was the
68 Malthus, Robert Thomas. "An Essay on the Principle of Population." (New York:
Oxford University Press, Reprint of 1798 original, 1993), 4.
69 Overbeek, 41.
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dominant philosophy in England at the time), Malthus regarding this suffering as a 
negative affect on the level o f total human happiness. And he attributed this suffering to 
population growth. This is because population growth, if not checked, would grow 
exponentially, while food production could not. Therefore, population must be checked. 
It could be done by either the preventive type or the repressive type. Preventive checks 
are used by humans to voluntarily limit their numbers, and in Malthus' day such checks 
included late marriages and abstinence (whereas Plato and Aristotle advocated abortion 
and exposure). Repressive checks, also referred to as natural (or Malthusian) checks on 
population growth, are much harsher. Malthus contends that once a population exceeds 
the carrying capacity of its geographic location, natural checks such as famine, disease, 
pestilence, and warfare will follow. His views on population are especially important 
since it marks the first time that such concern was rooted in the relationship between the 
environment and the population that it was supporting. Framing the issue in this way has 
for the most part persisted through today's version of the population debate.
Secondly, Malthus' writings were a reaction to the widespread optimism and 
romantic ideas that were current during the latter part o f the 18th century.71 Similar to 
the religious beliefs that influenced mercantilist thought (that were actually still quite 
popular during Malthus' time), there was the belief that humans were virtually infallible 
in the sense that there were no limits on human potential. It was assumed that all
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, 42.
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problems could be fixed by humans, and Malthus was too much o f a pessimist to let such 
a notion go unopposed.
For the most part, Malthus' predictions of widespread starvation brought about by 
overpopulation have not yet occurred. And although there is mass starvation in parts of 
the developing world, many would argue that it is a distribution problem and not a 
population problem. In other words, the earth can yield enough food to feed its six 
billion inhabitants, but political conflict and social inequities prevent the equal 
distribution o f  food and resources. Nonetheless, Malthus has remained the prophet of 
modem day population alarmists. Dubbed as neo-Malthusians, there are many people 
today who still voice the same fears o f Malthus. Neo-Malthusians come from a wide 
array o f careers and academic disciplines, and are essentially reacting to contemporary 
versions o f mercantilist thought as well as the view of human infallibility, just as 
Malthus did. But instead o f claiming that improved social institutions are the answer to 
social problems ( as did the optimists o f Malthus' era), many modem day optimists 
believe that technological innovation is our saving grace. Referred to as the "Comucopia 
Fallacy", there is the belief that human potential, and therefore human progress, is 
unlimited through technology. Technology is what has allowed us to grow enough food 
to feed a growing population and avoid famine, to keep checks on disease, and to mitigate 
health problems that may have otherwise stemmed from pollution and environmental 
deterioration. Proponents o f the "technological fix" to everything have used history 
(which is certainly on their side) as proof that limits do not exist. Neo-Malthusians, on 
the other hand, balk at such arrogance. They claim that Malthus was not wrong in his 
predictions, but only in his timing. There are indeed limits to our size and our activities.
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and technology can only delay the inevitable. Advocates o f stopping population growth 
often point to famine in many parts o f the world, climate change, and regional warfare as 
evidence that Malthusian checks do indeed exist.
This confrontation between pro-growth and neo-Malthusians is how the 
population debate has taken form. It is interesting to see how the form in which the 
modem debate takes place has changed little from the way it was formed during the time 
o f Malthus.
Modem U.S. Population Debate 
These historical views of population growth form the underpinnings o f the 
schools o f thought circulating in today's debate. The recent concems (with "recent" 
being defined here as from the 1960s onward) over population growth stem from the vast 
amount of population growth that has occurred in the latter half of the 20th century. In 
fact, there has been more growth since 1950 than there has been in the entire history of 
the human race. But worries about population growth did not emerge in a vacuum, and it 
is no coincidence that the modem population debate emerged at the same time the U.S. 
started to become more immersed in environmentalism. During the late 1960s and early 
1970s, as Americans were becoming more politically active and concemed about the 
various social problems that defined the times, the environment was one o f many issues 
that received a lot of attention. Much of the environmental legislation used today was 
initiated during this time. That is not to say, however, that environmentalism was bom in 
the 1960s. In fact, the evolution of environmentalism can be divided into four periods.
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with the first three being the most relevant to the topic o f this p a p e r .7 2  First, from 1 8 9 0 -  
1 9 2 0 , was the Conservation-Efficiency Movement. During this period, the government 
took part in rational planning to promote the efficient development and use of all natural 
resources. Conservationists, with the most notable being Theodore Roosevelt, felt that 
politics were an anathema and that environmental policies should be devised by scientific 
experts (who understood technical and scientific methods) aided by the allocation of 
public fu n d s .7 3  Second, from 1 9 2 0 -1 9 6 0 , was the Conservation-Preservation Movement, 
which drew much o f its support from hunting and fishing groups as well as the upper- 
middle class who were enjoying previously unprecedented levels of leisure time. This 
movement was concemed not only with the efficient use o f resources, but also with 
preserving natural habitats. Third, from 1 9 6 0 -1 9 8 0 , was the Environmental Movement. 
This movement saw a great breadth o f constituents (unlike the previous movements that 
were dominated by elites) and was dominated by a "bottom-up" or grassroots phenomena 
in which environmental objectives arose out o f changes in values about the use of
n a t u r e . 74 People became much more involved in a wide array of environmental issues, 
such as clean air, clean water, hazardous waste, and wildlife protection; issues that had 
direct bearing on the quality of their lives. It was during the latter half o f this third period 
of environmentalism that the modem population debate began, and the anti-growth side
72 Lester, James P. "Evolution o f Environmentalism." (San Fransisco: Sierra Club
Books, 1 9 8 9 ) , 2 3 .
73 Hays, Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel o f  Efficiency. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 9 ) , 15.
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gained considerable support. Had there not been a growing sense of environmentalism, 
the population issue may never have re-emerged. The size o f a population is much more 
important when society is worried about the environmental issues that have a direct 
bearing on the lives and health of the general population, instead of the recreational 
opportunities for a few elites. Therefore, population growth began to be viewed as a 
critical link in environmental protection. So what type o f environmental problems have 
been blamed on population growth? The following section summarizes some of the 
major environmental problems supposedly caused by population growth. It is this 
evidence of enviroiunental deterioration that not only neo-malthusians use to bolster their 
argument, but also by those who are more moderate in their stance on population growth. 
It is also from these observations that many people have based their ethical argument for 
population stabilization.
The first area requiring attention is that o f agriculturally-related environmental 
damage. Agriculture is undoubtedly our most important resource, as well as the closest 
link we have to the natural world on which we are dependent. Humans could probably 
get by without coal, oil, and other fossil fuels (although it may alter our lifestyles and, 
perhaps, diminish our quality o f life). But without agriculture, humans simply could not 
siuwive. This is why it so alarming that agriculture is so severely threatened by 
population growth. Due to the unprecedented number o f people to feed, farmers are 
forced to make unprecedented demands on their fields in the efforts to produce a higher 
crop yield. In the short term it is working in some respects. Grain production is at an all-
74Lester, 26.
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time high. In fact, over the past forty years the U.S. has increased (on average) its grain 
production 2.5% per y e a r . 7 5  But in the long term, such agricultural methods cannot be 
sustained and they cause enormous amounts of environmental damage, much o f which 
can already be seen. For example, in order to maintain such a high yield, farmers must 
predominantly rely on high-yield monocultures. This reliance on monocultures is 
dangerous because monocultures are very susceptible to pests and disease. This increases 
the chances o f a major crop failure. To offset such a high risk, farmers employ the use of 
massive amounts of fertilizers and pesticides which, unfortunately, has begun to show 
signs o f decreasing usefulness. Pesticide application has increased thirty-three fold since 
World War II, but losses to pests has doubled in this time f f a m e . 7 6  Although high levels 
of pesticides may at times increase the crop yield, the side effects are disastrous. For 
example, fertilizer and pesticide runoff into waterways poisons millions o f fish (another 
food source) as well as our own water supply. The National Academy of Sciences has 
reported that as many as 1 . 4 6  million cases of human cancer may result from exposure to 
pesticide r u n o f f . 7 7
There are also significant problems with high yield agriculture that stem from its 
dependence on machinery rather than human labor. Agriculture that is reliant on 
machinery- intensive methods is problematic for two reasons. First, the burning o f fossil 
fuels to run the machinery is harmful to the environment, especially when considering
75 Bouvier and Grant, 35.
76 Ibid, 37.
77 Ibid, 38.
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that farmers are currently using 120 gallons o f oil per acre o f farm l a n d . 78 Secondly, the 
fossil fuel supply is finite and when it is depleted, the machinery on which agriculture is 
dependent may come to a halt. Unless the infrastructure has changed prior to this 
anticipated, yet largely unprepared for, depletion of fossil fuels, the results may be 
catastrophic.
Another problem with high yield agriculture arises out o f the necessity to provide 
sufficient irrigation. As populations expand, the disputes for water between urban areas 
and farming areas will escalate. Contrary to what much of the public believes, water is a 
finite resource. Aquifers once thought to be limitless are being rapidly depleted to the 
point where it is now feared they will run dry. Overdrafts on aquifers are one reason why 
many geologists are convinced that water shortages will bring the human population to a 
h a l t . 7 9  The Ogalla Aquifer, which supplies water to the Great Plains states, takes in only 
one half-inch o f water per year but drops four to six feet annually.80 Because of such a 
large overdraft, it is estimated that it will be depleted within the next twenty-five 
y e a r s . I n  California's San Joaquin Valley, aquifers are pumped at a rate that exceeds 
recharge by more than 500 billion gallons a n n u a l l y . ^2 And nationwide, water is being
78 Pimentel, David and Marcia. "Land, Energy, and Water: The Constraints Governing
Ideal U.S. Population Size." Elephants in the Volkswagen. Grant, Lindsey, ed., 
(New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1992), 26.
79 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 30.
80 Ibid, 28.
81 Bouvier and Grant, 37.
82 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 29.
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used (on average) at a rate 25% higher than its replenishment rate.83 The use o f this 
much water cannot be continued in the long term, yet our high level o f agricultural output 
(which is required by such a large and growing population) demands it.
The final, and perhaps most serious problem caused by such high-yield 
agricultural methods is erosion. To satisfy the growing population's appetite, farmers 
have largely abandoned using the crop rotation technique. The subsequent damage of 
such methods have left the soil very susceptible to erosion through wind and irrigation 
runoff. In fact, the Department o f Agriculture estimate o f annual cropland erosion is
three billion tons.84 The state o f Iowa, which has our richest and deepest soil, has lost 
about one half o f its topsoil over the last century.85 This is certainly worth worrying 
about since it takes about five hundred years to naturally replace one inch of topsoil. But 
the world must continue to provide food for over 100 million more people each year,
despite the loss in soil.86 To compensate for this loss in soil, farmers rely more heavily 
on fertilizers, and the harmful consequences of such actions have already been noted.
Environmental damage resulting from population growth can also be witnessed 
through the worldwide destruction o f forests. The deliberate removal o f forests is one o f 
the most longstanding and significant ways in which humans have modified the 
environment. Since 1960 about half of the world's forest land has been destroyed.87 The
83 Pimentel and Pimentel, 25.
84 Bouvier and Grant, 36.
85 Ibid.
86 Hardaway, 2.
87 DesJardins, Joseph R. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental
Philosophy (Belmont, CA; Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993), 102.
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rainforests in South America are disappearing at the incredible rate o f 100 acres per 
m i n u t e . 88 Each year a land area the size o f Tennessee is slashed and burned to make 
room for the expanding population and for the farmland and grazing land for cattle that is 
needed to feed such a high number o f people. And although it has become quite 
fashionable to berate the Brazilians for the destruction o f their forests, it is being done in 
the U.S. to an equal, if  not greater, degree. In fact, only 10% o f the U.S.'s old-growth 
virgin forests still remain intact. Some estimates show that at the time o f the Mayflower 
the U.S. contained 170 million hectares o f forestland which has since dwindled to only 10
million h e c t a r e s . 89 Most o f the trees standing in the U.S. are part o f monocultured tree 
farms instead o f self-supporting ecosystems. Trees are being cut down at such a fast pace 
to satisfy a growing population's paper-product requirement, its housing needs, and to 
make room for agriculture. In addition to an array of damage caused by such destruction, 
the cutting down o f trees hastens the rate o f soil erosion and thus decreases the 
productivity o f  the land.
Another serious type of environmental damage caused by such rapid human 
expansion is the toll it is taking on the energy supply. Currently, the U.S. is 92%
dependent on fossil energy.90 This is problematic for several reasons. First, fossil fuels 
are very finite resources. At current consumption rate, oil resources in the U.S. will last
88 Hardaway, 17.
89 Goudie, Andrew. Human Impact on the Environment: Fourth Edition. (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1994), 43.
90 Pimentel and Pimentel, 26.
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for only sixteen more years while natural gas will remain for only thirty six more years.91 
This is assuming consumption rates remain constant which, since an increase in 
population appears inevitable for some time to come, is not likely. Coal, the other main 
fossil fuel, will remain abundant for hundreds o f years. But it is the dirtiest form o f fossil 
fuel and contributes the most to climate change, water and soil acidification, and air 
pollution. Reliance on coal is not acceptable, especially since it is estimated that 48% of 
all Americans are already breathing air deemed to be unsafe by federal standards.92 
Furthermore, much of the coal that remains in the earth is presently economically 
unrecoverable. A potential energy crisis such as this perfectly demonstrates the law of 
diminishing returns. As the closest and richest resources are used (due to a high 
population and high consumption rates), it requires more energy and more money to 
access energy sources farther away.93 As we diminish the fossil fuel supply to such low 
levels, it gets increasingly more difficult and expensive to find and gain access to 
previously untapped sources. It also causes great amounts o f serious, and often times 
permanent, environmental destruction when previously unexploited and unspoiled areas 
are tapped.
A second energy-related problem stems from the fact that alternative energy 
sources presently do not provide an adequate solution, nor will they in the foreseeable 
future. Wind and solar technological development has virtually stalemated and is already
91 Bouvier and Grant, 25.
92 Rohe, John F. A Bicentennial Malthusian Essay (Traverse City, MI: Rhodes and
Easton, 1997), 49.
93 Ehrlich and Herlich, 137.
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rather limited. Additionally, due to the large land area needed to contain solar lakes 
(which is one method of obtaining solar energy), there lies the strong possibility of fierce 
competition for land with agricultural interests and with the real estate market as it 
becomes more scarce due to population expansion. Nuclear energy is presently deemed 
too unsafe by society to be widely accepted, especially because of the difficulty and 
danger o f storing its vast amounts o f radioactive waste (which remains so for many 
generations). And biomass energy technology has not yet reached the point where it 
could be a viable source either. Current technology in the process o f converting biomass 
to usable energy requires the use of more energy from fossil fuel sources than is 
converted. And, once again, there is a potential conflict over increasingly scarce land 
since the biomass used for energy is found on farmland and in forest basins. In sum, the 
energy sources presently being used are finite and may not provide for any more 
population growth (without a substantial reduction in consumption levels) while 
alternative energy technology has yet to reach the point where it can even come close to 
providing an adequate amount of energy for the present population, let alone an 
increasing one. It is possible that in the future alternative energy technology could 
progress to the point where enough energy would be supplied. However, this will not 
occur in the foreseeable future and simply putting complete and unfettered faith in the 
natural progression of technology to solve the earth's energy concems is not sound policy.
An increasing population also invariably increases the amount of solid waste that 
must somehow be absorbed by the earth. Present-day U.S. cities are generating twice the
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amount o f solid waste as they did in 1 9 6 0 . 9 4  On an individual level, each person 
generates fifty tons o f solid waste each y e a r . 9 5  But solid waste does not just vanish. It 
must somehow be absorbed by the earth or contained by landfills and water ways. The 
quality o f life o f humans, through being forced to live in such close proximity to landfills 
that are increasing in both size and number, suffers great detriment. It is also disastrous 
to the water and its aquatic-life. Wastes, such as nitrogen and phosphorous, being 
pumped into the oceans and rivers not only poison our own water supplies, it has caused a 
great increase in the number and fi-equency of mysterious brown-tides and red-tides
which kill millions o f f i s h . 9 6  Humans subsist on the aquatic-life that is being killed off 
at such an alarming rate. It was once thought that the seas were abundant enough to feed 
the world. However, with such high levels of water pollution it is becoming all too 
obvious that this is no longer the case. But solid waste is not the only threat to the health 
o f aquatic ecosystems. Overfishing, to accommodate the appetite of such a large 
population, is taking its toll as well. The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
estimated that out o f the two hundred eighty fisheries it monitors, only twenty-five could 
be considered underexploited or moderately e x p l o i t e d . 9 7  Statistics also show that 
thirteen o f the 1 7  major fisheries in the world are overfished or are in d e c l i n e . 9 8
And another example of environmental harm supposedly caused by human 
population expansion to be attended to in this chapter is the historically unprecedented
94 Bouvier and Grant, 15.
95 Ibid, 16.
96 Ibid, 42.
97 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 86.
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assault on biodiversity. Biodiversity is the variety of life at all levels o f organization, 
from the level of genetic variation within and among species to the level o f variation 
within and among ecosystems and biomes.^^ Largely through human activity and, more 
importantly, the loss o f habit due to human expansion, life on earth faces the greatest
mass extinction since the end of the dinosaur age 65 million years ago.^^^ Scientists 
estimate that without h tun an activity, approximately one species would become extinct 
every few years but, with credit being given to human activity, between fom to six
thousand species are becoming extinct each year.^®^ To explain this causal relationship, 
ecologists use the example o f an island. As ecologist Andrew Goudie explains, islands 
support fewer species than do similar areas o f mainland, and smaller islands have less 
than larger ones. As hiunans destroy the greater part of a naUu'al forest, leaving just a 
small reserve, they become like islands. Initially it will be "supersaturated" with species, 
containing more than is appropriate to its area when at equilibrium. But since the 
population sizes o f the species living in the forest must now be greatly reduced, the 
extinction rate will increase and the number o f species will decline towards equilibrium. 
And not only are the overall numbers reduced, so is their genetic quality as such problems 
as inbreeding become a c u t e .  ^^2 \  main cause o f this "island effect" is the rapid
expansion o f human activities across the earth and the subsequent modification of natural
Benchley, 55.
Tillman, David. "Biodiversity and Ecosytem Functions." Nature's Services. 
Gretchen Daily, ed.(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997), 93.
100 DesJardins, 3-4.
101 Ibid, 101.
102 Goudie, 133.
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ecosystems into systems managed for human benefit. This is also largely due to the 
earth's deforestation, pollution, and subtle (yet deadly) climate changes induced by the 
activities o f an expanding and intrusive human population. In the U.S. there are other 
culprits as well that lead to the loss of biodiversity, such as tall buildings and towers that 
kill millions o f birds each year as well as dams which take an incredible toll on fish and 
wildlife that is dependent upon them as a food source. Furthermore, road networks are a 
highly-effective cause o f habitat isolation acting as a series o f barriers to movement. And 
even though there are many species that are still not threatened with extinction, most have 
experience vast declines in numbers and spatially. As a result, humans now have the
highest biomass than any other species on earth. ̂
The reduction in biodiversity mentioned above mainly deals with individual 
species. But the widespread destruction of entire ecosystems and the disruption of the 
services they provide caused by human expansion is detrimental as well. Ecosystem 
services are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the
species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life.^O'^ Examples o f these services 
are the purification o f air and water, the mitigation o f drought and floods, the 
detoxification and decomposition o f wastes, the generation o f soil and soil fertility, the 
pollination o f crops and natural vegetation, the control o f pests, and the partial
stabilization of the climate. These valuable ecosystems are being destroyed in the 
U.S. through grazing, the plowing of grasslands, the clearing of forests, and the draining
103 Goudie, 89.
104 Daily, Gretchen C., ed. Nature's Services. (Washington, DC; Island Press, 1997), 3.
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of wetlands. In fact the U.S. has lost 54% of its wetlands, mainly because of the 
expansion o f agriculture but also largely because of the creation o f  h o u s i n g .  106
Survival Agenda vs. Opportunity Agenda 
Those who point out the possibility of such environmental disasters materializing 
are hoping to create a sense o f urgency among politicians and the general public. This is 
a tactic often used in other environmental issues as well, such as global warming. And 
then there are those who take a much more mild approach and claim that population 
growth may not cause widespread disaster, but it will certainly cause a downward slide in 
the quality o f life we have enjoyed. This, they claim, will come about through increased 
pollution, crowding, loss o f serenity, and loss o f recreational opportunities.
Have those who attempted to give population growth its due attention been 
successful? This question can be answered by applying two criteria; 1) the degree of 
official government attention to the problem, and 2) the policy outputs that resulted from 
this government attention. On the global level, there has been remarkable success. 
Although the world population is still growing (with a momentum that will cause it to do 
so for several more decades), world leaders have long since acknowledged that 
population growth poses serious problems. As a result o f this concern, the United 
Nations established such bodies as the U.N. Population Division, which monitors world 
demographic trends, and the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, which gives financial 
help and expertise to underdeveloped countries seeking to lower their fertility rates.
105 Ibid, 4.
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Furthermore, the U.N. frequently holds international conferences that address the various 
problems attributable to population growth and various means to rapidly and humanely 
bring about world population stabilization.
The efforts on the part o f those who were concerned with the U.S. population 
have only enjoyed mixed results. On the upside, the growing concern over U.S. 
population growth in the 1960s warranted a major government study. Released in 1972, 
the Rockefeller Foundation's very comprehensive study titled "Population and the 
American Future" studied the affects of population growth on virtually every facet of 
American life. It came to the following conclusion:
"After two years o f concentrated effort we have concluded that, in the long 
run, no substantial benefits will result from further growth of the Nation's 
population, rather that the gradual stabilization o f our population would contribute 
significantly to the Nation's ability to solve its problems. We have looked for, and 
have not found, any convincing economic argument for continued population 
growth. The health o f our country does not depend on it, nor does the vitality of
business nor the welfare o f the average person."
In addition to making several policy recommendations that would bring about the 
eventual stabilization o f the population (one of which being the creation o f an Office of 
Population Affairs under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), the study 
also placed great emphasis on the very real possibility o f a drastically deteriorating 
natural environment where such things as a safe and adequate water supply would 
become a major issue in the future.
106 Goudie, 111.
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But the study did not focus solely on the environment. It also asserted that the 
economies o f scale between the population and the government services had been 
exceeded, and that attempts to cure social ills (especially those that involved minority 
groups) would be exceptionally difficult in the wake o f continual population growth. 
Furthermore, the study devoted substantial effort toward debunking the myth that a large 
population is necessary for national security. It concluded that, "When the nation was 
young and her independence not very secure, her defense depended on the number o f 
people bearing arms...", but, "Because of the expected natme of future military conflicts, 
experts suggest that a peacetime active duty force o f two to three million would be 
sufficient to ensure national security. The three million required would be less than six 
percent o f the male population 18 to 45 years old... Thus we can discern no threat to the
nation's security from lesser future growth of total population."
The Rockefeller Report was very successful in two ways. First, it intelligibly 
linked population growth to the diminished ability of the nation to care for its natural 
environment. Second, it deflated much of the mercantilist-like perceptions that still 
pervaded American thought as it pertains to population. The study was very explicit in 
stating that population growth is not necessary for a strong national defense or for a 
healthy economy. But on the downside, the U.S. government largely ignored the findings 
of this study. There were many advances made in family planning services, as evidenced 
by the passage o f the improved Family Planning and Research Act o f 1975 and by 
Supreme Court cases such as Roe vs. Wade, but these were more o f an outgrowth o f the
108 Ibid,85.
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debate over the issues o f privacy and women's reproductive rights. They did not 
necessarily originate from a concern over population. Since the Rockefeller Report, there 
has been one other major government study that focused on population. In 1996 the 
President's Council on Sustainable Development released a report titled "Sustainable 
America: A New Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for 
the Future" in which an entire chapter was devoted to population growth. In this report, 
the coimcil lists ten broad goals that together would make for sustainability o f U.S. 
development, with one of those being population stabilization. It was stated, "Stabilizing 
the population without changing consumption and waste production patterns would not 
be enough, but it would make an immensely challenging task more manageable. In the
United States, each is necessary; neither is s u f f i c i e n t . "   ̂09
In both government studies, the eventual stabilization o f the population is called 
for. But these reports differ in that the Rockefeller Report's thesis was that population 
growth is not necessary and that problems would become more manageable as growth 
slowed, while the Council on Sustainable Development took a firmer stance in so far as it 
essentially claimed that population stabilization is necessary to meet our goals. 
Unfortunately, calls for population stabilization have largely gone unheeded, as 
evidenced by the fact that since the Rockefeller Report the American population grew by 
about 70 million people and (according to the Census Bureau's medium projection) is
109 President's Council on Sustainable Development. "Sustainable America: A New
Consesus for Prosperity,Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the Future." 
(Government Printing Office, 1996).Chapter 6: "U.S. Population and 
Sustainability",!.
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expected to grow by over 100 million in the next five decades. 116 As an explanation as 
to why the government has remained rather lax towards population growth, many claim 
that we have a long-standing "growth ethic" in this country that will take years, if  not 
generations, to change. Others point out that population is an inherently thorny issue that 
many elected officials (who must run for re-election) prefer to avoid. Similarly, it is such 
a long-term issue that it does not make sense for those in elected office to devote a 
significant amount o f attention to it when they are other problems seen as more pressing 
and immediate. These may be true, but a more likely explanation is that how an issue is 
defined dictates what type o f agenda it gets placed on. This, in turn, influences what type 
o f policies will be used to address that particular issue. By turning the discussion to the 
agenda-setting portion o f the policy process, it will become clear why American 
population growth was not acted upon with as much vigor as many were hoping for.
It has been argued that there are two types o f agendas on to which the various 
problems systemic to population growth can be placed: the siuvival agenda and the
opportunity agenda. ̂   ̂  ̂ Many developing nations are faced with such rapid population 
growth and such scant resources that the very lives o f its citizens, as well as the viability 
o f the entire society, are at risk. Hence, population polices are developed and 
implemented as a matter o f  survival. The situation is much different in developed
 ̂16 U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projections o f the Population of the United States, by 
Age, Sex and Race: 1988 to 2080." Current Population Reports, P-25-1018. 
Washington, DC. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
11  ̂ Bergman, Elihu. "American Population Policy: An Agenda for Expanding
Opportunity." Politcal Issues in U.S. Population Policy. Virginia Gray and Elihu 
Bergman, eds.(New York: Lexington Books, 1974), 3.
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nations, especially in the U.S. Although population growth is occurring, it is not as rapid 
and certainly does not threaten our survival. As population policy expert Elihu Bergman 
stated, "Contrasted to the primordial requirements o f the developing world, we have long 
since won the battle o f survival, and in so doing, have developed greater capacities for 
influencing the conditions o f our survival."  ̂ Therefore, we do not perceive population 
growth and its subsequent damage as life-threatening. At least not in the foreseeable 
future. Instead, we focus on the affects population growth has on our quality o f  life or, 
as Bergman worded it, "the scope o f opportunity." Interestingly, he points to the 
Rockefeller Commission's "Population and the American Future" as an example of a 
comprehensive version o f the opportunity agenda for population policy making. As 
previously mentioned, this report stated its findings on how population growth can 
adversely affect our education, health, ability to address social inequities, and the 
environment. The content foimd in this report demonstrates what a contrast there is 
between the situation o f a very poor and underdeveloped nation that is facing a problem 
of survival and that o f a developed nation facing a problem o f decreasing quality o f life. 
The report makes no mention of a possible threat of starvation (as there may be in a 
developing nation), but it does raise the possibility o f an increase in food and energy 
prices as well as a decrease in outdoor recreation possibilities. Because the issues 
stemming from U.S. population growth are such that we can place them on an 
opportunity agenda instead o f a survival agenda, we are permitted the "luxury o f greater
112 Ibid.
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variation in policy a l t e r n a t i v e s . " !  13 instead o f being forced to mandate a one-child 
policy (like China) or exercise involuntary sterlizations (like India reportedly did in the 
1970s), the U.S. could address population growth in a much more flexible way. This 
explains why the government focused solely on family planning programs to address 
population growth.
Where does this agenda-setting fit in the overall scheme of the policy process? 
The public policy process follows six steps: problem recognition, agenda setting, policy 
formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy analysis and 
evaluation.! 1^ During the late 1960's, population growth was increasingly being seen as 
a problem. These problems (with environmental damage being the dominant one) were 
vocalized by many interested parties, but were officially relayed to the government 
through the Rockefeller Commission. Along with other sources, the government 
considered this report and deemed the issue to be worthy of being placed on an 
"opportunity agenda". Since survival was not at stake, the policy formulation phase 
almost exclusively consisted of alternatives within the realm o f family planning. 
Choosing this alternative was the proverbial "win-win" situation for the decision makers. 
First o f  all. it was nothing too drastic and did not mark a radical departure from past 
governmental involvement (or lack there of) in childbearing decisions. Second, by doing 
something they appeased those who truly felt population growth needed to be dealt with.
113 Ibid, pp. 8
11^ Theodoulou, Stella Z. "How Public Policy Is Made." Public Policy: The Essential 
Readings. Stella Theodoulou and Matthew A. Cahn, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1995), 86-95.
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And third, this coincided with a time when many Americans were calling for more family 
planning services and "reproductive freedom", as demonstrated by some now famous 
Supreme Coiul cases tried during this time frame.
But why was the population problem placed on an opportunity agenda instead of a 
survival agenda? One explanation is that the Malthusian symbols that were used (and are 
still being used) were not persuasive enough. It was the proverbial "crying w o lf 
situation: Malthus' predictions never came true, nor have those o f the neo-Malthusians 
such as Ehrlich. Many still doubt whether they ever will, so the very same debate 
continues. At least the case has not been made that population has to be addressed instead 
o f  solely focusing on technology or consumption. It is not logically sound to argue that 
since technology has worked thus far in preventing population-induced "ecotastraphe" it 
will continue to do so in the future. However, history has certainly proved this camp right 
so far. The fact is that there is a decreasing proportion of people starving worldwide than 
ever before and Americans are (materially speaking) living better than ever. Whether this 
trend continues remains to be seen. But a deeper explanation requires an examination of 
the dominant form of environmentalism, with the understanding that environmentalism is 
guided by environmental ethics. It was mentioned earlier that concerns over population 
growth did not occur in a vacuum. They were prompted by a rise in environmentalism. 
Although population growth can be harmful for many reasons not necessarily directly 
related to the environment, most modem day concerns about population are rooted in 
environmentalism to some extent. Therefore, if  environmentalism is what prompted the 
contemporary population debate, then the type o f environmentalism (and environmental
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ethics) to which we subscribe influences how the issue is defined and what agenda we 
place it on.
Environmental ethics presents and defends a systematic and comprehensive 
account o f the moral relations between human beings and their environment, 115 and can 
basically be broken down into two categories: anthropocentric (human-centered) ethics 
and biocentric (life-centered) ethics. Needless to say, anthropocentric ethics is (and has 
always been) the dominant strain o f ethics in American environmentalism. And the fact 
that we have been assessing population growth from the viewpoint o f this body of 
environmental ethics explains why it was placed on the opportunity agenda. Furthermore, 
it partially explains why many feel that population growth is merely an indirect cause of 
environmental deterioration. I f  however, biocentric ethics were to dominate 
environmentalism, then the population issue may have been framed much differently 
followed by much different policy outcomes. Instead of focusing on safe drinking water,, 
increased agricultmal prices, and decreased natural beauty and recreational opportunities, 
perhaps such issues as species extinction, reduced biodiversity, and the destruction of 
natural self-sustaining ecosystems would have been given more attention in the problem- 
definition phase o f the policy process. Furthermore, if non-human species (or at least 
some of them) were granted a higher degree o f moral standing, then perhaps the 
population problem would have been placed on some form o f a siuvival agenda than an 
opportunity agenda. In other words, a shift to biocentric ethics would give the population
115 DesJardins, Joseph R. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental 
Philosophy. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993), 13.
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issue much more importance than it receives now. The next chapter defines biocentric 
ethics, explores the roots of biocentric ethics, defends biocentric ethics as the branch of 
environmental ethics that should be adhered to in the policy making process, and 
demonstrates how biocentric ethics requires us to make a concerted long term effort at 
stabilizing our population.
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CHAPTER 4
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND POPULATION GROWTH
Up until this point this thesis has focused on the demographics of population
growth and how population growth has been viewed by society and the political process.
In this chapter the focus shifts to environmental ethics and its application to population
growth. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to convince the reader that the traditional
anthropocentric-based utilitarian arguments for population stabilization are inadequate
and a shift in thinking that leans more towards biocentric thought is the better approach to
environmental ethics. To meet this purpose, this chapter is broken down into five
sections. The first section provides some of the background information on
environmental ethics that is necessary for the reader to understand the arguments being
made in this chapter. The main focus of this section is distinguishing anthropocentric
ethics from biocentric ethics. It is helpful to make it clear from the beginning that an
ethical theory can rarely be strictly anthropocentric or biocentric. Instead o f labeling
ideas as one or the other, it is best to view environmental ethics as a spectrum with
anthropocentric views on the one end and biocentric views on the other. Usually ethical
theories will fall somewhere in the middle, taking on characteristics o f both and thus
making it difficult to characterize certain thinkers as anthropocentric or biocentric.
The second section o f this chapter provides a historical overview o f how
anthropocentric environmental ethics have dominated our thoughts on how humans
79
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should interact with nonhuman organisms and natural ecosystems. This overview 
illuminates the many problems associated with such strict anthropocentric views and how 
it fails to protect the interest o f nonhuman species. This leads directly into the third 
section o f the chapter which bridges the gap between earlier efforts to address population 
growth and the shortcomings o f anthropocentric environmental ethics. Relying on 
anthropocentric environmental ethics is simply not the correct way to address 
environmentally-related problems, as is evidenced by the failure to adequately address 
population growth sooner. It does not provide a powerful enough argument to persuade 
others that population stabilization should be a priority of ours because it fails to take into 
accoimt many interests that should be given consideration. Therefore, to summarize the 
view taken in this section on anthropocentric environmental ethics, it can be stated that 
anthropocentric ethics is not wrong or illogical, just that it is incomplete. While it does 
take into consideration many important interests and ideals, it does not consider all of the 
ones it should and thereby does not recognize all of the problems that population growth 
causes.
As a result o f these shortcomings, this chapter then turns its attention to biocentric 
ethics and urges a shift in thinking towards this outlook. Note the word "shift" is used 
instead o f "switch" because, as stated earlier, environmental ethics should be viewed as a 
scale instead of as two basic theories that require us to choose one or the other. As a 
result, this shift will force us to view population growth in a new light. One that makes it 
clear to us that even if population growth can continue without harm to humans, 
population stabilization should still be a societal goal o f ours since population growth 
frustrates the interests o f nonhiunan species and ecosystems that we, as moral agents.
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should be giving much more moral consideration. This aspect o f the argument is done in 
three steps. First, there is an overview of the emergence o f biocentric ideas in Western 
thought. An understanding o f the early biocentric thinkers and how biocentric thought 
has progressed is essential to understanding the modem biocentric ideas used in this 
thesis. Secondly, there is a defense of biocentric environmental ethics. It must be 
established that this is the outlook we should in fact adopt, otherwise it is pointless to 
proceed in demonstrating how a shift towards biocentric ethics would require efforts 
toward population stabilization. The final section o f this thesis is devoted to arguing that 
an adoption o f a more biocentric outlook will in fact require us to stabilize our 
population. This aspect o f the argument is composed of two basic premises: population 
growth is no longer necessary to achieve or protect any human interests, and efforts 
aimed at altering consumption and technology are not enough alone to protect the 
interests o f nonhuman species.
Defining "Environmental Ethics"
In the last few decades, the field of environmental ethics has gained a substantial 
amount of attention. Environmental ethics courses are taught in many universities, and 
there has been a surge o f writing on environmental ethics over the last few decades. 
These works include such now famous books as Rachel Carlson's Silent Spring (1962), 
Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975), Tom Regan's The Case For Animal Rights 
(1983), and Paul Taylor’s Respect fo r  Nature (1986); an abimdance o f articles published 
in scholarly journals o f a wide cross-section o f academic disciplines and political slants; 
and the creation o f scholarly joiunals such as Environmental Ethics, Ecology Law
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Quarterly, and Environmental Review that are completely devoted to environmental 
ethics. All o f this recent academic work in environmental ethics may lead one to believe 
that it is a completely new field. While it is true that only recently have environmental 
ethics developed into a cohesive and "independent" academic discipline, environmental 
ethics in a sense have always existed. After all, humankind has always been dependent 
on the earth for its survival and well-being or, at the very least, has always had some 
interaction with natiue. Therefore, there have always been ideas concerning the right way 
and the wrong way to treat nature and its nonhuman inhabitants even though these did not 
always have the label o f  "environmental ethics." As this brief history will show, 
anthropocentric- dominated ethics have virtually always been (and in many ways still are) 
the norm, although the tide seems to be turning in favor o f biocentric ethics.
Environmental ethics presents and defends a systematic and comprehensive
account o f  the moral relations between human beings and their environment.  ̂^6 in other 
words, environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relations between humans and 
the natural world. The ethical principles governing those relations determines our duties, 
obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the 
animals and plants that inhabit it. ̂   ̂7 Therefore, what a theory of environmental ethics is 
designed to do is "establish the rational grounds for a system of moral principles by 
which human treatment o f  natural ecosystems and their wild communities o f life ought to
l ib  DesJardins, Joseph R. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental 
Philosophy. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993), 13.
117 Taylor, Paul W. Respect For Nature: A Theory o f  Environmental Ethics. (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 3.
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be guided."! 18 J q explain it in a simpler fashion, environmental ethics can basically be 
broken down into two categories: anthropocentric (human-centered) ethics and biocentric 
(life-centered) ethics. Anthropocentric ethics claims the duties we hold to the natural 
world are ultimately derived from the duties we hold to one another. Destruction o f the 
environment or harm to nonhuman species can only be deemed unethical if it in some 
way harms another human being. A strict following o f anthropocentric ethics requires 
one to believe that the natural environment and its nonhuman species have only an 
instrumental worth. This means that their worth depends only on how much value they 
have for humans (whether it be in economical, recreational, or aesthetic terms).
Biocentric ethics claims that the earth does not exist solely for the service of 
humans. Instead, all living creatures and wild communities, regardless o f their utility 
(i.e., instrumental value) to humans, have a worth that is inherent to them; a worth that is 
to be respected for its own sake. In other words, humans are no longer the sole gauge of 
the rightness or wrongness o f an action and its consequences. As philosopher Holmes 
Rolston in stated, "All ethics seeks an appropriate respect for life, but respect for human 
life is only a subset o f respect for all life. What ethics is about, in the end, is seeing 
outside your own sector o f self-interest, o f class interest. A comprehensive ethic will find
value in and duties to the natural world." 11^ Therefore, according to biocentric ethics, if 
it can be demonstrated that something we do harms nonhumans species yet does not
118 Ibid, 9.
119 Rolston, Holmes HI. " Challenges in Environmental Ethics." Environmental
Philosophy: From Animal Rights To Radical Ecology .Michael E. Zimmerman, 
ed. (New York, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993), 136.
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create any problems for humans, then that action is still morally wrong. On the opposite 
end o f the spectrum is strict (or pure) biocentric ethics which would hold that all life is o f 
equal worth. Yet this is a rather extreme view, and is not representative o f the majority o f 
biocentric thinkers. Although all beings are considered to have some inherent worth, that 
of a nonhuman species and human species (or among different nonhuman species for that 
matter) are not necessarily equal. Peter Singer explains this concept by stating, "It is not 
arbitrary to hold that the life o f a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, o f 
planning for the future, o f complex acts o f communication, and so on, is more valuable 
than the life o f a being without these capacities." This statement resembles a school o f 
thought that has been called "eco-humanism." Eco-humanism, which by all accounts is 
still a form o f biocentric environmental ethics, is a compromise position which attempts 
to combine eco-compatibalism's emphasis upon harmonizing human activity with 
ecological principles and promoting the overall well-being of the non-human biosphere 
with humanism's concern for human i n d i v i d u a l s .  ^20 a form of humanism, eco- 
humanism stresses the importance of humans and so grants priority to the vital interests 
o f humans when they come into irreconcilable conflict with other individuals or the larger 
biosphere with the burden o f proof being on humans to show that their vital interests are
at s t a k e . ^21 Therefore, biocentric ethics does not necessarily hold that all species are 
equal; it merely asserts that all species, regardless o f their instrumental value, have some 
inherent worth and are therefore worthy o f some degree o f  moral consideration. How
^20 Aiken, William. "Ethical Issues in Agriculture." Earthbound: New Introductory 
Essays in Environmental Ethics. Tom Regan, ed. (New York: Random House 
Inc., 1984), 271.
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much moral consideration is, o f course, a much debated issue, and is one that will be 
taken up later in this chapter. Not only is biocentric ethics split with respect to how to 
assign inherent worth, biocentric ethics is also split between the individualistic vision and 
the holistic vision. The individualistic philosophers emphasize the importance of 
individual members o f the earth's biosphere. Those who adhere to the holistic vision 
place ultimate value in ecosystems and their continual functioning instead o f the 
individuals that comprise it. In short, within biocentric ethics there are several theories as 
to what characteristics make nonhumans worthy o f moral consideration, and theories that 
emphasize an individualistic or holistic approach. The strengths and weakness o f these 
theories will be examined throughout this chapter and then applied to the population 
issue.
Historical Dominance of Anthropocentric Environmental 
Ethics in the Treatment of the Environment 
Natiue has not fared too well in Western ethics. Most post-enlightenment 
philosophies simply assumed that nature (and its nonhuman inhabitants) did not have 
rights and that it existed for the sole purpose o f serving humans. But what were the 
origins o f such anthropocentric beliefs? For Americans, as Roderick Frazer Nash 
explains in his book The Rights o f  Nature: A History o f  Environmental Ethics, there are at 
least three reasons why nature was given such little t h o u g h t .  ^22 first, most o f the United
121 Ibid, 272.
122 Nash, Roderick Frazier. The Rights o f  Nature: A History o f  Environmental Ethics.
(Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1989), 34-35.
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States was wilderness up until the middle of the 19th century. The inexhaustibility o f 
resources was the dominant American myth that even rendered utilitarian conservation 
unnecessary. The idea of living ethically and harmoniously with nature was incompatible
with 19th century American p r i o r i t i e s .  123 Secondly, up until this point the dominant 
concern o f earlier reformers and intellectuals was with the rights o f people. After all, that 
is what the American Revolution was all about. And once the revolution was won, the 
emphasis on human rights progressed to include slaves and eventually women. 
Understandably, the rights o f nature took lower priority to these concerns for humans 
(especially since there was not yet even much of a utilitarian need to respect nature). .And 
third, once the desire to protect nature did arise, it was based on anthropocentric oriented 
utilitarianism. This is an aspect o f American environmentalism that will be discussed in 
greater detail later.
Since anthropocentrism was the dominant form o f environmental ethics in early 
America, there was little or no efforts to protect the environment. Many have also placed 
some blame on Judeo-Christian tradition for instilling in us the belief that humans are not 
only superior to all other life, but that we are the only species of any moral worth. 
Perhaps the most well known example of this type o f criticism comes from historian 
Lynn White, Jr.'s 1967 essay, "The Historical Roots o f Our Ecological Crisis." 
According to White, both Judaism and Christianity posited a dichotomy between people 
and the natural world making people masters o f the natural world instead o f mere
123 Ibid.
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m e m b e r s .  124 This dichotomy was supported by many religious teachings such as 
humans being created in the image o f God, humans being unique in that they were the 
only species to possess a soul, and only humans could achieve salvation and move on to 
an afterlife. Although White's article received some criticism and even angered some 
members o f the religious community, his argument is not without support. For example, 
in Genesis, the first book of the Bible, the following is stated: "Then God said: 'Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness. Let them have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild animals and all the creatures 
that crawl on the ground.' God created man in his image...God blessed them, saying: 'Be 
fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it' " (Genesis 1:26-28). This passage is a 
good example o f the view referred to as the Great Chain of Being which claims that 
humans are created as higher beings than nonhumans. This view holds that every existent 
thing has a certain place in an infinite hierarchy of entities extending from the most real 
and perfect to the least real and most i m p e r f e c t .  ^25 Beginning with God at the top, this 
hierarchy continues down through the angels, then to humans, then to animals and plants, 
and so forth. With such strong anthropocentrism being commanded by God, there is no 
wonder why people felt superior to nonhumans. White also pointed toward Christianity's 
rejection o f animism. Animism can be understood as an expanded circle o f moral 
consideration; ethical relevancy did not end with God and other p e o p l e .  ^26 other
124 Ibid, 88.
125 Taylor, 139.
126 Nash, 90.
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words, everything had a sacred quality and people could have a personal relationship with 
nature, but the rigid monotheism o f Judaism and Christianity forbade this.
According to Nash, Christianity's harmful influence on environmental ethics does 
not end with the points made by White. There is also the traditional Christian view o f 
wilderness as a cursed land. As the Puritans demonstrated at the beginning o f the 
American experience, the only appropriate Christian response to wilderness and its
nonhuman inhabitants was conquest and s u b j u g a t i o n .  127 Additionally, there is a sense of 
otherworldliness embedded in Christianity. Christian aspirations were fixed on heaven 
and the earth was a mere "halfway house" that God was prone to destroy at any
minute. 128
Those who disagree with blaming the Judeo-Christian tradition for our 
anthropocentric ways are quick to point out that it is imfair to blame this religion for 
environmental destruction. While there may be some biblical passages that do encourage 
a harmful human-nature dichotomy, there are several others that call for good 
stewardship. Furthermore, Saint Francis of Assisi (heralded as the patron saint o f 
ecology) is a good example o f how not all Christians, even devout ones, necessarily 
embraced the tenets o f Christianity that were not exactly environmentally-friendly. He 
was often seen preaching to the animals in the country side and referred to them as his 
brothers and sisters. But nonetheless, even though there are some aspects o f Christianity
127 Nash, Roderick Frazer. Wilderness and the American Mind. (New Haven, CT,
1982), 13.
128 Nash: The Rights o f  Nature, 92.
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that encourage good stewardship o f the environment, it is clear that they did not hold the 
most persuasion.
Traditional Western religious views were not very favorable to the environment, 
and much of Western philosophy (although not always separable from religion) was not 
much better. Nash also stated in his book The Rights o f  Nature: A History o f  
Environmental Ethics: "But just like theologians. Western ethicists have focused for two 
millennia almost exclusively on the conduct o f people toward each other and toward 
various duties. Traditional moral philosophy professed little concern for the human 
relationship with nature. When philosophy did examine the moral status o f animals and 
natural objects, it was usually in the manner of Descartes, for the purpose o f ruling them 
out o f ethical bounds. Well into the middle of the 20th century, environmental ethics was 
simply inconceivable as a subject for p h i l o s o p h y . "  ^29 gg even though religion is often 
criticized by some environmentalists as the chief culprit, it has played a much less 
fundamental role than philosophy; most of the environmentally offensive ideas in
Western religion originated not in religion but in Western p h i l o s o p h y .  ^30 Eugene 
Hargrove, in his book Foundations o f  Environmental Ethics, demonstrates this by 
selecting a few thinkers from the two periods that he believes were the most influential in 
shaping philosophical attitudes toward the environment: classical Greek philosophy and 
early modem European philosophy. ̂  31
129 Ibid, 122.
120Hargrove, Eugene C. Foundations o f  Environmental Ethics. (Denton, TX: 
Environmental Ethics Books, 1989), 15.
131 Ibid, 16.
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O f the classic Greek period, the two most influential figures were, o f  course, Plato 
and Aristotle. Plato's metaphysical theory of the forms prevented the creation o f any 
significant appreciation o f nature and created a sort o f antipathy to natural objects. True 
beauty only existed in another plane, so there was no point in admiring natural objects 
and nonhuman species and certainly not in preserving them. They were only mere 
images in a sense. Although these views o f Plato are somewhat mystical, it is easy to 
observe how well they parallel the other-worldliness o f early Christians.
Aristotle, by contrast, was much more concerned with the natural world than 
Plato. In some respects he could even be thought o f as a naturalist. Many o f Aristotle's 
books, such as History o f  Animals, Parts o f  Animals, On Plants, and The Physics were 
recordings o f his observations of the natural world and his theories about the intricate 
workings o f nature. But Aristotle's findings were anthropocentric to the utmost. He 
thought that certain kinds of objects, especially living organisms existed for particular 
purposes as part o f a design built into n a t u r e .  ^32 But instead of simply examining each 
organism separately he also examines them in their relationship to other organisms. He 
then came to the conclusion that lower organisms existed for the benefit o f higher 
organisms. The reaching of the telos (or final cause) o f  a lower organism was necessary 
for a higher organism to reach its telos, and so forth. All organisms were ranked into an 
order o f being with humans being at the top. Aristotle articulated this in The Politics by 
stating: "In like manner we may infer that, after the birth o f animals, plants exist for their 
sake, and that other animals exist for the sake o f man, the tame for use and food, the wild.
132 Ibid, 25.
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if  not all, at least the greater part o f them, for food, and for the provision of clothes and 
various instruments. Now if  nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the 
inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake o f m a n . "  133
These writings o f Aristotle embody the inherent superiority of humans over other 
species that was implicit in the classical Greek definition of a human being as a rational 
animal. This capacity to reason was seen not only as unique to human nature, but also 
what gave us special value or w o r t h .  134 By having this ability to reason, we are able to 
live on a higher plane than nonhuman species. Living a rational life allows us to develop 
nobility o f character (or any of the virtues set forth in Aristotle's Ethics) which is the best 
type o f life according to the Greeks. Beings who were not rational had no chance of 
living this type o f life and therefore were considered a lower form of existence. This is 
what helped form the basic assumption of human superiority that has persisted until 
today.
During the period o f early Modem European philosophy, one of the key 
philosophers- at least as far as the influence on environmental ethics is concerned- was 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The Cartesian emphasis on consciousness or awareness 
was the guiding principle for rendering individual nonhumans unworthy o f moral 
consideration and is another major historical source o f the idea of inherent human 
superiority. Referred to as metaphysical dualism, Descartes thought that human beings 
were superior to animals and plants because humans have souls (or minds) as well as
133 Aristotle. The Politics. 1256b7-22.
134 Taylor, 135.
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bodies while animals and plants are only b o d i e s . A n i m a l s ,  in his view, are mere 
"automata" or machine-like organisms because they do not possess the minds that allow 
us to have reason and free will. They are not conscious like humans, and are therefore 
not aware of their existence and not capable of feeling physical pain, much less emotions 
and desires. Instead, they are mere physical mechanisms that house complex physical 
processes but not "life" in the same sense that humans do. He likened them to clock 
when he wrote that they are functioning only "according to the disposition o f their organ, 
just as a clock, which is only composed of wheels and weights..." Much of Descartes' 
philosophy (and not just that regarding animals) has widely been rebuked, but his 
emphasis on consciousness as a criteria for moral consideration has largely endured. 
Among modem proponents o f anthropocentrism, our higher level o f consciousness is 
what separates humans from nonhumans and what grants us intrinsic value while 
nonhumans enjoy only instrumental value. Even those that do concede that at least some 
mammals have some degree o f consciousness still hold that we have more and are 
therefore have more inherent value. In other words, some hold that consciousness is the 
primary factor when deciding a particular species moral worth.
Thus far the influential traditions of Western thought that have been discussed 
focus on how humans should treat individual nonhuman organisms, but this is only one 
aspect of environmental ethics. Another important concern of environmental ethics is 
how we should treat biotic communities and ecosystems or, simply stated, the land. With 
regards to how we should respect the land itself, perhaps the most lasting influence has
135 Ibid, 143.
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corne from John Locke (1632-1704). For most o f Europe's history, German and Saxon 
freemen d i d  not have a concept o f land ownership, only o f  l a n d h o l d i n g .  136 The concept 
o f land ownership (or private property) was introduced by John Locke in his book Two 
Treatises On Government which was first published in 1690. This work was held in very 
high esteem among many of America's "founding fathers" (Thomas Jefferson especially) 
and some o f its language actually turns up in the Declaration o f Independence. Deeply 
concerned with the natural rights of all men, Locke's treatise disputes many beliefs and 
practices of his day such as the divine right of kings and, more specifically, royal 
ownership of the land. According to Locke, if a man mixes his labor with a natural 
object, then the product is h i s .  137 He states the following:
"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to 
all men, yet, every Man has o f Property in his own Person. This no 
Body has a Right to but himself. The Labour o f his Body, and the 
Works o f his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he 
that removes out o f the State that Nature hath provided, and left in, 
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is 
his own, and thereby makes it his P r o p e r t y ."  138
Locke's reasoned that the enjoyment o f property is a presocietal natural right. The 
right to property, through labor, existed before society was formed. It existed in the 
"state o f nature" that ceased to exist once humans entered into the social contract that was
136 Hargrove, 65.
137 Ibid, 66.
138 Locke, John. Two Treatises o f  Government. Thomas Cook, ed. (New York:
Hafiier Press, 1947), section 27.
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created to protect people from one another. And since this society was formed for the 
purpose o f protecting one's rights, then no society could infringe on this right to property.
Based on Locke's reasoning, when a person came across a patch of wilderness not 
yet inhabited by another human, any work or "improvement" on that land made it that 
person's property. This concept o f property rights still runs strong today, and although it 
is not explicitly stated by Locke, it is interesting to note that his views implicitly hold that 
wilderness only exists for the sole purpose o f becoming the property o f humans. The fact 
that nonhuman species already inhabit that area and have "mixed their labor" with it is of 
no consequence. And certainly, the concept o f the natural objects o f that area (such as the 
trees and the rivers) having a right to remain intact since they were there first would have 
been beyond comprehension. In sum, Locke's philosophy embodies the two basic tenets 
o f the anthropocentric ethics that have developed so far. First, humans, by virtue o f  being 
human, are the only organisms of any moral significance. They are the only ones with 
rights and the only ones who have inherent value. And second (as an extension o f the 
first), humans thereby have the right to do what they wish with nonhuman organisms as 
well as wilderness areas, includes altering it regardless o f its effects on the inhabitants.
Applying Anthropocentric Environmental 
Ethics To The Population Issue 
Up until this point, this thesis has mainly dealt with three aspects o f  the 
population issue. First, it provided the demographic background information necessary 
for a discussion on the need for population stabilization. Secondly, this thesis offered a 
brief description o f the environmental damage that many neo-malthusians attribute to
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population growth and feel is enough to warrant the creation of population policies. This 
evidence possesses a definite anthropocentric slant. Nonetheless, it was important to 
provide this summary o f population-related damage because if population growth is not 
actually hurting the environment, then it would be difficult to argue for population 
stabilization based on environmental ethics. And third, also in the previous chapter, the 
historical context o f the population policy debate was provided. This was to demonstrate 
the way in which the fi-aming o f the population issue has been greatly influenced by the 
dominance o f the anthropocentric ethical perspective that has prevailed throughout 
history. Since U.S. population growth has not been given much more than superficial 
attention by the government, then clearly fi-aming the issue strictly in anthropocentric 
terms is not enough. Therefore, this section- by attacking the traditional and standard 
anthropocentric arguments for population stabilization- will show how anthropocentric 
ethics has failed to convince others to support the argument for population stabilization in 
the U.S. and why biocentric ethics is necessary if  policies aimed at population 
stabilization can be justified. In other words, if  the issue continues to be fi-amed strictly 
in anthropocentric terms ( and the things that we value for ourselves are not significantly 
altered) then population growth will simply not be given the attention it warrants. But the 
argument for population stabilization efforts cannot end there, or the argument would be 
circular. Instead, once it is shown that a shift from anthropocentric ethics to biocentric 
ethics is needed for population to receive its due attention, it must then be argued that a 
more biocentric outlook is indeed the right one to adopt.
To do this, let us assume for the time being that population is either the driving 
force behind this environmental destruction or, at the very least, a key component o f it. It
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is now time to make some sort o f moral judgement on this environmental harm that is 
taking place and, subsequently, a moral judgement on the population growth that we are 
to assume is fueling it. To do so in anthropocentric terms means that we evaluate this 
damage to the environment as right or wrong in terms of how badly it harms humans. 
The ethical theory that is relied on the most (in fact, almost exclusively) in arguing for 
population stabilization is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism (although it no longer enjoys as 
much support from the philosophical community as it once did) is still widely used in the 
policy evaluation arena, albeit under the ruse o f "cost-benefit analysis." Before there can 
be a departure from the traditional way of looking at population growth, it is necessary to 
first provide a detailed examination o f where the old approach fails and why.
Utilitarianism was originated by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham and later 
advanced, and slightly refined, by one o f utilitarianism's strongest proponents, John 
Stuart Mill. Bentham asserted that, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance o f 
two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure... They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
all we think: every effort we can make to throw ofT our subjection, will serve but to
demonstrate and confirm it."^39 other words, all human actions are consequentialist 
by nature. Taking this into consideration, utilitarianism holds that "actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
o f h a p p i n e s s . " H a p p i n e s s  is identified with pleasure and with the absence o f pain. 
Mill also went on to state, "Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things that are
^39 Benthem, Jeremy. Principles o f  Morals and Legislation (Garden City, NJ: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1961), 18.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118.
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desirable as ends, and all desirable things are desirable for the pleasure inherent in 
themselves, or as the means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of p a in ."  141 
It is important to note that utility includes not just the pursuit o f happiness, but also the 
prevention or mitigation of pain; and not just for the individual, but for all of society. 
"The multiplication o f happiness is, according to utilitarian ethics, the object of
v ir t u e ."  142 Therefore, the basic principle of utilitarianism can be summed up in the 
following declaration: actions are right to the degree that they tend to promote the 
greatest good for the greatest number.
Caring for the environment and mitigating the damage already done through the 
stabilization of our population carries great utility for society (and the world community 
as a whole). And, to perhaps state it better, the population increasing any further will 
carry a tremendous amount o f disutility, or pain, for society. Therefore, any further harm 
to the environment can be translated as further harm to us. An expanding population 
means the need for food is expanding, but the earth is limited and can only yield so much 
bounty. With the present population, the seas are already overfished and estimates of 
how much more it could provide are bleak. Farmland is already being taxed at an 
unsustainable level. To demand any more from our farms could require an increase in 
fertilizer and pesticide use, and the consequences o f this are literally deadly. To further 
increase crop yield, the only option is clearing more land for agriculture. But this is by 
no means a viable long term solution since it would require even more deforestation. 
Furthermore, land that could be used for agriculture (especially the raising of livestock)
141 Ibid.
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is, for the most part, already being used. Remaining land that could be farmed upon is 
certainly at a premium. All the while urban sprawl (a competing land use) is devouring 
1.1 million acres o f prime cropland per year in the U.S. 143 Shrinking supplies o f water 
for irrigation and land area on which to grow food coupled with an increasing demand for 
food are situations that are simply not compatible.
The same rationale applies to the earth's finite energy resources. Adding more 
people to the planet inevitably increases the total amount o f energy consumed, regardless 
o f their respective consumption levels. Therefore, the amount o f pollution created will 
inevitably increase as well. There will be that many more automobiles to run, homes to 
heat, and factories to operate. An increase in health problems and a decrease in quality of 
life resulting fi-om the increase in air and water pollution certainly does not promote a 
greater degree of happiness. And, similar to the food supply scenario, tensions will rise 
as competition for dwindling fossil fuels becomes intense. Some have even used the 
U.S.'s conflict with Iraq in the early 1990's as an example o f what can happen when a 
state's access to an energy resource is threatened. Again, with respect to the world's 
energy supply, population growth can and has created such conditions which are contrary 
to the promotion of happiness for individuals and the aggregate society alike.
Another environmental calamity that is damaging to the human species, though 
often unrecognized as such by many, is the assault on biodiversity. Through such 
mediums as rapid deforestation and climate changes induced by human activity, the earth
142 Ibid, 129.
143 Rohe, 123.
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has seen the extinction of thousands o f plant and animal species as well as a substantial 
decline in overall biodiversity. This is extremely dangerous since so many plant and 
animal species can hold such great utility for the human race. For example, about one 
third o f all prescription medicines are either plant defensive chemicals or chemicals 
modeled on t h e m .  144 The next plant species destroyed could have been the one with the 
cure for AIDS or cancer, yet it will pass without discovery. Furthermore, such an assault 
on biodiversity has greatly diminished the earth's genetic library. This can adversely 
affect the world community since it reduces the pool o f genetic variability needed to stay 
in the game o f high-yield a g r ic u l t u r e .  1 4 5  a . s  already mentioned, monocultures are very 
susceptible to pests and disease. To combat this, they are often bred with relatives 
growing in the wild to slightly alter their generic make-up and thus make them more 
resistant to blights and increasingly resilient pests that have become immune to toxins. 
But as the generic library diminishes, so do the chances of finding suitable partners. 
Many consequences o f destroying the natural habitat cannot be foreseen. No scientist can 
fully know what kinds of vital and potentially life-saving species are being destroyed or 
what kind o f  new viruses we will unleash or come into contact with if we begin 
inhabiting areas never ventured into before. Taking all o f this into consideration, it is 
clear that the destruction of the earth's biodiversity may be an act that brings great pain to 
society and serves to prevent many discoveries that could have enormous utility for all.
If much o f what was stated above is accurate, then certainly one would agree that 
population stabilization would certainly aid in "preventing pain and promoting pleasure."
^44 Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 34.
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But there is a second way that is at least equally important in determining utility. As 
eluded to earlier, population stabilization should be the primary concern when employing 
various environmental initiatives. It is often said that any cause is a lost cause without 
population stabilization. Without population stabilization, the utility o f other 
environmental initiatives (such as anti-pollution laws, recycling, raising awareness o f rain 
forest destruction, etc.) is greatly diminished. Such initiatives carry a great amoimt o f 
utility, but their full potential cannot be realized without measures to first reduce the 
human population. Thus, when determining whether or not population stabilization has 
utility (and also trying to quantify that utility), not only should consideration be given to 
the direct benefits o f  population stabilization, but also to its ability to raise the utility o f 
other environmental initiatives and laws. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits o f 
population stabilization, society will also benefit because o f the fact that population 
control enhances the utility o f other environmentally oriented efforts.
Utilitarianism, applied in this manner, is a completely human-centered ethical 
theory, as most ethical theories are. That is not to say that it cannot be used as a 
biocentric theory. If  nonhumans were given equal moral consideration, we could judge 
the rightness and wrongness o f an act or rule based on the utility it presents for them as 
well as us. One only needs to look as far as Peter Singer's Animal Liberation to see how 
utilitarianism can take a biocentric form. But in the manner used here, its concern is 
centered around the welfare o f humans. To state it simply, anthropocentric-oriented 
utilitarianism deems population stabilization to be ethically required since it holds great
145 Ibid, 33.
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utility (and prevents great pain) for the human race. Ending population growth eases the 
burden on the environment which, according to this philosophy, is the right thing to do 
since it is good for humans. As a result, anthropocentric-oriented utilitarianism seems to 
have little concern for the welfare o f the natural environment in and of itself. It does not 
require humans to care for the environment simply for the environment's sake. In other 
words, the value placed on caring for nature is strictly instrumental. It does not consider 
nonhuman species (and certainly not ecosystems) as having an inherent value to be taken 
into consideration. The strictest o f anthropocentric viewpoint holds that if the human 
race were somehow able to expand its population without causing considerable harm to 
each other (regardless o f  the impact on the environment and on other living beings), then 
there would be nothing wrong with allowing our population to continue to grow. But this 
does not seem to be the case. So why does anthropocentric-based utilitarianism work so 
well in theory, but in practice done little for the population stabilization movement? The 
next section of this chapter is devoted to answering this question, and is based on the 
ideas set forth in the books On Liberty by John Stuart Mill and Policy Paradox by 
Deborah Stone. The short answer to this question is that utilitarianism as whole is 
problematic because o f the complex and diverse interests that must be considered whenn 
deciding if something is actually harming society, and that anthopocentric-based 
utilitarianism when applied specifically to environmental problems is inadequate because 
it fails to take into consideration and protect all o f the interests that we as moral agents 
should consider.
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The Inadequacy o f Anthropocentic-Based Utilitarianism 
On Liberty, often regarded as one of the most important essays o f  liberal thought, 
is an attempt to demarcate the nature and limits o f the power which can be legitimately 
exercised by society over the individual. Mill stated: "The object o f this essay is to assert 
one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely in the dealings o f society with 
the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical 
force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That 
principle is the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action o f any of their number is self-protection. That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others (italics added). His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant...The only part o f the conduct of 
anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns o t h e r s . "   ̂46 (yhp 
created the harm-principle to use as a  tool to aid in the reconciling o f the need for social 
order with individual freedom. Referred to as the harm-principle, this "one simple 
principle" unfortunately proves to be quite complicated and ambiguous, and has been 
subject to a great deal o f criticism. In fairness to Mill, though, it was not his intention to 
provide clearly defined criteria to follow in the public policy process. Instead, Mill's 
argument is concerned with the importance o f individuality and autonomy among 
members o f society. Appearing as a humanist at times. Mill believed that humans are a
^46 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Rapaport, Elizabeth, ed. (Indianapolis, In.: Hackett 
Publishing Co, Inc., 1978), 9.
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progressive being and only through autonomy and rational thought can we continue to 
develop. He viewed unquestioned custom and the majority opinion as an enemy to one's 
efforts in becoming an autonomous creature, as was made clear when he wrote that 
society can be a "tyranny more formidable than many kinds o f political o p p r e s s i o n . "  ^ 47 
But that still leaves us with one major difficulty: what constitutes harm? Virtually every 
ethical theory, whether it be the utilitarianism of Mill or the deontological thoughts o f 
Kant, deems something to be wrong if  it "harms" someone. Although that notion is 
universal, people in such a diverse and pluralistic society such as ours, do not always 
agree as to what constitutes harm. A close look of all of the different types o f harm there 
is and how this applies to population growth, and ultimately poses a problem for those 
who think population stabilization is necessary since humans are being harmed by growth 
will illustrate this point.
Deborah Stone's Policy Paradox does an excellent job of identifying the different 
types o f harm that may be experienced as well as conveying how they are much more 
complicated than they first appear to be. The first and most obvious type o f harm is 
physical injury. The idea that causing another physical injury should not belong in the 
sphere on liberty seems rather straight forward. Upon further inspection, this type of 
harm seems quite a bit more complicated because physical harm does not always take the 
form of one simply assaulting another. Stone illustrates this point in her example o f the 
exposure o f small but recurring doses o f toxic chemicals in the w o r k p l a c e .  ^48 Now that
147 Ibid, 5.
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the harm is not immediate or direct and its effects are not felt as quickly, is it still a harm? 
And if so, to whom can blame be assigned for the purposes of seeking recourse or 
enacting policies that would prevent it from happening again. In the modem era this type 
o f physical harm results from the failure of a large and complex system rather than from
individual a c t i o n .  149
Another way we can be harmed is materially or, as I will refer to it, economically. 
The state can often interfere with the liberty of a person to prevent economic harm to 
another, such as with the case of slander. But there is the question of how far do we want 
to go in protecting people from economic losses at the expense o f other people's 
liberty? 130
Furthermore, there are amenity harms which are those that cause harm through 
depreciation of the aesthetic value o f certain places or things. Examples include an 
increase in noise pollution, a decrease in privacy, or loss o f a historical building. These 
are, as Stone points out, the most politically contentious harms since it is so difficult to
measure them in market values or other quantifiable units. 131
And a fourth type of harm that an individual may be exposed to is spiritual or 
moral harm. The actions of others can offend those of a particular religion. Mill gave a 
good example o f this type of harm when he cited the "rather trivial example" o f the hatred
148 Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art o f  Political Decision Making. (New
York: WW Norton & Co., 1997), 110.
149 Ibid.
130 Ibid, 112.
131 Ibid.
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o f Muslims toward the Christian practice o f eating p o r k .  132 Mill was quite clear on the 
importance o f not intruding on an individual's liberty on the basis o f a religious belief. 
Conduct does not harm others simply because they dislike it or abhor it. 133 This may be 
true, but it will hardly convince those with religion on their side that they are not being 
harmed or that society as a whole is not injured from such a degradation in the collective 
morality.
This list o f harms is generally agreed upon as the basic types o f harm an 
individual can be subjected to. There is disagreement, though, over when a harm has 
actually occurred and whether it is a harm sufficient enough to warrant government 
intervention. This is because society, or the polis as Stone refers to it, is not made of like- 
minded individuals who agree on everything. There are many different people possessing 
a multitude of "reasonable comprehensive doctrines", and it is this doctrine that people 
use to gauge harms and to guide them in discerning what the best policy would be in 
rectifying the harm. On the individual level it is easy for a person to consult his or her 
own doctrine and then decide if they have been harmed. It becomes infinitely more 
complicated for society, being guided by many different and conflicting doctrines, to 
determine if they are being harmed collectively. So herein lies two fundamental and 
recurring problems o f the harm-principle: 1) our different reasonable doctrines lead us to 
disagreement when defining harms, and 2) it is impossible for government to take
132 Mill, 83.
133 Ten, C.L. "Mill's Defence O f Liberty." J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus. Gray, John 
and Smith, G.W., ed. (London: Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1991), 215.
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account for every possible interest that people may have and judge one to be better than 
the other. These problems can be seen in the interest-based arguments commonly made 
by proponents o f population stabilization. For example, the agricultural industry's 
greatly increased use of fertilizers and pesticides to raise crop yields and keep pace with 
population growth may count as a physical harm. Pesticide and fertilizer run-off is the 
source o f a great deal o f water pollution which, because o f the health risks associated 
with water pollution, is a long-term accumulative physical harm. The same holds true for 
topsoil loss. Foregoing crop rotation (usually done in exchange for increased crop yield) 
is one main causes of topsoil loss. Without topsoil, crops will not grow. Although this 
may be a much more serious problem in developing nations than it is in the U.S., the 
long-term worse case scenario consequence is starvation, which is by all means a physical 
harm. But there is a fair amount of room for disagreement over this claim o f physical 
harm. The first type of disagreement is over whether a harm (or the potential for harm) 
actually exists. In the U.S., the claim that we may end up on the verge o f starving while 
we export so much grain and still pay our farmers not to grow food is very weak and few 
would agree to forego having another child because of it. Furthermore, there are those 
who feel toxins in the environment from a farm or a factory are not sufficient reason for 
lowering the population. The medical industry has and will continue to develop new 
ways to counter the harmful effects of pollution and protect our health. After all, even 
with all this pollution, aren't we living longer than ever? A second type o f  disagreement 
comes from those whose interest in having a large family (and consequently contribute to 
population growth) outweigh their personal interest in living in a clean pollution-free 
environment. They would rather contend with pollution problems than suffer any loss of
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personal happiness in not having more children. Similarly, there are those who would 
rather have a lower crop yield and eat a more simpler diet than give up having a large 
family.
Then there are those who predict that our population growth will eventually cause 
the depletion of the fossil fuels we are dependent on for energy before new alternative 
energy sources are developed and made economically feasible. If this becomes a reality, 
economic harm will be felt by many in numerous ways. But even if resources are finite, 
why restrict fertility instead o f people's wasteful consumption habits? Or why not devote 
much more attention to developing alternative energy. There are those who would rather 
have the government try to influence people to conserve energy before restricting fertility 
because their happiness is contingent upon having a big family instead o f living a lavish 
and consumptive lifestyle. And then there are those who, as a matter o f personal 
preference, would rather consume resources than have a family.
There is also the argument that population growth harms us in an aesthetic manner 
is the destruction o f our forests and wetlands. Soil erosion caused by deforestation is not 
the only problem that it causes. It also diminishes the amount o f biodiversity in the wild 
and decreases the amount o f recreational opportunities people can enjoy in the outdoors. 
This type o f harm is felt certainly by those who lost their favorite hiking trail in the forest 
to a clear-cut, or those who lost a river they viewed to be more beautiful than any man- 
made work of art ever created because it needed to be dammed and diverted in order to 
provide drinking water for a growing population. But there are competing interests here 
too. One's interest in hiking and enjoying the outdoors caimot be judged (at least not by 
the government) to be a more important interest than those interested in having children
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which in turn creates a larger demand for water and wood products, and real estate for 
housing.
And the final example o f a harm to be given here is the harm felt by those with 
religious or spiritual ties to nature. Religious or spiritual affiliation with nature is not 
found only in Native American cultures. Dubbed as the "greening of religion", there is a 
significant movement within many traditional Western religions toward incorporating 
environmental ethics into religious doctrine and adopting the principle o f stewardship o f 
nature. One of the more vocal leaders in this movement is Bartholemew I who, as the 
Ecumenical Patriarch, is the spiritual leader o f the world's 250 million Orthodox 
C h r i s t i a n s .   ̂34 Bartholomew I has stated, "For humans to cause species to become
extinct and to destroy the biological diversity o f God's creation...these are s i n s "   ̂35  ̂ and 
"How we treat the earth and all o f its creation define the relationship that each of us has 
with God. It is also a barometer on how we view one a n o t h e r . "   ̂36 Regardless o f the 
profoundness o f such sentiments, they are just as much a part o f  a religious belief as the 
prohibition o f eating pork is for Muslims. And it does not take a lengthy dissertation on 
our separation-of-church-and-state doctrine to demonstrate why restricting population 
growth on these types o f claims would be a mistake.
The point trying to made in this section is two-fold. First, as just previously 
shown, when taking only anthropocentric interests into account, it is difficult to warrant
134 Newsome, Melba. "To Have Dominion In The Earth." The Amicus Journal.
Winter/ 1999, pp. 16.
155 Ibid.
136 Ibid, 17.
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government intervention in population affairs. To attempt to blame population based on 
its supposed contribution to human harm via harm to the environment is very 
problematic. Interests are far too diverse to come to a consensus on the importance o f 
stabilizing the population versus focusing on consumption or technology, and people 
would rather see the environmental harms mentioned throughout this paper addressed by 
means other than population if at all possible. Secondly, as mentioned in the beginning o f  
this chapter, it is hard to even make the case that many of the environmental problems 
mentioned in Chapter 3 could not be rectified by the development o f more 
environmentally-benign technology and an all around change in how people live and 
value consumption. In other words, population may not necessarily be the culprit after 
all. So does this mean that there is no good argument for population stabilization? 
Speaking strictly in anthropocentric-based utilitarian terms, it would seem so. However, 
if we adopt the biocentric outlook, then the need for population stabilization arises once 
again. This is because the biocentric outlook forces us to judge population growth, and 
ultimately the human's place in the biosphere, according to much different standards. To 
illustrate this point, consider the following hypotheticals. The reason why these 
hypotheticals are presented is not to give strength to the anthropocentric-based 
utilitarianism that this thesis is rejecting, but to point out the need for us to shift towards 
the biocentric outlook. The logic behind this is that even if you assume everything that is 
purported by one theory to be true and it is still inadequate (with inadequate in this 
context meaning that all of the interests we should be protecting are not) then it adds 
strength to the assertion that it is time to reevaluate the ideals we have always subscribed
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to and give an honest consideration of alternative ideas and approaches to environmental 
protection.
Suppose that the population keeps growing, yet we are able to continue to 
develop new ways to neutralize the affects. With the advent o f the green revolution and 
the new agricultural methods that came with it, people all over the world who may very 
well have starved (or not been bom in the first place) had access to sustinence. Prior to 
that, many people were worried that a boom in the population would inevitably lead to 
mass starvation, but the green revolution prevented that from happening. So suppose that 
something of that magnitude is on the brink o f happening again, where food output for 
several hundred million more Americans is possible, and possible in a sustainable manner 
that does not require an increase in land. Furthermore, suppose that the organic farming 
methods being developed today become viable on a large scale, meaning that most o f our 
food could be produced this way. If this were to happen, then the production of more 
food would not require the unhealthy increase in fertilizers and pesticides than many fear 
would occur. In short, it is a possibility that new agricultural methods could be 
developed, as they have in the past, to keep pace with population growth. And if all else 
fails, there are certainly many things that could be done to alter America's consumption as 
well as its desire for certain products that are less efficient to grow and less nutritionally 
satisfying. Therefore, based on these hypotheticals, one really cannot argue that our 
population should stop growing based on agriculturally- related environmental problems. 
The same may hold true for water. In the drier regions of the country, perhaps 
advancements could be made in the transportation, or relocation, o f water to 
accommodate urban and agricultural areas. Elsewhere, more serious efforts of
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conservation could be made. Although droughts do occur and are beyond the control o f  
humans, there are certainly many things that could be done to mitigate their damage. 
Rationing o f water (if absolutely necessary) is something that is done in other coimtries, 
such as Jordan, where water is at a premium.
Regarding pollution and solid waste, these are environmental problems that are, 
more than any other, a direct result o f consumption. The pursuit o f excess material items 
that can be readily discarded is an unfortunate, and hopefully short lived, phenomena. It 
is true that land fills are being rapidly filled up and much of our forests are being chopped 
down to create paper and wood products. But it is possible that this wasteful process o f 
ours could be mitigated by much greater emphasis on reduction, the reusing, and then the 
recycling o f all products. It seems to be rather selfish to say our population should not 
grow anymore because it will mean that those o f us already here will have to stop being 
so wasteful. And this applies to pollution, and ultimately energy, in many ways as well. 
On the one hand, anti-pollution laws are hindered by an increase in population. Take the 
automobile for example. Between 1975 and 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency 
expected the imposed standards on the auto-industry to result in and eighty to ninety 
percent reduction in emissions. However, there was only an 18% reduction because the 
number o f cars on the road d o u b l e d . ^37 other words, reductions in per-capita 
pollution are frustrated by increases in population. But does this argument really get to 
the crux o f the problem? Instead o f focusing on less people polluting, why not focus on
137 Ophuls, William. Ecology and the Politics o f  Scarcity: PrologueTo A Political
Theory o f  the Steady State, (San Fransisco: W.H. Freeman and Co, 1977), 137.
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getting people to change their consumption habits? Mass transportation, or at least 
carpooling, could be encouraged, possibly with the use of incentives. And better yet, a 
revitalization o f urban centers could take place that would encourage people to move 
closer to cities. This would discourage suburban sprawl, which inevitably comes with 
long commutes that create pollution and make mass transportation hopelessly 
inconvenient. Or, if consumption habits and lifestyles cannot be altered to accommodate 
for a growing population, the technology approach could be taken. And this is where a 
contradiction, and therefore a fundamental flaw, in the argument of those who argue for 
population stabilization based on depleting resources is exposed. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, a growing population that continues our present consumption levels could 
possibly lead to the depletion of resources, namely fossil fuels. So on the one hand, 
environmentalists argue that population growth must cease in order to ensure a steady 
supply o f energy for us and for future generations. But on the other hand, 
environmentalists call for technological changes (i.e., solar, wind, water, electric) that 
make the use o f fossil fuels obsolete. But technological change will only be spurred once 
there is a need for it, and what could possibly be a better indication of need than the 
prospects o f running out? According to this logic, the sooner we end our reliance on 
fossil fuels, the better. And if this comes about as an adjustment to population growth, 
then so be it. There will no longer be a need to worry about an increase in pollution 
stemming from population growth if people no longer use polluting resources.
Finally there is the problem o f the loss o f biodiversity and species extinction. It 
was stated earlier that our population growth may result in the loss o f a species that holds 
tremendous instrumental value for humans. But if  we only value them for their
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instrumental value, then certainly there could be ways o f capturing that value and 
retaining it after they are gone. Genetic libraries could be established where synthetics 
are created. Zoos and even national parks could possibly keep a sustainable number of 
some species alive and reproducing. And regarding ecosystems that provide useful 
maintenance functions, perhaps humans could develop ways o f performing those 
functions, and possibly even do it better. Conceivably, then, humans could continue to 
exist in a world in which we were the only species, except for those which are raised for 
our consumption.
The above situations were just hypotheticals with some being more likely than 
others. Whether all or even some of them will actually become reality remains to be 
seen. The point was to demonstrate that for every aspect o f the argument that the U.S. 
needs to stabilize its population in an effort to avoid harming humans, there is a 
counterargument. It is these counterarguments that prevent us from truly believing that 
population stabilization is more important than a change in consumption habits, the 
continual development o f more efficient and benign technology, or even that a problem 
exists that needs to be dealt with at all. While it may still be true that population 
stabilization would make it much easier to protect the environment to the point where 
humans are not harmed, it still does not seem as if  it is absolutely crucial. That is what 
those who approach the population issue from the anthropocentric view believe, and that 
has been society’s view o f the problem. But taking into account a few realities and 
approaching the population issue from the biocentric outlook makes population 
stabilization something we should achieve, not just something that would be convenient. 
The reality is that modem humans, no matter how much we scale back our consumption
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and no matter what kind of new technology and methods we employ, will still have an 
impact on the environment. To be more specific, we will always have some impact on 
the nonhuman species that live with and around us because it is impossible for us to 
completely coexist with other species while maintaining anything close to our standard o f 
living, and trying to brings others up to our standard o f living. That is certainly not 
meant in a negative way or as a criticism against what our society has evolved into. Nor 
is it meant as a defense of some o f the consumption habits that many Westerners value. 
But the fact is that we all want, and should have, certain things and a certain amount o f 
material wealth in order to achieve happiness. This is an idea that goes back at least as 
far as Aristotle. We could survive without much of this, as early bands of hunter- 
gatherers have shown us, but we would not be happy. We would not be able to become 
fully human, as the early Greeks would say. So no matter how large of a population the 
earth is capable o f sustaining and matter how skilled we become at developing 
technology that allows us to protect the environment enough that we are not harmed, the 
fact is that as we continue to spread, we will inevitably have an impact on the nonhumans 
and previously unaltered ecosystems and habitats. As we expand, they diminish. This is 
true with virtually any species; the more one species flourishes, the more it pushes 
another out. Therefore, we should view our population growth in a different way, 
independent o f its affects on us. The question should not be can we grow, but what are 
the costs o f  doing so? Once we realize that our population growth, no matter how benign 
o f a species our consumption habits and technology can make us, will inevitably exact a 
toll on nonhumans (mainly through destruction of their habitat to make room for us and 
to tap into needed resources), it is time to question whether we stand to gain anything
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from further growth. If the answer is no, which it certainly seems to be, then we must 
admit that we should bring about the eventual stabilization of our population. Not 
because we need to, not because it would make things easier or more convenient, but 
because we should. This is the conclusion that the biocentric outlook leads to, and the 
remainder o f this chapter is devoted towards demonstrating this.
The Emergence o f Biocentric Environmental Ethics in Western Thought 
Environmental ethics has historically ranged from complete ambivalence towards 
nature to extremely rigid anthropocentric concern for the environment. This may lead 
one to believe that there was absolutely no sort of protection ever enacted on behalf o f 
wilderness or nonhuman organisms. However, there are many instances o f this type of 
action. For example, Henry Bergh established the SPC A in the United States in 1866, a 
few years after it was founded in Britain. Although this mainly dealt with domesticated 
animals, it did demonstrate concern for those not of human origin. Long before this there 
were calls in Britain to end the practice o f vivisection, the practice of dissecting animals 
while still alive and conscious. But the reasons for this concern were based on the notion 
that a nation that did not stop cruelty to animals ran the risk of cruelty extending to 
people and, ultimately, o f decline and decay as a civilization. This view is similar to why 
Locke spoke out against cruelty to nonhumans in his book Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education (1693). Locke claimed that cruelty to animals and insects, if not stopped and 
corrected, "will by Degrees harden their minds even towards Men... People who delight 
in the Suffering and Destruction of Inferior Creatures will not be very compassionate, or
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benign to those o f their own kind." ^38 Although these examples indicate concern for 
nonhumans to some extent, they certainly cannot be considered examples of biocentric 
ethics. This is especially true when compared to biocentric legislation of the U.S., such 
as the Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972) and the Endangered Species Act (1973), 
which sought to protect organisms for their own sake instead of for their economic value 
or because their suffering may offend the consciences of some people or "harden" them 
towards others. When exactly this shift to biocentrism (that is obviously yet to take place 
completely) began to emerge is impossible to pinpoint. Undoubtedly there are many 
thinkers, like St. Francis and Jeremy Bentham, that were to some extent proponents of 
biocentrism back when it was not only unusual but downright eccentric and possibly even 
heretical. But perhaps the one event that was most crucial for opening the doors for 
biocentric ethics was the publication o f Charles Darwin's The Origin o f  Species in 1859. 
The general theory of evolution that Darwin purported is now, with a few notable 
exceptions, widely accepted by both science and society at large. The impact that 
Darwin's work had on environmental ethics was profound for two reasons. First, it 
scientifically demonstrated (which, at the time, people were beginning to require in order 
for something to have merit) that humans were not the pinnacle o f creation. That does 
not mean that humans are not the most advanced species to date; it means that evolution 
(and therefore creation) has not ended with us. Chances are that in due time we will 
perish as a species just as the dominant and most advanced species o f past eras have
138 Locke, John. Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Quoted in Nash, Roderick 
FrzzieT, Rights o f  Nature, 19.
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done. At least in some ways this refutes the notion that creation occurred for the sole 
purpose of creating humans- a notion that much of anthropocentric environmental ethics 
has, and still is, based on. The second reason, which is more or less an extension o f the 
first, is that if  we cannot simply assume that we are superior based on dogmatic religious 
doctrine, then philosophers are required to come up with a moral theory that offers sound 
reasons for humans being the only species worthy of inclusion in the moral community. 
Although Descartes predates Darwin, his use o f consciousness as criteria o f moral worth 
is an example. As a result, the process was initiated where philosophers could critique 
the environmental ethical theories o f others, make points and counterpoints, and so forth. 
This process, as with every academic field, still continues. For environmental ethics the 
result has been the creation o f a large body of sound biocentric ethical theories that can be 
applied to many contemporary environmental issues, including the population issue.
One should not take Darwin as the sole instigator o f the shift to biocentric ethics. 
For one thing, the idea o f evolution cannot be completely accredited to him and, as 
mentioned earlier, there were biocentric thinkers dotting the philosophical landscape 
before Darwin. One of the most notable being Henry David Thoreau, who in July of 
1845 (14 years before the publication o f The Origin o f  Species) departed for the solitude 
and serenity o f Walden Pond fi’om where his memoirs and philosophical writings helped 
create the foundations for the biocentric outlook. Nonetheless, if one refuses to credit 
Darwin with providing the spark to ignite the flame of biocentric thought, then it has to 
be conceded that he at least aided in the creation of a society where it was possible for 
those endorsing the biocentric outlook to be taken seriously both academically and in the 
public policy arena. Philosophers such as John Muir, the founder o f the Sierra Club and
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the influential acquaintance o f Teddy Roosevelt that helped create the National Parks, 
stated in 1867, "The world, we are told, was made especially for man- a presumption not 
supported by all the facts... Why should man value himself as more than one small part o f 
the one great unit o f  creation?" and, "I have never yet happened upon a trace of evidence 
that seemed to show that any one animal was ever made for another as much as it was 
made for itself.” ^59
Critics o f Thoreau and Muir often claim that their writings are based too much in 
mysticism instead o f reason and logic. Some even dismiss them as being disenchanted 
misanthropes. This criticism is debatable. Certainly emotion and, to some extent, 
unexplainable mystic beliefs do have some place in philosophy. Regardless, their 
writings have proven to be critical to the field o f environmental ethics if, for no other 
reason, they inspired many philosophers to devote enough time and focus to create the 
biocentric theories that are becoming so influential in the policy arena.
Biocentric environmental ethics is what is ultimately being used in this thesis to 
support the claim that the U.S. should adopt some sort o f plan to bring about the 
stabilization o f its population. This brief section on the emergence o f biocentric ethics 
was to lay the foundation for such an argument. As already mentioned, environmental 
ethics presents and defends a systematic and comprehensive account of the moral
relations between human beings and their e n v i r o n m e n t ,   ̂50 and can basically be broken
159 Muir, John. A Thousand Mile Walk to the Gulf. Quoted in Nash, Roderick Frazier,
Rights o f  Nature, 40.
160 DesJardins, Joseph R. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental
Philosophy. (BeImont,CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,1993),13.
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down into two categories: anthropocentric (human-centered) ethics and biocentric (life- 
centered) ethics with anthropocentric ethics being the dominant strain o f ethics in 
American environmentalism. The fact that we have been assessing population growth 
from the viewpoint o f this body of environmental ethics explains why it was placed on 
the opportunity agenda. Furthermore, it partially explains why many feel that population 
growth is merely an indirect cause o f environmental deterioration. If, however, biocentric 
ethics were to dominate environmentalism, then the population issue would have been 
framed much differently followed by much different policy outcomes. Instead of 
focusing on safe drinking water, increased agricultural prices, and decreased natural 
beauty and recreational opportimities, such issues as species extinction, reduced 
biodiversity, and the destruction of natural self-sustaining ecosystems would have been 
given more attention in the problem-defmition phase of the policy process. Furthermore, 
if non-human species (or at least some of them) were granted a higher degree o f moral 
standing, then perhaps the population problem would have been placed on some form of a 
survival agenda than an opportunity agenda. In other words, a shift to biocentric ethics 
would give the population issue much more importance than it receives now. The 
remainder of this chapter will consist of two parts: that the biocentric outlook is the one 
that we should adopt, and the argument that biocentric environmental ethics actually does 
call for population stabilization.
In Defense of the Biocentric Outlook 
This section defends the biocentric outlook by taking a chronological look at the 
most important ideas by the preeminent modem biocentric philosophers, with the
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culmination being with Paul W. Taylor’s Respect fo r  Nature. The tenets o f Taylor’s 
philosophy are mainly what the arguments in this chapter rely on. However, in order to 
fully appreciate Taylor's work it is necessary to first go through those who predate him 
and point out the strengths that Taylor builds on and the weaknesses that Taylor 
compensates for, thus making his work the most comprehensive and persuasive work on 
biocentric environmental ethics to date.
Aldo Leopold is often credited with laying the foundations for the biocentric 
movement with his enduring collection of essays titled "A Sand County Almanac." 
Promoting what he described as the land ethic, Leopold argued that, "All ethics so far 
evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of 
interdependent parts... The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community
to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the l a n d . " ^61 Leopold was 
advocating a holistic approach, wherein the role that homosapiens play has changed from 
"conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen o f it." It is the belief in 
this land ethic that lead Leopold to the conclusion that, ’’ A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty o f the biotic community, and wrong when it
tends to do o t h e r w i s e . "  ^62 ^  ever-expanding population does not preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community.
161 Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and There. ( New
York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 203.
162 Ibid, 204.
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Despite Leopold's profound and lasting influence on environmental ethics, his 
argument in "A Sand County Almanac" is problematic for two reasons. First, although 
his conclusions helped to form the underpinnings of the biocentric movement, they are 
rather slim on reasoning. He is clear on what he thinks the human place in the biosphere 
should be, but he offers little as to how and why he came to this conclusion. Secondly, 
without much expansion and explanation, he leaves his philosophy as being dangerously 
holistic. By relegating humans to the status of mere citizen o f the biotic community, he 
puts us on an equal plane with other species. Following this logic (although I will admit 
this is perhaps a bit o f a slippery slope), if it is acceptable to cull portions o f one species 
to "preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community", then how could 
one argue that it would be wrong to do the same to humans if our population size proved 
to be having the same affect. This is one of the dangers in advocating an equal moral 
worth for all species. A more eco-humanist approach, on the other hand, would not only 
require us to do the right thing, but to do it in the right way. Because o f these two major 
shortcomings, offering Leopold as a defense of the biocentric positions would be very 
incomplete. After Leopold, several writers have attempted to fill in these gaps by giving 
more in-depth arguments as to why humans should include other species in the moral 
community, and have taken a more individualistic-oriented position versus a strict 
holistic one.
One o f the most influential philosophers to take up the subject o f moral 
consideration o f nonhuman species is Peter Singer. Although most o f  his writings, 
namely Animal Liberation, are directed at the treatment o f domestic animals and the 
abuses involved in such institutions as factory farming and animal testing, his arguments
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can still be applied to those in the wilderness and our treatment o f them. According to 
Singer, the reason we should extend moral consideration to nonhuman species is because 
o f one very important characteristic that they have in common with us: sentience. Used 
in this context, sentience is the ability o f an organism to experience pain, or to suffer. 
Singer contends that it is the possession o f this characteristic that is sufficient for equal 
moral consideration. Not necessarily equal moral worth, but equal consideration at least. 
This line o f reasoning is consistent with the utilitarianism that Singer subscribes to which, 
as described in a previous chapter, judges the consequences of an action by how well it 
promotes pleasures and prevents pain. Singer is extending this principle to animals, as 
did Jeremy Bentham when he stated, "The question is not can they reason? nor can the 
talk?, but can they suffer?"
Again, Singer wrote Animal Liberation as a call to end some institutionalized 
abuses o f animals, but it can be extended to the population issue as well. As humans 
expand into previously untouched areas (or under-exploited areas), the inhabitants of that 
area can be caused to suffer which can have the eventual result o f decreasing their 
numbers and the overall biodiversity. This can happen as a result o f  decreased food 
supplies, which leads to starvation, and habitat destruction, which can lead to death by 
exposure. However, it does not always occur in this manner. Species extinction and 
reduction does not necessarily have to come because o f a direct assault. As animals are 
relegated to smaller and smaller areas to inhabit, resources will become too sparse to 
support a viable and sustainable population. Hypothetically, they do not necessarily have 
to suffer by starving to death, but are just hindered to the point where they cannot
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continually repopulate. Mates are not found, food is not abundant enough to raise 
offspring, etc. This leads to a gradual but steady decline.
It may be hard to imagine that habitat destruction is not a direct form of pain, but 
for the moment let us assume it is possible. According to Singer's reliance on sentience, 
loss o f biodiversity in this way would not be wrong. In other words the loss o f a species, 
or even a substantial reduction in that species' numbers, is not inherently a bad thing. If 
all, or most, members o f a species were gone but it caused no ecological damage and loss 
o f  utility (and therefore pain) for other species, then it would not be w r o n g .  ^ 6 3  i n  other 
words, we have a moral duty not to cause pain for sentient creatures, but if we lessen their 
numbers or cause their extinction painlessly- only to be replaced by more humans- then 
we have done nothing wrong. Nonhuman species have a right to avoid pain, but not 
necessarily to exist.
Another gap in Singer's theory is that plants and other non-sentient creatures (such 
as insects, perhaps) are offered little protection, as are ecosystems as a whole. Their 
worth is purely instrumental and goes only so far as they have utility for sentient 
creatures. In other words, sentience is not very all-inclusive. Therefore, to use sentience 
as a criterion for inclusion in the moral commimity is a good place to start, but it does not 
seem to be enough. Sentience could be a good measurement for how much consideration 
they should receive, but not whether they should receive it. In order to remedy these 
shortcomings, we can turn to philosophers such as Tom Regan and Kenneth Goodpaster
163 Guim, Alastair S. " Preserving Rare Species." Earthbound: New Introductory
Essays in Environmental Ethics. Tom Regan, ed. ( New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1984), 308.
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who both raise the standard from sentience to simply being alive. According to Regan 
rights are not based on the value o f consequences which will affect individuals for good 
or ill, as a utilitarian might contend. Instead, rights are based on the inherent value o f the 
individual. But what is it that gives this individual inherent worth? The answer is that, 
just like us, they have a life. A life which is "...better or worse logically independent o f 
anyone else's valuing us or finding us useful; we are subjects of a life that is more or less 
valuable to us." 164 Hgj-g ^ e  can see the difference between what it means to have 
instrumental worth and to have inherent worth.
Goodpaster goes into even more detail as to why being subject to a life is a better 
criterion than sentience. Goodpaster wrote that, " biologically it appears that sentience is 
an adaptive characteristic of living organisms that provides them with a better capacity to 
anticipate, and so avoid, threats to life. This at least suggests, though of course it does 
not prove, that the capacities to suffer and to enjoy are ancillary to something more
important rather than tickets to considerability in their own right."  165 Pleasure, as is 
pain, is an evolutionary-derived indicator and not the goal itself. It is the "applause which 
signals a job well done, but not the actual completion o f the job ."  166 So what 
Goodpaster is actually saying is that the capacity for suffering is not really what we
164 Regan, Tom. "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs." Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights toRadical Ecology. Michael Zimmerman, ed. (New York: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993), 43.
165 Goodpaster, Kenneth. " On Being Morally Considerable." Environmental
Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. Michael Zimmerman, ed. 
(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993), 97.
166 Ibid.
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should look for when determining if an organism is worthy o f moral consideration since 
it is merely a tool used by some organisms (and not by others) to aid them in the pursuit 
o f what matters to all organisms: staying alive. A tree, for example, may never have 
developed the ability to suffer (at least not how we understand it to mean) but it thrives to 
continue living and has developed various methods for doing so. So instead of taking 
Singer's approach of emphasizing the shared characteristic between humans and some 
nonhumans o f sentience, Goodpaster emphasizes the shared characteristic of being the 
subject-0 f-a-life (i.e., being alive) and trying to stay that way. One can hardly deny that 
living organisms clearly demonstrate efforts to stay alive and appear as if they believe 
themselves to be of inherent worth and thereby having a good o f  their own. In his essay 
"Challenges In Environmental Ethics" Holmes Ralston 111 described this in the following 
way: "Wild animals defend their own lives, because they have a good of their own. 
Animals himt and howl, seek shelter, build nests and sing, care for their young, flee from 
threats, grow himgry, thirsty, hot tired, excited, sleepy, seek out their habitats and mates. 
They suffer injury and lick their wounds. They know security and fear, endurance and 
fatigue, comfort and pain. When they figure out their helps and hurts in the environment,
they do not make man the measure of t h i n g s . "  ^67
An even better and deeper defense o f biocentric ethics (and one that can be readily 
applied to the population issue) is Paul W. Taylor's book Respect fo r  Nature, which is 
one o f the most fully developed and philosophically sophisticated contemporary defenses
^67 Ralston, 137.
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o f biocentric e t h i c s .  ^68 Throughout this very important book, Taylor outlines the core o f 
the biocentric outlook. The beliefs that form the core of the biocentric outlook are four in
number: ^69 i)  the belief that humans are members of the earth's community of life in the 
same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members o f that same 
community, 2) the belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral 
elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living thing, as 
well as its chances o f faring well or poorly, is determined not only by the physical 
conditions o f its environment but also by its relations to other living things, 3) the belief 
that all organisms are teleological centers o f life in the sense that each is a unique 
individual pursuing its own good in its own way, and 4) the belief that humans are not 
inherently superior to other living things.
Taylor essentially supports the first belief- that humans are members o f the earth's 
community in the same sense as other living things- by drawing several parallels between 
human life and non-human life, two o f which are especially important. First, in order to 
survive, we all must be able to constantly adapt to environmental changes. And to do 
this, all species must have the capacity to relate themselves in certain ways to other living 
organisms. In order to live a healthy and full life, it is necessary to carry on life functions 
in ways that allow successful ecological coexistence with other organisms. For 
example, if  humans continually mistreat the farmland on which our food supply depends, 
it will eventually be unable to support us. Similarly, if  a grizzly bear mistreated the
168 DesJardins, 152.
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stream from which it catches salmon to the same degree humans mistreat their land, the 
stream would be unable to support the traversing salmon and the grizzly would starve. 
The second way in which both humans and nonhumans are members o f the earth's 
community is our common origin with other living things. It was the same order of 
evolutionary processes, govemed by the laws of natural selection, that gave rise to our
existence and to the existence o f every other species. 1^1 In other words, the evolutionary 
factors that govemed our original emergence were not different from those that gave rise 
to all other creatures, and it is in this sense that we are all united by a common o r i g i n .  1 ^ ^  
The second belief o f the biocentric outlook- that all species are integral parts in a 
system of interdependence- requires us to view the whole natural domain of living things 
and their environment as an order o f interconnected objects and events that comprise a 
tightly woven web.^^5 Nq action by one species goes unfelt or undetected by another 
species in that particular ecosystem. Or, as Taylor stated, "No life commimity associated
with a particular ecological system is an isolated u n i t . "  ^^4 Humans must grasp the 
concept that they are members of the biosphere and that human activity will inevitably 
affect other members o f the biosphere, just as the actions of an alligator or an elephant 
affect the other members o f the particular ecosystem in which they live. The only 
difference is that humans are capable o f  altering ecosystems globally as well as locally.
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The third belief o f Taylor's biocentric outlook- that all organisms have their own 
telos- focuses attention on the lives o f individual organisms (instead of simply claiming 
that they have membership and a specific place in the earth's community). Through 
extensive observation and study, humans have been able to greatly expand their 
knowledge o f how animals and plants behave. Not only as physical and chemical 
systems, but also how each organism can act as an individual. Close study over periods 
of time have even enabled people to describe animals as having unique "personalities". 
Aristotle went to great lengths in studying wildlife and was the first to argue that each 
organism has a telos, which means an "end", a "purpose", or a " f u n c t i o n .   ̂75 That is to 
say, every living being has a natural activity or a final cause. Its life is aimed at achieving 
its good. Determining what in fact the human telos is has, o f course, been extensively 
debated in philosophy. But as far as nonhumans are concerned, Aristotle concluded that 
all nonhuman beings are to ultimately serve some human purpose. Needless to say, 
biocentric ethics strongly disagrees with Aristotle on this point.
To say an organism is a teleological center o f life is to say that all o f its activities, 
internal and external, are goal-oriented with the constant tendency to maintain the 
organism's existence through time and to enable it to successfully perform those 
biological operations; it is all o f an organism's functions being directed toward the
realization o f its good that make it a teleological c e n t e r .   ̂76 \  living plant or animal has 
a good o f its own in the same sense that a human being has a good of its own, and it is 
independent o f human interests or needs. A different telos does not necessarily mean that
175 DesJardins, 26.
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it is a telos equal in quality to ours, but it is one that should be respected nonetheless and 
not interfered with unless it is necessary to meet a vital human interest. Human beings 
must then respect the right o f all living things to realize their good, or achieve their telos. 
To understand why, the concepts o f a moral agent and a moral subject must first be 
defined. A moral agent is any being that possesses those capacities by virtue o f which it 
can act morally or immorally, can have duties and responsibilities, and can be held 
accountable for what it d o e s .  177 These capacities are the ability to decide right or wrong, 
to engage in moral deliberations, and the ability to make decisions based on these 
deliberations. Humans are, for the most part, moral agents. But it is important to note 
that some humans, such as children, the mentally ill, or the mentally retarded, cannot be 
considered moral agents since they lack such capacities. Instead, they are to be regarded 
as moral subjects. Moral subjects are beings with regard to whom others (moral agents) 
have duties and r e s p o n s ib il it ie s .  178 Most nonhuman inhabitants of the earth would 
certainly qualify as moral subjects to which moral agents owe moral consideration. (I 
used the word "most" since many higher animals, as pointed out in Frans deWaal's book 
Good Matured: The Origins o f  Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals, certainly 
have the mental faculties sufficient to be considered moral agents). They are living, 
breathing entities which, above all else, have the ability to feel pain. They have the 
ability to suffer in consequence to the particular actions o f a moral agent. To mistreat
176 Taylor, 121-122.
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children or the mentally handicapped merely because they have limited abilities and 
cannot reach "full personhood" would be morally abhorrent, and is widely accepted as 
such. Instead, their right to live and to be nurtured within their limited capacities is 
respected. The same should hold true for nonhiunans. Simply because their abilities and 
characteristics are different from that o f a human, and because they will not achieve "full 
personhood", does not provide sufficient reasons to prevent them from living and 
realizing their own good. And similarly, the fact that humans have the abilities to destroy 
and subordinate nonhuman species does not justify doing so. Simply put, might does not 
make right.
This last point directly leads to the adoption of the fourth belief in the biocentric 
outlook: the denial of human superiority. The belief that humans are superior to the earth 
and all of its nonhuman inhabitants is deeply rooted in our way of thinking, especially 
within Western society. And it is certainly not in keeping with the belief that we are all 
merely members o f the earth's community instead of its rulers. Such a framework of 
thought has had a tremendous influence on all o f humankind, philosophers and laymen 
alike. But in order to truly have respect for nature, it is critical that such thinking be 
abandoned. Humans tend to feel superior because the characteristics hiunans possess are 
judged to be superior, or higher. But such a judgement is rather biased and unfair when 
made from a strictly human outlook or point o f view.
It is undeniable that the htunan race is a very unique and special species that has 
uniquely human characteristics. These characteristics, such as rationality, individual 
autonomy, and free will are essentially possessed only by humans. And there is no doubt 
that they are wonderful qualities to have. They allow us to live in the manner that we do
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and to achieve our telos. But they cannot be said to be superior, or to qualify us as 
superior. They are only thought to be superior when judged from a human point o f view. 
As Taylor reminds us, when judged from a plant or animal point of view, they are 
worthless. For example, plants are dependent on the process o f  photosynthesis. It is a 
characteristic o f plants that is vital for their survival and for them to achieve their telos. 
Photosynthesis is an extremely complex, intricate, and amazing process that took millions 
o f years o f evolution to develop. It is arguably just as complex and amazing as the 
thought process used by humans when we engage in reasoning, if not more so. But for a 
plant to achieve its telos, photosynthesis is essential while reasoning is worthless. For 
humans, it is vice versa. Such characteristics that make humans unique are not superior 
to uniquely bumble-bee or uniquely cactus characteristics. They are only different. A 
species-specific characteristic is indispensable when attempting to realize the good o f that 
particular species, but not for others. Therefore, one unique characteristic cannot be said 
to be better than that of another species. Hence, it cannot be said that one species' telos is 
inherently better than that o f another. At the very least it would be wrong to prevent 
another living organism from achieving its telos when our vital interests are not at stake.
Another reason humans have deemed themselves to be superior is because of the 
notion that hiunans, as best stated by Rene Descartes' idea of metaphysical dualism, have
souls or minds as well as bodies while plants and animals possess only b o d i e s .  ^79 
Accordingly, nonhumans are mere physical mechanisms that are no different from 
inanimate objects. All the while, humans have these physical processes as well as minds
179 Ibid, 143.
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that enable us to exist on the level o f consciousness. A level that, admittedly, most 
nonhumans do not live at. At least not to the extent that humans do. But an argument for 
human superiority based on such premises is easily refuted.
First o f all, to claim that nonhumans are mere physical mechanisms with no 
mental capacities contradictory to science and biological knowledge. Studies o f animals, 
especially o f the higher primates and mammals, indicates that they give every indication 
o f possessing the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, and both their external behavior and 
internal structure of their brains and nervous system indicate that they can experience 
many kinds o f emotions, such as anxiety, fear, excitement, and concern for others in the
g r o u p .  180 In light o f this, many nonhumans can be regarded as living on somewhat of a 
conscious plane. Hence, not respecting their right to life on the basis that they do not 
have any consciousness whatsoever and are inanimate objects is significantly weakened. 
Secondly, even if it were accepted that only humans do possess minds, it would be 
irrelevant. Most nonhuman species can and do live their lives and find their good without 
a "mind". Humans need such a mind to be happy and become "fully humans" but plants 
and many animals simply do not. A bear or a beetle can still live its life to its full 
potential and achieve its respective telos without the same level o f consciousness 
possessed by humans. Their guidance from instinct and other innate abilities is sufficient. 
A mind, in the human sense, is not needed just as photosynthesis is not needed by a 
human.
180 Taylor, 145.
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To summarize, the most important o f Taylor's contributions to biocentric thought 
are that we should not blindly adhere to the prejudices that have allowed us to 
automatically assume our interests, regardless of importance, should always come first, 
that we are much more cormected with and related to nonhuman species and the natural 
world than we tend to believe, and our "uniquely human" qualities are what make us 
moral agents. Being moral agents is a form of power, and like all power it is accompanied 
with responsibility. Along with this power of being moral agents comes the great 
responsibility o f affording moral subjects the consideration they deserve and not 
automatically trumping those interests every time they come into conflict with human 
interests. It may seem as if it is a bit o f a contradiction to agree with Taylor that humans 
should not claim superiority, while at the same time agree with the principle of eco- 
humanism that human needs should be given priority over those o f non-humans. 
However, that would indicate a misunderstanding o f what it means to reject human 
superiority. We should not think that rejecting human superiority means rejecting the 
idea that human needs should come first. To put us on an equal plane with another 
species is not only illogical, it is unnatural. What other species would put the interests o f 
another species ahead o f their own? Instead of thinking that a rejection of human 
superiority means placing all species on equal footing with respect to moral worth, we 
should think o f it as a rejection of the notion that all human interests should be given 
more importance than all non-human interests.
So what are the main aspects o f biocentric environmental ethics that we are to 
extract from this section? First of all, we must understand that we are much more similar 
to nonhuman species than different. Many of the characteristics that we feel gives
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humans such great value in this world are shared by many other organisms as well. That 
is not to say that we should give nonhumans the same value as us merely because we 
have so many shared characteristics, only that they have interests that should not be 
automatically trumped every time they conflict with htunan interests. Second, as moral 
agents we have a responsibility to not only take into consideration these interests but also 
protect them when the situation allows. To believe otherwise is based more on blind 
prejudice than logic and compassion. To simply continue our old ways out of 
convenience and out of a refusal to embark o f self-examination and a re-evaluation of our 
values would be a conscious choice to ignore what we now know about the natural world 
and its inhabitants. That type o f behavior has consequences that reach far beyond those 
related to population and the treatment o f the environment. Furthermore, to refuse to 
acknowledge this responsibility is an acceptance of the "might makes right" ethos. This 
is an attitude that has lead to unjust and even deadly consequences throughout the history 
o f the human race, and we are finally at a point in our civilization where it has been 
abandoned in much of the world. It is time we extend the abandonment of such a 
dangerous philosophy to the treatment o f the environment and the species that we are 
fortimate to still have with us.
Biocentric Environmental Ethics And Its Call for Population Stabilization
Once the basic tenets o f biocentric environmental ethics are integrated into one's 
moral and ethical belief system, it naturally and logically follows that violations of 
biocentric ethics, and the biocentric outlook, are unethical. Therefore, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that allowing the human population to expand, even if  it were possible to do
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so without experiencing considerable human harm through Malthusian checks, would 
violate the principles o f biocentric ethics. The argument that further population growth is 
a violation o f biocentric environmental ethics is based on two premises: population 
growth is no longer necessary to achieve or protect any human interests, and efforts 
aimed at altering consiunption and technology are not enough alone to protect the 
interests o f nonhuman species.
If all human interests are automatically granted priority anytime there is a conflict 
between human and non-human interests, then there was no point of even introducing the 
principles o f biocentric environmental ethics. If on the one hand we claim that all species 
are worthy of moral consideration, but on the other hand claim that all human interests 
are automatically more important than non-human interests, then this is essentially the 
same as agreeing with some o f the anthropocentric views that this thesis has rejected. 
Therefore it is necessary to furnish some sort of balancing test to guide us when 
determining what to do when human interests come into conflict with non-human 
interests, and apply the population issue to this test. Essentially it is being used to answer 
the following question: if population growth serves a human interest, is this interest 
important enough to trump the vital interests o f the nonhuman species we are obliged to 
afford consideration imder the tenets o f biocentric environmental ethics?
The most basic test that has been used is the vital-nonvital interest dichotomy. A 
vital interest is one that is necessary for smvival, such as food, water, shelter, adequate 
healthcare, etc. A nonvital interest are those that only fulfill desires (i.e., things we want 
but do not necessarily need). The most basic principle is that when vital interests collide, 
human interests come first. Even from the biocentric outlook, to argue otherwise defies
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logic and nature. It is unnatural because it would completely go against the survival- 
instinct that is not only common to all species, but is what we have to thank for becoming 
as successful as we have. It is unheard of for a species to put the interests necessary for 
survival o f another species ahead of its own. It is illogical because if  we were to decide 
that our vital interests do not automatically come before those o f nonhumans, then by 
what logical criteria are we to decide between human or nonhuman? It cannot be based on 
that which is "more vital" because something is either vital or it is not. It cannot be based 
on strength or "might" because this would go against one of the central tenets of 
biocentric ethics. Therefore we must simply acknowledge that there is no way to argue 
that a vital nonhuman interest is worthy of the same moral consideration as a vital human 
interest. While we should certainly have compassion and appreciation for nonhuman 
organisms and ecosystems and seek to protect their interests when warranted, we should 
not allow this compassion to defy logic and be counterproductive. In sum, even though 
biocentric ethics asks us to give moral consideration to nonhuman species, the eco- 
humanism aspect o f it certainly does not require us to put the welfare o f other species 
ahead of us, and it does not require us to put them on an equal plane with humans.
Unfortimately, this fundamental principle that vital human interests should be 
given more importance than non-human vital interests does not help much in this context 
since it is so obvious that further population growth is not necessary to meet any vital 
human interest. We have long since achieved substantial numbers and geographic 
dispersion to ensure not just our survival but also our way of life. Therefore, we must 
move beyond this simple vital-nonvital dichotomy and attempt to devise a sort of 
balancing test to guide us when non-vital human interests come into conflict with vital
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nonhuman interests. Such a test is necessary because we cannot make the blanket 
statement that all vital interests (regardless o f species) should automatically be given 
more weight than all non-vital interests (regardless of species). This would be contrary to 
one o f the main themes o f  not just biocentric environmental ethics but all o f  philosophy: 
that we are here not just to survive, but to thrive as a society and as individuals. It is 
impossible to list all possible human interests and rank them in order o f importance and 
then draw a line at which are worthy of trumping the vital interests of nonhuman species. 
Instead, based on the principles of biocentric ethics set forth earlier with a slant towards 
eco-humanism, when deciding whether a human non-vital interest should trump the vital 
interests of nonhumans consider the following factors: 1) the importance o f the human 
activity in furthering our progression as individuals and as a society, 2) the availability of 
reasonable alternatives, 3) the degree to which we are blindly adhering to human 
prejudice and rejecting other principles of biocentric thought, 4) the amoimt o f hardship 
and sacrifice that is required on our part, 5) the abiltity o f the environment to absorb and 
eventually reverse the effects o f us acting on this particular interest (i.e., how permanent 
will the loss be), and 6) the consciousness and sentience of those being adversely 
affected. With that being the balancing test to guide us, it is now time to apply it to the 
population issue.
The first question that must be addressed is whether further population growth is 
actually an interest o f ours. In an era o f very low mortality rates and a population that is 
sufficient in both size and geographic dispersion to ensure our economic efficiency and 
continued comfortable existence, having one or two children can of course still be 
considered a vital need (since reproduction is obviously important for the continued
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existence o f a species) but society having a total fertility rate above replacement level is 
not. Even though population growth is not even close to being a vital human interest, is it 
a nonvital interest that should trump the vital interests o f nonhumans? With respect to the 
amount o f  sacrifice to achieve population stabilization, there is not a great deal o f it 
required on our part as individuals or as a societal whole. If this thesis were advocating 
strict one-or-two child policies, then the sacrifice would be great because it would be 
placing severe limitations on many families and preventing them from living what they 
have deemed to be the good life. Our interests in having reproductive freedom and 
individual liberty, although not vital to our survival, would trump any vital interests of 
nonhumans. However, it was made very clear earlier in the thesis that such an approach 
is not necessary. Individuals do not have to be targeted in order to lower a society's total 
fertility rate. Therefore, the sacrifice required on our part is virtually nothing on the 
individual level.
But what about as a society? Will our quality o f life somehow suffer if the 
population growth we have known since the dawn of our existence were to cease? Is our 
progression as a species somehow dependent on continual population growth? Not only is 
the answer no, it is becoming much more apparent that we have much to lose by 
population growth and absolutely nothing to gain. To support this statement, it would be 
useful to once again mention the findings of the Rockefeller Report presented in Chapter 
3:
"After two years of concentrated effort we have concluded that, in the long 
nm, no substantial benefits will result from further growth o f the Nation's 
population, rather that the gradual stabilization o f our population would contribute 
significantly to the Nation's ability to solve its problems. We have looked for, and 
have not found, any convincing economic argument for continued population
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growth. The health o f our country does not depend on it, nor does the vitality o f 
business nor the welfare o f the average p e r s o n . "  ^ 8 1
In addition to the Rockefeller Commission's conclusions about the negative 
impact o f population growth on our interests, perhaps the best way to describe how 
population growth will negatively impact our society and quality of life is to present an 
argument that further population growth will infringe on the liberties that we cherish and 
hold as an important part o f our chosen way of life. These arguments concerning the 
threat to our liberty from population growth are being presented to really drive home the 
point that population growth is not necessary to protect or promote any human interest, 
and therefore should certainly not trump vital interests o f other species. These arguments 
provide much more strength to the argument that population growth is not an interest o f 
ours worthy o f trumping vital interests of nonhuman entities than simply quoting 
government studies, and it is a way o f refuting the prevelant and all too often unexamined 
assumption in this society that population growth is important to our way o f life and our 
comfortable existence.
Liberty consists o f three different but equally important and inseparable 
components. The first component o f liberty, referred to as the ancient view o f liberty,
was the most dominant conception o f liberty among the G r e e k s .  ^82 w ithin this view, the 
idea of freedom consists o f the rights of individuals to participate in the deliberation o f
 ̂8 1 The Report o f the Commission on Population Growth and The American Future.
"Population and the American Future." 1972.
^82 Gray, John. Liberalism. (Minneapolis, MN: University o f Minnesota Press, 1986), 
1.
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government. This idea o f liberty is reflected by our own system of government in that it 
is a participatory democracy run by elected officials. But for many o f the Greeks, 
individuals were not accorded as much personal freedom and independence from 
government control as they are under the more modem conception o f freedom, referred to 
as negative liberty. Under the view of negative liberty individuals enjoy a protected 
sphere o f non-interference in thought and activity. Synonymous with classic liberalism, 
it is this type o f liberty that is often referred to as "freedom from". People are entitled to 
freedom from intrusion into their personal lives, and this is protected in two ways. First, 
there are legal rights such as those found in both the letter and the spirit o f  the U.S. 
Constitution. Secondly, our commonly shared social values o f  respecting the rights and 
interests o f others often prevents us from unfairly restricting people from carrying out 
their wishes regardless o f how eccentric or easily misunderstood they may be.
Third, there is the most recent conception of liberty called positive liberty. 
Espoused by revisionary liberals, and referred to as "freedom to"^83 positive liberty 
recognizes that being free means much more than simply not being subject to external 
restraints. It requires that all people should be given the skills and disciplines necessary 
to realize the vast opportunities that life holds. In other words, positive liberty seeks to 
free the individual from the internal restraints we are bom with. As Isaiah Berlin stated, 
"It is true that to offer political rights, or safeguards against intervention by the state, to 
men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased is to mock their condition." ̂  84
^83 Berlin, Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Liberty." Four Essays on Liberty. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 124.
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Undoubtedly, positive liberty requires the existence of equality and security, as well as 
the attainment o f at least the minimum amount of material wealth and education 
necessary for a life that can focus on quality and not merely survival. This is a concept 
that can be found at least as far back as Aristotle.
All three components o f liberty can be threatened by population growth. For 
example, a representative democracy is predicated on the ability o f the people to voice 
their concerns. However, a large and condensed population results in an impossible 
number o f concerns to be heard and interests to be attended to. Consequently, the power 
of the citizen is significantly diminished. Furthermore, there is legitimate concern over 
our reliance on technology to coimter the effects o f an overly large population. It would 
be a bit o f a stretch to claim we are on the verge o f a technocracy, but the need to clean 
up and reduce environmental damage as well as develop alternative energy brings with it 
the need for regulatory and administrative bodies. Although not inherently bad, such 
organizations inevitable take the power and decisions out o f the hands o f the officials that 
the citizens elected. But the main way that population growth threatens our chosen way 
of life is through the constraints it will inevitably place on our negative liberty. The 
environment is a form o f commons and, to state it simply, the commons are overcrowded. 
As the population grows and becomes more condense, the commons will become even 
more crowded. And when the commons are overcrowded, "mutual coercion mutually 
agreed upon" is n e c e s s a r y .  ^85 This was stated by Garrett Hardin in his famous essay
184 Ibid.
185 Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy o f the Commons." Science, Vol 162, No.3858
(December 1968), pp. 1243-48.
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"The Tragedy of the Commons" in which he used the example o f a pasture to illustrate 
his point. This pasture, offered as a microcosm of our society, is used by several 
herdsman to raise cattle. But o f course this pasture has a limited carrying capacity, 
meaning it can only provide for a limited size herd before it begins to degrade and 
eventually becomes ruined. But the herdsman are rational, or self-interested, beings 
which means they each seek to maximize their gains. Therefore, they will always ask the 
following question: "what is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd."^^^ 
After all, the gains o f adding one more animal are enjoyed solely by the individual while 
the harmful effects o f overloading the commons, as gradual as they may be, are dispersed 
among all who share the commons. Population growth is synonymous with such 
thinking. There are several theories as to why people procreate or, in other words, add to 
the commons. In agricultural societies, children are economic resources who are a source 
of labor as well as old-age security for the parents. In a more modem industrialized 
society such as ours, children can serve two purposes: 1) they are a source o f intrinsic, 
non-substitutable pleasure, and/or 2) they are social capital in the sense that they establish
new relations among persons such as parents, siblings, neighbors, and friends. Either 
way, people have children (and therefore add further stress to the commons) because they 
are seeking their own interests. Rarely does anyone stop to think about how it will affect
186 Ibid.
^87 Schoen, Robert, et al. "Why Do Americans Want Children?" Population and 
Development Review. Vol. 23 June 1997, pp. 333-358.
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others, and even fewer people have children thinking that population growth is in 
society's best interests and they are therefore doing their civic duty.
There are many modem forms of the commons, such as the air, water, and 
fisheries. And once these "commons" are overloaded, activities that are not inherently 
wrong become harmful to others. This point can be illustrated with examples o f activities 
fi"om our everyday lives that few people would even think of as being harmful to others. 
For example, we do not regard driving an automobile as bad. It provides a great amount 
o f social mobility and fireedom of movement. It is true that it can spew out an array of 
pollutants, but when limited this can be absorbed into the atmosphere and cause no real 
harm. But when there are a substantial number o f people driving automobiles, especially 
in a concentrated area, the air pollution can no longer be absorbed by the atmosphere and 
a host o f environmental and health problems ensue. The same holds true for resource 
consumption. In a modem industrial society, people have to extract resources from the 
environment to not only survive but to maintain their quality of life. The problem arises 
when there is an increasingly large population that needs to bum oil to heat its homes or 
cut down trees to meet its paper-product demand. The Cotmcil on Sustainable 
Development articulated this point well when it stated, "There is nothing inherently 
wrong with a population- even a large one- meeting its material needs by consuming 
resources and creating wastes. Problems arise when the numbers o f people and the scale, 
composition, and pattern of their consumption and waste generation combine to have 
negative effects on the environment, the economy, and s o c i e t y . "   ̂88 jh e re  is also nothing
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wrong with wanting to own a home in a peaceful rural or suburban area instead of the 
crowded and noisy city. But when a substantial number of people are doing so, it creates 
suburban sprawl that brings with it a host of environmental (as well as socio-economic) 
problems. And finally, the production of the typical American diet, consisting o f large 
quantities o f meat, fish, and other animal by-products, takes an enormous toll on the 
surrounding ecosystems and estuaries. It can be argued that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with eating animals; there is nothing more common in nature that one animal 
killing another for food. But in doing so to this extent we turn an inherently neutral 
practice into a harmful one.
So how can the harmful effects systemic to an overloaded commons be prevented 
or at least mitigated? One alternative that is popular among contemporary conservatives 
is to get rid of the concept o f the commons altogether and have it become private 
property. The rationale behind this alternative is that "over the long mn, private 
ownership is the most effective protector of the environment- provided ownership is 
transferable and backed by the courts that make people liable when their pollutants 
invade the person or property o f others. This system of private ownership would protect 
the environment for the same reason that it protects other kinds o f property: because it
encourages good s t e w a r d s h i p . "  ^89 ^ fear of liability is hardly a sufficient deterrent
188 President's Council on Sustainable Development, "Sustainable America: A New
Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the 
Future." (Government Printing Office, 1996), Chapter 6 :"U.S. Population and 
Sustainability", 2.
189 Stroup, Richard L. and Jane S. Shaw. "The Free Market and the Environment." The
Public Interest. Spring/1995, pp. 31
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because the threat is so far removed. If toxins are released into the environment in 
harmful quantities or in a harmful manner, the source o f these toxins is too hard to 
pinpoint. This is especially true if there is no regulation enforcing these industries to 
monitor their pollution levels. From a legal perspective, even if the source of 
environmental harm can be detected, bringing suit against the alleged culprit would be 
quite difficult. Usually the harms that people would suffer are indirect, meaning they are 
only noticeable after a long period of time has elapsed and the harm accumulates to the 
point where it can even be noticed at all. And even then there are so many other factors 
that could have been the cause o f or a contributor to the harm that liability would be very 
difficult, expensive, and time consuming to prove. From a philosophical perspective, it 
would not be right for someone to claim ownership over the commons. These commons 
are continually being traversed by other living beings who cannot be owned as a piece o f 
property or manufactured good can. If a factory claims ownership over the part o f the 
river that it pumps pollutants into, does it also own all o f the fish and other creatures 
whose habitats were established there long before the factory was built? And from a 
practical perspective, the commons are not entities fixed in time and space. They are 
continually flowing and the harm done to a particular area o f the commons one day, 
regardless o f who "owns" it, affects others the next day as the water flows to a 
neighborhood down river or the wind blows the are o f one community to the next. It is 
impossible for harm in the commons cannot be localized and contained.
If  converting the commons to private property is not a viable option, then another 
alternative would be appeal to altruism. By convincing people to limit their freedom and 
forego their own interests for the good of the community, the commons will be protected.
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Unfortunately, people, as self-interested beings, do not think this way. Unless a 
significant amount o f others agree, by foregoing your own interests you bear the entire 
burden while the good that can result fi-om your self-denial is minimal and undetectable. 
For example, if  I wanted to reduce the smog hanging over the city by finding an 
alternative mode of transportation, it would only be a matter of time before I realized that 
this was doing absolutely no good since the others were not taking the same initiative. 
The inconveniences felt by me would be far greater than any benefit to the environment 
and to society.
Some argue that to counter the tragedy of the commons is to develop cleaner and 
more efficient technology. But, as stated earlier, any gains made through technology (as 
well as a reduction in consumption) are negated by population growth. This is evident 
from the amount o f air pollution we must still tolerate. Between 1975 and 1987, the 
Environmental Protection Agency expected the imposed standards on the auto-industry to 
result in an eighty to ninety percent reduction in emissions. However, there was only an
18% reduction because the number o f  cars on the road d o u b l e d .  ^90 another
objection to this alternative that invokes even greater concern is that technology cannot 
keep up with population growth. In the past, advancement in technology (as seen with 
the Green Revolution) has helped our dwindling resources dwindle a little slower. But 
there is mounting evidence new technologies are not developing at a fast enough rate, and 
even if developed will not be at a low enough cost to allow us the same access to the
190 Ophuls, William. Ecology and the Politics o f  Scarcity: Prologue To A Political 
Theory o f  the Steady State. (San Fransisco: WH Freeman and Co, 1977), 137.
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quality o f life we enjoy. For example, fossil fuels are dwindling and becoming 
increasingly expensive to extract, and are becoming less socially acceptable, but wind and 
solar energy technological development has virtually stalemated and is already rather 
limited. Additionally, due to the large land area needed to contain solar lakes (which is 
one method of obtaining solar energy), there lies the strong possibility o f fierce 
competition for land with agricultural interests and with the real estate market as it 
becomes more scarce due to population expansion. Nuclear energy is presently deemed 
too unsafe by society to be widely accepted, especially because o f the difficulty and 
danger o f storing its vast amounts of radioactive waste (which remains so for many 
generations). And biomass energy technology has not yet reached the point where it 
could be a viable source either. Current technology in the process of converting biomass 
to usable energy requires the use of more energy from fossil fuel sources than is 
converted. And, once again, there is a potential conflict over increasingly scarce land 
since the biomass used for energy is found on farmland and in forest basins. In sum, the 
energy sources presently being used are finite and cannot provide for any more 
population growth while alternative energy technology has yet to reach the point where it 
can even come close to providing an adequate amount o f energy for the present 
population, let alone an increasing one. It is possible that in the future alternative energy 
technology could progress to the point where enough energy would be supplied. 
However, this will not occur in the foreseeable future and simply putting complete and 
unfettered faith in the natural progression of technology to solve the earth's energy 
concerns is not sound policy.
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Reliance on a technological fix is not acceptable and we cannot expect people to 
cease being rational and self-interested, so the only two alternatives left are restricting our 
fi-eedom or stabilizing our population at a low enough number whereas our daily 
activities can be absorbed in the environment without harm. In other words, we are faced 
with a choice. Do we agree to restrict fertility or do we restrict all of the daily fi-eedoms 
we enjoy and take for granted. And by restriction of our daily freedoms I mean 
restriction to the point necessary to meet our stated clean air and clean water objectives 
instead of merely making empty promises. At first glance, such restrictions may seem 
only superficial and tolerable. Take for example the statute limiting the number and 
frequency o f backyard barbecues in Los Angeles aimed at reducing the city's infamous 
smog p r o b l e m .  ^91 Pew would argue that we have an inalienable right to barbecue 
whenever and wherever we wish. Even the most ardent proponent o f "rugged 
individualism" would concede that sometimes we must consider what is in the best 
interests o f  the commimity. But these restrictions would add up to the point where every 
part o f our lives becomes regulated. When and where it is permissible to drive a car, 
when we can run our air conditioners, how much water and paper products we can 
consume, what diets are environmentally benign, having to live in an apartment in a 
crowded city instead o f a home in the suburbs, etc. Even if these aspects o f our lives are 
not directly regulated, the same objectives can be met indirectly through such measures as 
increased taxes on certain goods and services. Driving a car, putting a pool in our
^91 Cone, Marla. "Barbecue Rule Adopted to Take Bite Out O f Smog." Los Angeles 
Times. 6 October 1990, pp 14.
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backyards, or eating at a fast food restaurant do not exactly qualify as inalienable rights, 
but the cumulative effect o f all this restriction (which may very well be necessary) is a 
terrible affront to our liberty. The foimders were not only referring to rights when they 
sought to form a government that would protect our "life, liberty, and pursuit of 
happiness". As parts o f the whole, we all recognize the need to balance our own interests 
with responsibility. But when adhering to the principle o f civic responsibility results in 
an intrusion on the freedoms we have grown accustomed to in virtually every aspect of 
our lives, then clearly something is wrong and we are out o f balance. Thus, the choice 
must be made between stabilizing our population at a lower rate or restricting our 
freedom accordingly.
In addition to its threat to our way o f life, population growth is also a direct 
assault on biocentric values. Human population growth simply caiuiot occur without 
some degree o f destruction to the natural environment. More people being added to the 
planet directly results in more encroachment on wildlife through the need to make more 
room for housing, more forests being cleared for farmland and paper products, and more 
pollution o f some sort that has to be absorbed by nature. Such damage to the world's 
ecosystems causes great damage to its inhabitants. And by doing so, we are ultimately 
not respecting each organism as a teleological center of life with a right to strive for its 
own good. It is impossible for members o f an ecosystem to achieve their telos if  they are 
constantly being forced to find new homes, being forced to forage longer and harder for 
sustenance, or by being poisoned or intentionally killed by human activity. Instead of 
living according to their telos, their existence is defined solely by warding off the harmful 
effects of human growth and increased human activity.
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Population growth also runs counter to biocentric ethics because it is the product 
o f a blind adherence the biased notion that humans are superior. All populations have a 
right to life, and life can only continue through reproduction. But, as it has already been 
stated several times, there is a point where an increase in numbers is simply no longer 
needed to ensure the survival o f the species and, obviously, the human race has long since 
attained this level. Nevertheless, we continue to be fertile and multiply despite the fact 
that any benefit that could come from population growth was realized long ago. Such 
behavior conveys the attitude that harm to the natural environment is irrelevant since its 
members are inferior to humans and are only here to serve us. Rarely has a wooded area 
not been cut down or a beautiful meadow not been paved over in reverence to its plant 
and animal inhabitants. Instead, new roads and new houses needed to accommodate the 
overflowing population are built because it is felt that the needs o f the humans, even 
those that were unnecessarily added to the world, take precedence over the needs and 
lives o f nonhumans.
Furthermore, expanding the population above the earth's carrying capacity is a flat 
rejection o f the belief that humans are members o f the earth's community and that we are 
dependent on the health o f the earth, just as a fish is dependent on the health o f a river in 
which it swims. Humans continually expand, yet expect the food supply to expand 
equally. As a result, we use increasingly harmful agricultural methods that adversely 
affect the environment. They pollute the water and the air and cause undesirable change 
to the earth's climate and ecology, as do a host o f other human activities. There is 
nothing wrong with effecting change in an ecosystem, per se. All creatures do it. A bear 
alters the ecosystem o f the stream when it fishes out salmon headed up the current to
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spawn. A snake alters its ecosystem when it swallows its prey. However, in the complex 
web o f life such changes are very minor and are soon thereafter reversed. With humans, 
it is quite different with respect to both the magnitude o f the changes and with the time it 
takes for them to be noticed and felt (at least within the human community). The changes 
caused by human population growth are typically only felt (by other humans) in the long 
term. But our short term way of thinking prevents us from thinking about and preparing 
for the long term. Nonetheless, such long term changes still certainly qualify as changes 
to the earth's ecosystem and such change affects the ability o f other organisms to live and, 
more importantly, to thrive. But instead of stabilizing the population, we repeatedly turn 
to technology to provide short term solutions which only serves to reinforce our false 
notion that we can live outside o f earth's ecosystems and independently o f its health. 
This frame of mind, and its harmful results, were eloquently stated by Vice President A1 
Gore in his book Earth in the Balance. In it he states: "Believing ourselves to be separate 
from the earth means having no idea how we fit into the natural cycle of life and no 
understanding of the natural processes o f change that affect us and that we in turn are 
affecting. It means that we attempt to chart the course o f our civilization by reference to 
ourselves alone. No wonder we are lost and confused. No wonder so many people feel 
their lives are wasted. Our species used to flourish with the intricate and interdependent 
web o f life, but we have chosen to leave the garden. Unless we find a way to 
dramatically change our civilization and our way of thinking about the relationship
between humankind and the earth, our children will inherit a w a s t e l a n d . "   ̂92
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Are there alternatives to population stabilization within the ecohumanist 
biocentric outlook? No matter how much we reduce our own consumption and alter our 
lifestyles, and no matter how advanced our technology becomes, a realistic look at us 
shows that we cannot help but have some sort o f impact on the earth and on other living 
organisms. As ecologist Andrew Goudie stated, "One of the most fundamental ways in 
which humans are causing extinction is by reducing the area of natural habitat available 
to species. Even wildlife refuges tend to be small "islands" in an inhospitable sea o f 
artificially modified vegetation or urban s p r a w l . "  ^93 We no longer live in small roving 
bands o f hunter-gatherers that have little impact on the environment (although that 
perception o f early humanity has even been called into question by modem theories o f 
early humans being the cause o f several extinctions instead of the drastic changing of 
climates, as once thought). And our numbers preclude returning to such a society, and 
nor should we even aspire to do so. While we should always aim to minimize harm to the 
environment and leave as much to wildemess as possible, we shouldn't do so to the point 
where we are infringing on the quality o f human life and reverse the progress we have 
made. "Man is a political animal; humans maximally are what they are in culture, where 
the natural selection pressures are relaxed without detriment and with b e n e f i t . "  ^94 
Facing this reality requires us to understand that we must strike a balance between
192 Gore, Al. Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1992), 140.
193 Goudie, 132.
^94 Roston, Holmes HI. "Challenges in Environmental Ethics." Environmental
Philosophy: From Animal Rights To Radical Ecology. Michael Zimmerman, ed.
(New York: Prentice Hall Inc, 1993), 137.
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humans and nature. Modem humanity cannot completely coexist in an ecosystem ( at 
least not now and not in the foreseeable future, anyway) without altering it in some way 
and thus reducing the biodiversity. Therefore, to truly live according to the aspect of 
biocentric ethics that requires us to give all species their due moral consideration, we 
must cease our outward expansion. And the only way to do that, while at the same time 
not severely deteriorating our own quality o f life, is to realize that we simply cannot keep 
growing.
To summarize, population growth is certainly not a vital interest o f  ours. We have 
long since achieved a population that is large enough and geographically dispersed 
enough to ensure our survival. Any threat that comes to our survival will be a result o f 
our own doing, and not as a result o f having too small o f a population. Therefore we 
must acknowledge that population growth is, at best, a nonvital interest and is subject to 
the balancing test proposed in this chapter to determine if  it is a nonvital interest that is 
we as moral agents can honestly say trumps the vital interests of the moral subjects we 
are ethically bound to protect. So how does it withstand the scrutiny o f this test? Quite 
poorly considering that it would be a stretch to even argue that population growth serves 
any societal interests at all. O f course, individual people maintaining the right to have 
larger families is an important interest that is worthy of protection, but since this thesis 
advocates targeting the society's total fertility rates in ways that do not include placing 
direct restrictions on individuals per se, then that is not really an issue. Furthermore, 
population growth is a blanket rejection of the biocentric principles we are to adhere to as 
moral agents, and the harm it causes will in many ways be irreparable.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND CONCLUSIONS 
Does the U.S. have a need to stabilize its population growth? This is the issue 
that many environmentalists have tried to push to the forefront o f our policy-making 
agenda. Although it is a relatively new issue in the U.S. and did not surface until 
environmentalism began to surge in the 1960s, it is a very old issue that dates back at 
least as far as the ancient Greek philosophers. However, as this thesis argued, this 
question originates from an outlook we should do away with and is therefore the wrong 
question to ask. Instead o f asking, “can we afford to grow?” the proper question is 
“should we allow ourselves to grow?” To understand why we should instead be asking 
this question requires a shift in thinking toward the biocentric end of the envirorunental 
ethics spectrum. By making such a paradigm shift it becomes clear to us that making 
moral judgments on population growth based merely on how it affects us is an 
incomplete approach because it does not take into account all o f the interests that we as 
moral agents are required to consider imder the norms o f biocentric ethics. A reliance on 
the anthropocentric outlook gives us a distorted view of whether we are living up to our 
ethical duties in allowing population growth continue even though we have long since 
achieved the numbers and dispersion necessary to insure our survival and quality of life. 
Therefore, the inquiry should go well beyond whether population growth poses a threat to 
human welfare.
154
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To make such an argument, this thesis took a very historical approach. In doing 
so it examined the evolution of environmentalism from the strict anthropocentric norms 
that prevailed throughout most o f  our Westem history to the emergence and growth of 
the biocentric thought in Westem philosophy that is beginning to play more o f a role in 
environmental policy. This historical overview of environmental philosophy was 
accompanied by a specific emphasis on how this traditional anthropocentric outlook of 
ours has influenced our thoughts on population growth. Essentially, population growth 
has always been seen as a good thing that should continue until it reaches the point where 
it causes environmental damage of the type and magnitude that causes harm to humans. 
O f course, it is not fair to assign this line of thinking to everyone throughout modem 
Westem civilization for there are many biocentric-oriented thinkers during this era 
thought would not have agreed with such an outlook and with such ambivalence towards 
population growth. However, it is fair to say that this is the general consensus for most of 
our history, and it is this general consensus that is being criticized in this thesis.
Within this historical overview of environmentalism and the population debate, a 
cycle was uncovered that dates back at least as far as the time of Malthus in the 18* 
century. On the one side there are those who feel that population growth is causing 
dangerous and irreparable harm to the environment that will cause great harm to htunans. 
Referred to as neo-Malthusians, they argue (as Malthus did) that we have finally reached 
the limits o f what the environment can handle. To support this argument they point to 
vast amoimt o f environmental damage, which was described in detail in Chapter 3, and 
assign the blame to population growth. Neo-Malthusians fear that any more growth will 
result in such an overloading o f what the environment can handle that great suffering will
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follow. On the other side, it is argued that population is not a concern because 
improvements in technology and its subsequent lowering of per-capita affect on the 
envirorunent will always keep us one step ahead o f the Malthusian checks we are being 
warned about. Some even go as far as saying that not only is population growth not a 
concern, it is actually desirable because it forces us to improve technology and 
continually seek new and better ways to mitigate our impact on the environment. This is 
how the population debate has taken shape, and this is the cycle that is repeated every 
time the issue re-emerges. This cycle is based on a reliance on strictly anthropocentric 
ethics (which is far too narrow of an outlook) and a blind adherence to an antiquated 
growth ethic that originated in times and conditions that no longer persist today and 
should be abandoned.
Once the faulty logic and inadequacies o f the traditional anthropocentric view 
towards population growth were exposed, two steps in the argument remained. First, it 
was demonstrated that the biocentric outlook is the one we should adopt. O f course there 
are many shades o f biocentric thought and the one deemed to be most sound is that of 
eco-humanism; one that includes nonhuman species in our moral community yet does not 
make the mistake of assuming that all species are o f the same inherent moral worth. 
Second, it was demonstrated how further population growth cannot be reconciled with the 
biocentric principles this thesis proposes. Further population growth, while holding 
absolutely no benefit for us (vital or nonvital) is having a visibly harmful affect on other 
life forms that, for a host of reasons, have the right to continued existence and well-being. 
O f course, population is not the only variable that needs to be addressed. Consumption 
and technology should always remain on the forefront o f our envirorunental protection
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agenda as well. Nonetheless, to continue the traditional American ambivalence toward 
population is not in keeping with the biocentric ethics defended in this thesis.
The Biocentric Approach to Policy Formulation 
Just as there is debate surrounding what our future population will be, there is 
much debate over what it should be. Increasingly, though, a growing number of 
Americans are beginning to view further population growth as a significant problem. 
Many are simply growing weary of the increased congestion and lack of solitude, but the 
strongest calls for curtailing population growth come from those who are concerned about 
its affects on the environment. For those who seek to protect the environment on this 
front, any population growth is seen as a problem.
Trying to determine the exact number that our population should be is not the 
purpose o f this thesis, and is really not something that is required of us. Biocentric 
environmental ethics does not require us to forge some sort o f utopian ideal o f what our 
optimum population should be and then seek to attain it. The term "optimum population" 
has been defined by demographer Lindsey Grant "not as the largest number we can get 
away with, but as a target that would help us achieve the greatest human w e l l - b e i n g . "   ̂9 5  
Grant further expands on this definition by describing optimum population to be 
"presumably, some magic point that best reconciles all the different goals related to
^95 Grant, Lindsey. "Reconciling Texas and Berkeley." Elephants in the Volkswagen: 
Facing the Tough Questions About Our Overcrowded Country. Lindsey Grant, 
ed. (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1992) 7.
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demography: full employment and maximum productivity per person, livable housing 
accessible to employment, social equality and reasonable levels of consumption, national 
security, open spaces and the preservation o f resources, clean air and water, leisure, 
education and cultural amenities, and indeed 'liberty and the pursuit o f  h a p p i n e s s ' . "  ^96 
Based on this rather ambiguous definition, it becomes apparent that this is an 
exceptionally difficult question to answer for several reasons. First, not only are there 
many complex variables that must go into such an estimation, this falls back into the very 
same trap caused by a reliance on anthropocentric environmental ethics. If we decide an 
optimum population based on what we believe the environment can sustain at this present 
time, it fails to take into consideration future improvements in technology and 
consumption habits and would therefore be constantly changing, just as the supposed 
maximum number o f people the environment can sustain that neo-Malthusians believe 
exists. In other words, this is essentially the same mentality that lead us to ask “How 
much can we grow?” instead of “Should we grow?” Secondly, serious efforts at 
determining such a number would require input from such a diverse contingency of 
experts from so many fields that reaching any sort o f a meaningful consensus would be 
unlikely. This is the same type o f problems illustrated Chapter 3. With so many diverse 
interests and notions o f the “good life” it would be virtually impossible to reach such a 
consensus, even if we were required to do so. Third, populations fluctuate quite a bit. 
Even if an "optimum population" could be decided upon, there would be no way to keep 
it at that exact number unless strict population control measures were implemented.
196 Ibid, 8.
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While it is important to stabilize the population, it is important to keep in mind that it can 
never be kept stable at a certain number. It will inevitably fluctuate, and therefore we can 
only aspire to keep it stable within a general range. Fourth, such an endeavor requires a 
sort o f  social engineering that most Americans would find repugnant. It is worth stating 
again that it must always be kept in the forefront o f the minds of those who aim to see the 
attainment o f population stabilization that there are always other interests and values to 
be considered when fashioning an effective and realistic approach to addressing any 
problem. Therefore, determining an “optimum population” is an interesting question, but 
population policy should be approached from a different perspective. Instead of trying to 
figure out what we can be or should be, we should just ask ourselves what does the eco­
humanist slant to biocentric ethics require us to do? According to the principles of this 
school o f thought set forth in this thesis, we need not engage in some never-ending 
debate over what our population should be. We need only recognize that we have long 
since reached adequate numbers and that the time to make a more concerted effort at 
stabilizing our population as soon as we can is long overdue. (Ideally it should have been 
done thirty years ago at the time of the Rockefeller Report because by now the population 
would be stabilized. However, that was simply a missed opportimity and although we are 
faced with population momentum, there is still a lot that can be done). Biocentric 
environmental ethics forces us to recognize that we may very well be able to grow more, 
but since that is not in furtherance of any interest o f ours (or at least not o f one that is 
important enough to trump the vital interests o f nonhuman organisms) we should not do 
so. As mentioned earlier, population momentum will inevitably cause the population to 
grow. We simply need to accept that, do as much as we can in the meantime to mitigate
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the effects o f this growth, and engage in a concerted effort to make sure that once this 
momentum ends we achieve stabilization and maintain it. This can easily be done through 
reduction in fertility rates to about 1.5 coupled with immigration rates of around 500,000 
per year will result in a stabilized population o f around 230 million by the year 2050; 170
million less than there would be if present demographic trends were to persist. 197 -phig ig 
a very reasonable objective since it does not call for a drastic reduction in immigration 
and because a fertility rate o f 1.5, as seen by many European nations who have achieved 
this and even lower fertility rates, is certainly attainable.
Policy Recommendations 
The question remains about how to get there. Before this is answered, it must be 
understood that any policies aimed at ending population growth should be guided by two 
basic parameters. First, immigration will continue. To propose that immigration should 
cease in lieu of efforts to influence fertility rates fails to recognize that policy making 
inherently involves having to take into consideration all o f the interests o f the U.S. One 
should not lose sight o f the big picture and fail to see that population stabilization is not 
the only interest of ours, and not even a paramount one at that. Furthermore, proposing 
the cessation immigration fails to recognize that population growth is a global problem, 
not just one in the U.S. While this thesis focused on U.S. population growth for reasons 
stated in Chapter I, it does not do so under the false presumption that the U.S. can live in
197 McKibben, Bill. Maybe One: A Personal And Environmental Argument fo r  Single- 
Child Families. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 10.
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an isolationist vacuum and forget about problems occurring on the global level. Simply 
put, the U.S. has an interest in stabilizing its population but must realize that ending 
immigration will do absolutely nothing for the global population problem. Secondly 
implementing population policies that aim at influencing fertility rates must do so under 
the auspices that population control must be accomplished by voluntary means. In 1968 
the United Nations Conference on Human Rights stated, "Couples have a basic human 
right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and a 
right to adequate education and information in this respect." Such sentiments are clearly 
prevalent in the United States, so a restrictive population policy such as the one in China 
for the U.S. would be undesirable and, above all else, uimecessary. The fact remains that 
it is a very important aspect o f the private lives o f  individuals that the government, and 
society at large, must respect. Unfortunately many people mistakenly think that any 
attempts to influence population through a reduction in fertility rates requires involuntary 
coercion, and the widely publicized policies o f  India and China have exacerbated this 
misconception. One of the main points of this thesis was to show that population can be 
stabilized with long term planning and foresight without resorting to population control. 
Now more than ever population growth can be stabilized without resorting to intrusive 
and isolationist means. Although this chapter does not provide the definitive answer, it 
provides insight into how a developed nation like the U.S. can use its knowledge to 
develop a long-term comprehensive plan and offers four basic recommendations. 
Interestingly, it does not require that we do many things that we are not already doing- 
only that we do more of it.
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A concerted effort at increasing education on population growth is a good starting 
point, since education plays an important role in developing and understanding of the 
causes and consequences o f population growth. This is vital in developed nations like the 
U.S. where fertility rates are determined largely by choice instead o f as a matter of 
survival or natural fertility since the transition from a rural agricultural society to a 
modem urban society has been made and where there is a strong grasp on health. As the 
Rockefeller Foundation recommended, there should be the enactment of a Population 
Education Act to assist school systems in establishing well-planned population education 
programs so that present and future generations will be better prepared to meet the
challenge arising from population c h a n g e . ^98 Jq  implement such a program, federal 
funds could be appropriated for teacher training, for curriculum development, for research 
and evaluation, and for assisting state departments o f education to develop competence 
and leadership in population e d u c a t i o n .  ^99 Education in this maimer would be much 
more effective and acceptable in this society than a more direct propaganda campaign 
used in other nations attempting to influence their fertility rates.
Along the same lines, the U.S. should create a government agency (or at least 
fund a major government study) aimed at preparing the U.S. for population stabilization. 
Part o f the reason why many avoid the topic of population is apprehension of some 
perceived negative consequences o f a stabilized or shrinking population. This would 
include such things as making any appropriate changes in the economic system to
198 The Report o f the Commission on Population Growth and The American Future.
"Population and the American Future." 1972., 141.
199 Ibid.
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accommodate for a population that is no longer growing or is slowing decreasing. This 
would ease fears that and end to population growth will necessarily damage the health o f 
the economy. Such a project should also study and create ways to accommodate various 
demographic changes such as changes in the age structure.
A necessary precondition for lowering fertility is adequate family planning 
services, and the U.S. is clearly not succeeding in this area. In 1995, only sixty-four 
percent o f women between the ages o f fifteen to forty-four were practicing 
contraception.200 As a result, over half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintentional
(with only about half o f those ending in abortionj.^Ol Despite all o f these unintended 
pregnancies. Title X spending has fallen by more than seventy percent between 1980 and 
1992 and has not been reauthorized by Congress since 1984.^02 go clearly there needs to 
be more of an effort to expand access to family planning, education, and related 
reproductive health services, particularly for at-risk individuals. This can be done in 
several ways. The first step in doing this for states to adopt affirmative legislation that 
will permit minors to receive contraceptive information and services regardless o f 
parental consent. Secondly, the U.S. should make it mandatory that costs of
200 piccinino, Linda and Mosher, William. "Trends in Contraceptive Use: 1982-1995."
Family Planning Perspectives. Vol 30, No.I. Jan/Feb 1998: pp. 4-12.
201 Henshaw, Stanley K. "Unintended Pregnancies in the U.S." Family Planning
Perspectives. Vol 30, No.l Jan/Feb 1998: pp. 24-30.
202 President's Council on Sustainable Development. "Sustainable America: A New 
Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the 
Future." (Government Printing Office, 1996), Chapter 6:"US Population and 
Sustainability."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
contraceptives are covered by health insurance coverage. Not only should this include 
the traditional methods, but also the more permanent ones such as sterilization that is 
typically rather expensive and considered elective and therefore not covered. 
Sterilization is by far the most effective technique, but not the most well received because 
o f its cost and permanence. If it could be made more cost effective (like being covered 
by insurance companies) and perhaps even less permanent (i.e., reversible), then it would 
be far more utilized and, considering the reproductive life span last well beyond the last
planned pregnancy, unintentional pregnancies would d e c r e a s e . 2 0 3  Third, the U.S. should 
increase funding and make a more concerted effort in the continual development and 
improvement o f family planning services and methods to make them as effective, 
inexpensive, and accessible as possible to all people regardless of age, economic 
standing, or geographic location.
The U.S. also has to ask whether it is taking full advantage of the contraceptive 
affects o f education and socioeconomic status, especially among women. Poverty and the 
lack o f economic, educational, social, and political opportunities are important influences 
on early and unintended c h i l d b e a r i n g . 2 0 4  Almost two-thirds o f the adult poor are women 
and more than half o f all poor families are headed by a single mother. These factors 
demonstrate the need to deal with broad social conditions such as poverty that contribute 
to unintended pregnancy and, in turn, to the relatively high rates o f adolescent pregnancy
203 Bumpass, Larry L. "The Risk of an Unwanted Birth: The Changing Context o f
Contraceptive Sterilization in the U.S." Population Studies, 41(1987), pp. 347- 
363.
204 Ibid.
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and population growth compared with other industrialized c o u n t r i e s . 2 0 5  People who feel 
that population growth can only be addressed by coercive measures should first look at 
the economic and educational differentials that exist in the U.S. With such 
socioeconomic differentials, especially with income and employment opportunity for 
women, it is a wonder why U.S. fertility levels are as low as they are. Many think that 
the U.S., being the most developed nation in the world, has already maximized the 
contraceptive effects o f development and therefore assume that a TFR o f 2.1 is as low as 
it can be without getting coercive. However, such thinking fails to recognize the many 
pockets o f American society where the fertility rate is much higher than the national 
average, and often these pockets are created out o f a lack of education or economic 
opportunity. In conclusion, for almost all of the history of the human population, 
growth was dictated by extemal forces such as health. As health has become more 
controllable, population growth stems from fertility rates which, taking into consideration 
the various cultural and socioeconomic conditions in which they are foimd, stem mostly 
from personal choice. As long as there is an adequate level of health and a sufficient 
amount o f family plarming services, fertility rates are determined mainly the economic, 
educational, and cultural conditions found in a given society. Any efforts on the part o f a 
society to influence fertility rates should be preceded by an assessment of these 
conditions in order to come to an enlightened decision as to the most effective and 
justified pathways for doing so.
205 Ibid.
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